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RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE DEFAULT AND THE
CONSTRAINTS OF JUNIOR LIENS
R. Wilson Freyermuth* and Dale A. Whitman"
I. INTRODUCTION
When a residential mortgage borrower becomes delinquent in payments
and is unable to cure the default, there are two general courses of action
available to the loan's servicer.' First, the servicer may agree with the
borrower on a "workout"-usually in the form of a modification of the loan
to reduce the monthly payments, grant a moratorium on some payments,
change the interest rate or maturity date, or otherwise make it easier for the
borrower to cure the delinquency and return the loan to performing status.2
Second, the servicer may determine that a workout is not feasible,3 or that
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' Because most residential mortgage loans are either sold on the secondary market or securitized, the
original mortgage lender is rarely the party with whom the borrower must deal when a default occurs.
Secondary market purchasers and securitizers nearly always contract with mortgage servicers, who act as
agents for loan holders in relationships with borrowers. The servicers' duties include receiving and
accounting for loan payments, changing payment amounts as necessary for adjustable rate loans,
maintaining escrow accounts for property taxes and casualty insurance premiums, making the actual
payments for taxes and insurance when due, making collection efforts if the borrower defaults, negotiating
"workouts" or loan modifications if feasible, and foreclosing the mortgage or otherwise liquidating the
property or obtaining title for the loan's holder. See Making Payments to Your Mortgage Service, FED.
TRADE COMM'N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0190-making-payments-your-mortgage-servicer
(last updated June 2010); see also Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. REG.
1 (2011). Because the role of mortgage servicers is so pervasive, this Article will generally use the term
"servicer" when referring to the party representing the loan's holder.
2 See BAXTER DUNAWAY, LAW OF DISTRESSED REAL ESTATE § 4:5 (2017); Larry Cordell, Karen
Dynan, Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang & Eileen Mauskopf, Designing Loan Mod fications to Address the
Mortgage Crisis and the Making Home Affordable Program, 42 UCC L.J. 1 (2009).
' See Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why Don't Lenders Renegotiate More
Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures and Securitization, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. (July 2009),
https://www.ihfa.gov/PolicyProgramsResearch/ResearchlPaperDoctuments/WHY-DONT-LENDERS-
RENEGOTIATE-MORE-HOME-MORTGAGESN508.pdf, Diane E. Thompson, Why Servicers
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one has already been tried and failed. Now the servicer's objective is to
foreclose the mortgage or otherwise arrange a transfer of title to the real estate
to the holder of the loan, or to approve a "short sale"' that will liquidate the
property and return to the holder an acceptable sum as a payment of the loan.
Whichever course the servicer follows, the existence of subordinate liens
on the property can have a drastic impact in inhibiting the servicer's actions.
We explain below why existing legal rules make this so. These inhibitions
are generally detrimental to borrowers, because they limit the servicer's
flexibility in making potentially attractive arrangements with borrowers.
There is an irony in this, at least when the junior lien in question is a
mortgage. When the borrower placed thejunior mortgage on the property, its
purpose was to raise cash for desirable purposes-to pay for goods or
services needed or wanted by the borrower. But when the first mortgage loan
is in default, the very presence of a junior mortgage may tie the servicer's
hands in trying to make a mutually beneficial deal with the defaulting
borrower.
Our purpose in this Article is to show how and why junior liens impose
these constraints on the process of resolving residential mortgage loan
defaults, and to suggest some changes in the law that can restore a measure
of desirable flexibility for borrowers and servicers in negotiating default
resolutions. At the same time, these suggestions take into account, as they
must, the need for fairness in respecting the legitimate rights of junior
lienholders.
In Part II, we provide some important background on American mortgage
law and the ways in which the structure of American law has favored and
facilitated the creation of junior lien financing on residential real estate.' In
Part III, we describe the standard techniques open to a servicer when faced
with an uncured default by a borrower-either in the case where the servicer
seeks to save the loan and keep the borrower in the house,6 or where the
servicer instead determines that the loan cannot be saved, and that foreclosure
or one of its alternatives is necessary.' In Part IV, we explain how the
Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles ofServicer Behavior, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR.
v-viii, 1-3 (Oct. 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdlpr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf
4 A "short sale" involves an agreement whereby the mortgagor sells the mortgaged property for an
amount that is below (or "short") ofthe outstanding balance ofthe mortgage debt, but where the mortgagee
nonetheless releases the mortgage lien so that the buyer will receive marketable title. See Philip J. Vacco,
Surviving a Short Sale: Guidelines for a Rewarding Short Sale Experience, 27 PRoB. & PROP. MAG.,
Mar.-Apr. 2013, at 40; Calvin Zhan& A Shortage of Short Sales: Explaining the Under-Utilization of a
Foreclosure Alternative 7 (Apr. 2, 2018), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=3050600.
' See infra notes 12-73 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 74-117 and accompanying text
7 See infra notes 118-58 and accompanying text.
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presence ofjunior liens can inhibit or needlessly complicate the use of these
techniques, particularly where the servicer wants to use a deed in lieu of
foreclosure or a short sale to avoid the time and expense delays attendant to
foreclosure.8 In Part V, we describe and consider the benefits of the Model
Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure Act, recently promulgated by the
Uniform Law Commission (ULC). This Act, which borrows from the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9's strict foreclosure process,
seeks to mitigate some of the inefficiencies imposed by junior liens by
permitting a deed in lieu of foreclosure that would have the title-clearing
benefits that a lender could obtain only through foreclosure under current
law.9 Finally, in Part VI, we compare mortgage law's treatment ofjunior liens
with their corresponding status under Article 9,10 and offer our observations
with respect to whether other Article 9-inspired reforms may be useful to
address some or all of the problems posed by junior liens."
II. How AMERICAN LAW FAVORS JUNIOR FINANCING
In several ways, the American legal system favors and facilitates the
creation ofjunior lien financing on residential real estate. We consider below
whether this is desirable, but begin by outlining the ways current law
implements this favoritism.
We start with the premise that senior lenders strongly dislike the creation
ofjunior financing, and will usually prohibit or restrict it if they can. 2 There
are several reasons for this antipathy, some obvious and some more subtle.
Perhaps the most evident reason is thatjunior mortgage financing represents
an additional cash flow burden for residential borrowers, increasing their
potential financial stress and escalating the probability of a default in
payment of the senior mortgage." Of course, second mortgage debt is not the
only way this can occur; households can also take on auto loans, education
debt, or any other form of consumer debt, secured or unsecured. Nonetheless,
second mortgage debt is a clear harbinger of increased risk of default, and
one that first mortgage lenders would generally like to avoid if they can.
'See infra notes 159-83 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 184-246 and accompanying text.
to See infra notes 247-56 and accompanying text.
See infia notes 257-303 and accompanying text.
12 See Joshua Stein, Subordinate Mortgage Financing: The Perils of the Senior Lender, 27 REAL EST.
REv. Fall 1997, at 3.
11 Andrew Leventis, The Relationship Between Second Liens, First Mortgage Outcomes, and
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Second mortgage debt has a further negative impact that other types of debt
do not; it decreases the borrower's equity in the property, giving the borrower
less to protect and less to lose in a subsequent foreclosure." Thus, the
borrower's incentive to avoid default on the first mortgage is weakened by
junior mortgage financing.
In addition, the creation ofjunior mortgage debt deprives a first mortgage
lender of significant control of the property.15 For example, the junior lender
may put the borrower into bankruptcy or may foreclose its mortgage, with
the result that the property's title may pass into the hands of a person regarded
by the first mortgage lender as an undesirable risk. Further, as we will see
below," the presence of a junior lien vastly complicates the process of first
mortgage loan modification or workout, as well as the taking of a deed in lieu
of foreclosure or the approval of a short sale. It is easy to see why first
mortgage lenders dislike subordinate financing.
A. Due-on-encumbrance Clauses and the Garn Act
Suppose a first mortgage lender is determined to discourage or prohibit
junior financing on the property. What tools are available to do so?
Traditionally, lenders have turned to the "due-on-encumbrance" clause for
this purpose." Such a clause provides, in essence, that if the borrower
imposes further mortgages or other liens on the property without the first
lender's consent, the first lender may accelerate the debt, declaring it due and
payable in full, and may foreclose if payment is not made.' 8 Due-on-
encumbrance clauses are usually combined with "due-on-sale" clauses that
permit acceleration of the senior debt if the borrower transfers the property
without lender approval. Indeed, the same language can often be easily read
to allow acceleration for either reason-a transfer of title or the imposition
of ajunior lien. Here is a typical example:
If all or any part of the Property or any interest in it is sold or
transferred ... without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may require
14 Id.
sSee id at 4.
6 See infra notes 159-3 and accompanying text.
" Alternatively, the lender might simply cause the borrower to covenant not to impose any additional
liens on the property; a violation of such a clause would constitute a default under the mortgage. See, e.g.,
RCH Mortg. Fund IV, LLC v. Byrd, LLC, No. A12-1379,2013 WL 1788528, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
29, 2013) (enforcing such a clause). Clauses of this type are sometimes used in commercial mortgages,
but virtually never in residential mortgages.
" See id
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immediate payment in full of all sumns secured by this Security Instrument.' 9
Without doubt, the creation of a junior lien comprises a "transfer" of an
"interest" in the property.2 0 This language, standing alone, thus functions
equally well both as a due-on-sale and a due-on-encumbrance clause. On its
face, the clause gives the first lender full control over whether the borrower
can place junior financing on the property.
However, this analysis is too simple. To understand why, one must have
some appreciation for the controversy that surrounded due-on-sale and due-
on-encumbrance clauses in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As a consequence
of national economic conditions-and in some part a reaction (or
overreaction) to the Federal Reserve Board's monetary policies in the early
1970S21-interest rates during the late 1970s rose to unprecedented high
levels. 2 This placed mortgage lenders, and particularly depository financial
institutions, at a great disadvantage; their costs of funds borrowed from their
depositors increased drastically, while the average interest yield on their
portfolios-consisting almost entirely of fixed-rate mortgage loans-grew
only slowly. By 1980, many of them were operating their mortgage lending
programs at a loss, with their costs of funds exceeding their mortgage
23portfolio earnings.
To try to forestall this result, virtually all mortgage lenders were using
due-on-sale clauses by this period.24 If these clauses had been fully
" Security Instruments, FREDDIE MAC, http//www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html (last
visited Aug. 5,2018) (Clause 18 of the uniform mortgage instrument of each state contains this language).
a See, e.g., Bank Midwest v. Lipetzky, 674 N.W.2d 176, 179-81 (Minn. 2004) (creation of security
interest in installment land contract triggered prohibition on transfer); Phillips v. Phillips, No. A13-0699,
2014 WL 902683, at *34 (Minn. CL. App. Mar. 10, 2014) (creation of security interest was a transfer of
an interest in personal property); Egbert v. Freedom Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 440 N.E.2d 22, 25 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1982) (creation of junior mortgage was within clause covering "any change in . . . the
[m]ortgagor's present legal ... title or interest"). Cf City of Chicago v. Elm State Prop. LLC, 69 N.E.3d
390,402 (Ill. App. Ct 2016) (mortgage was not a transfer of a "beneficial interest" for purposes of transfer
tax statute).
21 Many have argued that the extreme inflation seen during this period was a result of policy errors
by the Federal Reserve Board. See, e.g., Fabrice Collard & Harris Dellas, The Great Inflation ofthe 1970s
(Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Int'l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 799, 2004),
https//www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2004/799/ifdp799.pdf; John Keefe, What Causes hnflation?
Lessons from the 1970s, Vol. 3, CBS NEWS: MONEYWATCH (May 22, 2009),
http/www.cbsnews.com/news/what-causes-inflation-lessons-from-the-1970s-vol-3/.
2 The Freddie Mac index of 30-year fixed-rate mortgage interest rates rose above 10/o in November
1978 and did not fall below 10% again until April 1986. The index peaked in October 1981 at 18.45%.
See Average 30 Year Fixed Mortgage Rates, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY,
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.con/dataf30-year-mortgage-rates.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2019).
1 See R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. & Andrew S. Carron, Thrill Industry Crisis: Causes and Solutions, 2
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. AcnvrrY 349,349,351, 354 (1987).
2 One of the authors began practicing real estate law in Los Angeles in 1967, shortly after the first
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enforceable, the lenders would have been able to accelerate their loans and
demand payoff when borrowers sold their houses, or would have been able
to exact "assumption fees" or interest rate increases in return for agreeing not
to accelerate. 25 Few mortgage loans during this period carried adjustable
rates, but lenders viewed the due-on-sale clause as a sort of poor man's
adjustable rate clause, albeit with a rate that could be adjusted only when the
borrower sold the property rather than on a prearranged schedule.26 It was not
a perfect solution for institutional lenders, but it was far better than having
no power at all to adjust rates upward toward current market levels on loans
held in portfolio.
Unfortunately for these lenders, borrowers in a number of states
successfully sued to stop these upward rate adjustments.27 The suits were
usually based on the theory that the due-on-sale clause discouraged the sale
of the property and hence was an unreasonable restraint on alienation.28
Plaintiffs generally conceded that it would be permissible for the lender to
accelerate the loan if the proposed transferee of the property had poor credit,
but argued that a lender should not be allowed to assert the clause for the
purpose of raising the interest rate on the loan. 29 Decisions in about a dozen
states agreeing with this view had appeared by the early 1980s.10 Depository
mortgage lenders were extremely frustrated by this development, and they
aggressively pressured Congress for a federal solution to their problem.
Congress finally responded by adopting Section 341 of the Garn-St.
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn Act). 3 ' This section's
uptick in mortgage interest rates of the postwar period. The rise in rates was a frequent topic of discussion
among real estate lawyers and lenders, and it prompted many lenders to begin using due-on-sale clauses
for the first time. The clause gained popularity during the late 1960s, and was incorporated in the original
Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage form, published in 1972. Fannie Mae subsequently adopted the
clause as well, and the 1975 version published by both entities included it. Since that time, the clause has
been well-nigh universally found in residential mortgages. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. REV.
1077, 1085 (2007).
2 See I GRANT S. NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHART & R. WILSON FREYERMUTH,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5:21 (6th ed. 2014); Richard J. Hayden, The "Due-On-Sale" Clause in
Washington after De La Cuesta and Garn. Has Washington Been Left a Loan?, 20 GoNz. L. REV. 511,
514 (1985); Samuel J. Wilner, Due on Sale and Due on Encumbrance Clauses in California, 7 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 306, 306-07 (1974).
a See Wellenkamp v. Bank of Am., 582 P.2d 970 (Cal. 1978).
" See Hayden, supra note 25, at 529-38; Wilner, supra note 25, at 311-13.
n See Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d 970; see also Hayden, supra note 25, at 548-50; Wilner, supra note 25,
at 308-13.
29 See Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d 970; see also Hayden, supra note 25, at 528-30; Wilner, supra note 25,
at 311-13.
' Perhaps the most famous (or infamous) decision was Wellenkamp, 582 P.2d 970.
31 12 U.S.C. § 1701j--3 (2018). See NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25,
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core was language approving the lenders' power to enforce their due-on-sale
clauses, even when enforcement was for the purpose of increasing the interest
yield on a loan.32 This language was preemptive of any contrary state law.33
It thus provided the relief from the adverse court decisions that the lending
community had sought-although by this time rates had begun to subside and
much damage had already been done to the industry. 4 While it is by no
means certain that fully enforceable due-on-sale clauses during the steep rise
in interest rates would have "saved" the savings and loan industry, they
would clearly have mitigated the industry's losses to a significant extent.
Prior to the Garn Act's preemption of state limitations on due-on-sale
clauses, the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage form's
version of the due-on-sale clause contained eight exemptions-that is, it
listed eight situations in which the holder of the mortgage was not authorized
to accelerate the loan." Most of these situations involved involuntary or
intra-family transfers, such as transfers at death or divorce, transfers to the
owner's spouse or children, and short-term leases.3 ' These exemptions were
evidently created as a matter of fairness to borrowers who, it was thought,
should not be subject to mortgage acceleration because they divorced, made
gifts of the property to their children, or made other transfers that were not
outright sales.3 ' For our purposes, the exemption of greatest interest was the
first one listed in the form, which provided that the lender could not
accelerate the loan on account of "the creation of a lien or other
encumbrances subordinate to the lender's security instrument which does not
relate to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property."" When Congress
§§ 5:21-:26; John C. Murray, Enforceability ofMortgage Due-On-Sale Clauses - An Update, AM. BAR
ASS'N (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/rpteereport/2015/2-
March/enforceabilityof mortgage.authcheckdam.pdf.
32 See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2018); NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMuTH, supra note 25,
§ 5:24, at 339-40.
3 The Gain Act's provisions apply "[n]otwithstanding any provision of the constitution or laws
(including thejudicial decisions) of any State to the contrary." 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(b)(1) (2018).
' Of the approximately 4,700 savings and loan associations existing in 1979, about 1,500 had been
closed or merged due to insolvency by 1983. See David L. Mason, Savings and Loan Industry (U.S.),
ECON. HIST. ASS'N (Feb. 1, 2010),
https://web.archive.org/web/20131020002106/http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/mason.savings.loan.indu
stry.us; see also FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. & NAT'L CREDIT UNION
ADMIN. BD., A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE, S. Pet 98-65, at 328 (1st Sess.
1983) (recounting the effects of the extremely high interest rates during this period).
" See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2018).
3 See generally id.
3 See generally id.
- Id § 1701j-3(d)(1). It might be thought that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac placed lenders in an odd
position with this language. A first mortgage lender might strictly prohibit a borrower from imposing a
second mortgage on his or her property at the time they obtain the first mortgage loan, but that same first
2019] 213
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passed the Garn Act, it incorporated these exemptions virtually verbatim into
the statute." Because the Act preempted conflicting state law, its effect was
to deprive first mortgage lenders of any power to control borrowers who
wished to place junior mortgage financing on their property. Those in the
second mortgage lending business must have been pleased indeed that their
customers would not need to get their first mortgage lenders' consent to
impose second mortgages on their properties.
However, commercial mortgage lenders deeply objected to this state of
affairs.0 They were accustomed to imposing detailed, highly restrictive due-
on-encumbrance clauses on their borrowers. Now they found that such
clauses had been made unenforceable by federal law, and they complained
vigorously to Congress. As a result of their lobbying efforts, the Gan Act
was amended by Section 473 of the Urban Rural Recovery Act of 1983 so
that the list of exempt situations applied only "in the case of real property
loans secured by liens on residential property containing less than five (5)
dwelling units."' The result was that commercial lenders could enforce due-
on-encumbrance clauses on their borrowers, but residential lenders could not
and still cannot. 42 Thus, the Garn Act has been highly advantageous to home
equity line of credit (HELOC) and other residential second mortgage lenders,
eliminating what would otherwise have been a major roadblock to their
business models. It has been correspondingly detrimental to residential first
mortgage lenders, because it gives every homeowner the option to take an
action that may materially increase the risk of default on his or her first
mortgage.4 3
mortgage lender would have no control at all over the placing of a second mortgage a week or a month
later.
3 See id
4 NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 5:24, at 344-45.
41 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (2018).
4 See Blitz v. Marino, 786 P.2d 490,492 (Colo. Ct App. 1989) (because by the terms ofthe mortgage
the creation of ajunior lien was excluded from the operation of the due-on-sale clause, the foreclosure of
ajunior lien would likewise not trigger the clause); In re Ruepp, 321 S.E.2d 517, 519 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding the same). Oddly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac then revised their uniform mortgage instruments
to remove the detailed list of exempt situations; instead, the current form simply incorporates the language
of the statute, providing, "However, this option [acceleration] shall not be exercised by Lender if such
exercise is prohibited by Applicable Law." Security Instruments, FREDDIE MAC,
httpJ/www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.htnl (last visited Aug. 5, 2018) (Clause 19 of the
uniform mortgage instrument of each state contains this language).
"' See Leventis, supra note 13, at 3-4; Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Second Liens and the
Leverage Option, 68 VAND. L. REv. 1243, 1282 (2015).
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B. Future Advances and Future Advance Priority
A second way in which junior mortgage holders may or may not have the
protection of the legal system lies in the system's treatment of future
advances by senior lenders. If a first mortgage lender can make a further
advance on its loan, and if that advance will have the priority of the original
mortgage, the impact on a junior lienholder could obviously be devastating.
A junior lienholder who had made a loan that it expected to be secured by the
mortgagor's equity in the home-the home's value over the senior mortgage
debt--could see that equity disappear if the senior lender could readily "soak
up" the excess value through future advances to the mortgagor.
Under the common law, whether a future advance will retain the original
mortgage's priority depends on whether the advance is obligatory, meaning
that the mortgagee has a contractual duty to make it," or optional. If the
mortgagee is contractually obligated to make the advance in question, it will
be senior to any intervening lien, i.e., the mortgagee will have the same
priority for the future advance as it did for the original advance. On the other
hand, if the future advance is optional, meaning that the mortgagor has no
contractual right to demand it, and if the mortgagee has notice of an
intervening lien at the time the advance is made, the priority for the advance
will date only from the time of the advance. Thus, that advance will lose
priority to the intervening lien.45
The purpose of this seemingly bizarre rule is not to benefit second
mortgage lenders by giving them an unexpected promotion in priority,
although it obviously can have that effect in some cases. Rather, its objective
is to help the borrower by avoiding a situation in which he or she is unable to
obtain further secured financing from any source.' In theory, if the
mortgagor cannot convince the first mortgagee to make additional advances
and has no legal right to demand them, the rule enables the borrower to
approach a second mortgagee, explain the situation, and borrow additional
funds. The junior lender would, it is presumed, be entirely willing to lend;
the optional advance rule would supposedly assure the junior that its security
position would not be impaired by any subsequent advances by the senior
" See, e.g., In re Qualstan Corp., 302 B.R. 575 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2003) (where there was no
contractual duty on part of mortgagee to make advance, advance was optional and lost priority).
5 See generally Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Behun, 140 A.3d 547 (NJ. 2016) (holding that the
common law rule was incorporated in statute in New Jersey, and declining to abrogate it despite
recognition of its critics); NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 12:7. The
rule seems to have originated with Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H. of L. 514 (1861). See Gerald L. Blackburn,
Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, 21 MO. L. REV. 209,209-11 (1956).
4 See Blackburn, supra note 45, at 209-10.
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lender. Thus, the purpose of the rule is to protect the mortgagor's ability to
obtain credit, and in this way, it facilitates the market for junior mortgage
lending.47
Unfortunately, the common law rule has proved to be spectacularly
confusing in practice. Its application is fraught with problems." There has
been seemingly endless litigation about applying the distinction between
optional and obligatory advances, particularly in the context of construction
lending.49 More litigation has arisen over the sort of knowledge or notice on
the part of the senior lender that is sufficient to cause a loss of priority for the
advance. Is actual knowledge required or is constructive notice from the
public records enough?"o If the intervening lien was a mechanic's lien, what
sort of knowledge about the lien would result in loss of priority?" Indeed,
' See LaCholla Grp., Inc. v. Timm, 844 P.2d 657,659-60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); NELSON, WHITMAN,
BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 12:7, at 1096. The rule is not limited to situations involving
junior mortgages; it has also been applied, perhaps illogically, to mechanic's liens, see Shaw Acquisition
Co. v. Bank of Elk River, 639 N.W.2d 873 (Minn. 2002), to judgment liens, and to a trustee in bankruptcy
under the "strong-arm" powers, see In re Stanton, 285 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2002) (Washington law).
" For detailed discussion and criticism of the common law, see Robert Kratovil & Raymond J.
Werner, Mortgages for Construction and the Lien Priorities Problem- The "Unobligatory" Advance, 41
TENN. L. REV. 311, 321-22 (1974); Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Rethinking Future Advance
Mortgages: A Brieffor the Restatement Approach, 44 DUKE L.J. 657, 668--84 (1995) (discussing the
common law response); Larry Skipworth, Should Construction Lenders Lose Out on Voluntary Advances
Ifa Loan Turns Sour?, 5 REAL EST. L.J. 221 (1977); Craig D. Tindall, The Obligatory Advance Rule in
the Construction Lending Context, 12 CONSTR. LAW. 13 (1992).
4 Compare Nat'l Bank v. Equity Inv'rs, 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973) (conditions in construction loan
agreement made advances optional, resulting in loss ofpriority), with Dempsey v. McGowan, 722 S.W.2d
848 (Ark. 1987) (similar conditions did not make advances optional); compare J. 1. Kislak Mortg. Corp.
v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972), affd 303 A.2d 648 (Del. 1973)
(where construction loan agreement required borrower to submit certain documentation to support each
draw on construction loan, and lender made advances without obtaining such documentation, advances
were optional and lost priority), with Home Lumber Co. v. Kopfinan Homes, Inc., 535 N.W.2d 302 (Minn.
1995) (waiver of conditions by construction lender did not make advances optional).
`0 Requiring actual knowledge: see Mobley v. Brundidge Banking Co., 347 So.2d 1347 (Ala. 1977);
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Wells, 596 P.2d 429 (Idaho 1979); Hous. Mortg. Corp. v. Allied Constr., Inc.,
97 A.2d 802 (Pa. 1953); McMillen Feed Mills, Inc. v. Mayer, 220 S.E.2d 221 (S.C. 1975); Bank of
Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538 (Utah 1977); Union Nat'l Bank v. First State Bank, 697 S.W.2d 940 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1985); Central Pa. Say. Ass'n v. Carpenters of Pa., 444 A.2d 755 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); Home
Fed. Bank, FSB v. First Nat'l Bank, 110 S.W.3d 433,439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (based on TENN. CODE
ANN. § 47-28--103(c) (2018)); First Interstate Bank v. Heritage Bank, 480 N.W.2d 555 (Wis. Ct. App.
1992). Finding constructive notice sufficient to deny priority. see Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Benun,
140 A.3d 547 (N.J. 2016); People's Say. Bank v. Champlin Lumber Co., 258 A.2d 82 (R-i. 1969);
Briarwood Towers 85th Co. v. Guterman, 523 N.Y.S.2d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) ("actual or constructive
notice"); Tyler v. Butcher, 734 P.2d 1382 (Or. Ct. App. 1987). Several states, by statute, have defined
notice in this context to include only notice sent to the senior lender in writing; see, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 9-
B, § 436(l)(B) (2018); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-238.01(3)(bXii) (2018); OHIo REV. CODE § 5301.232(B)
(2018), applied in Kent v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, 764 N.E2d 480 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, § 410(bX3XB) (2018), applied in Daniels v. Elks Club of Hartford, 58 A.3d 925 (2012).
` See, e.g., Grider v. Mut. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 565 S.W.2d 647 (Ky. Ct App. 1978) (knowledge
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since the purpose of the doctrine is to facilitate junior mortgage borrowing,
should it even apply to mechanics liens? In sum, there is sufficient
uncertainty about how and when the common law rule is to be applied that
only the rare junior lender would be willing to rely upon it.
The common law rule continues to be in effect without change in about
one-third of the states,52 but there has been widespread recognition that it is
ineffective for its intended purposes" and that tinkering with the definitions
of "obligatory" and "notice" are not adequate solutions. Numerous state
legislatures have adopted replacements for the common law. Mostly adopted
in the 1980s and 1990s, these replacements generally follow one of two basic
models.
The first is based on an ingenious statute adopted in Missouri in 1981.1
Its purpose is the same as the common law rule: to create an environment in
which a borrower can obtain secondary financing despite the presence of a
future advance clause in the first mortgage. This type of legislation, which
now exists in at least fifteen states, achieves its objective through adoption of
the concept of the "cutoff notice." " Under these statutes, all future advances,
whether obligatory or optional, take the priority of the original mortgage and
are senior to any intervening liens up to some maximum amount, which must
be stated in the mortgage." However, in order to facilitate the borrower's
obtaining ofjunior mortgage loans, these statutes permit the borrower to issue
that "the [mortgagor] is unable to pay such claims or that the claimant intends to file a lien"); First Nat'l
Bank v. Worthley, 714 P.2d 1044 (Okia. Civ. App. 1985) (knowledge that subcontractors have not been
paid).
2 See, e.g., Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Benun, 140 A.3d 547,561 (N.J. 2016); Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc. v. Bankfirst, 264 P.3d 1262 (Okla. Civ. App. 2011). See generally NELSON, WHITMAN,
BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 12:7.
sSee supra note 48.
* See Rita C. Edwards, Fun"e Advances in Missouri, 49 Mo. L. REV. 103 (1984).
ss Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055 (2018). See Golden Delta Enters., L.L.C. v. U.S. Bank, 213 S.W.3d
171 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing application ofthe statute). Other statutes adopting this "cutoff notice"
approach, at least for some types of loans, include CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (2018) ("open-end
mortgages"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04 (2018); Ky. REV. STAT. § 382.520 (2018); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
9-B, § 436 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-206 (2017); NEB. REv. STAT. § 76-238.01 (2018); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 106.380(1) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-67 to 45-74 (2017); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5301.232 (2018); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.155 (2018); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8143 (2018)
("open-end mortgages"); 34 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 25-8 to 25-14 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-28-101
to 47-28-110 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-582, -59 (2018).
1 The statutes typically require that the mortgage or loan agreement state a maximum amount that
may be advanced, and limit their protection to that figure. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055(2) (2018)
("[T]he security instrument shall state the face amount.... mhe total principal amount of the obligations
secured at any given time may not exceed the face amount stated in the security instrument"); Id §
443.055(6)(1) ("The total debts so secured after receipt ofsuch notice shall be limited in principal amount
to the amount stated by the lender in its recorded notice, by which statement the lender shall be irrevocably
bound . . . .").
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a notice to the future advance lender that freezes priority advances at their
current level, cutting off the possibility that any further advances could obtain
the same priority as the original loan. The cutoff notice, in effect, ensures that
any further advances will be subordinate to any intervening liens, but only
prospectively. A borrower who has this power to freeze advances has no
need of the optional/obligatory distinction. If the borrower needs additional
financing, cannot get it on satisfactory terms from the existing mortgagee,
and wishes to pursue borrowing opportunities with other lenders, he or she
needs simply to issue a cutoff notice. The mortgagee is thus informed that
no further advances will be secured by the mortgage's original priority; the
future advance provision of the loan is terminated. Other lenders may then
safely take junior mortgages on the property, knowing that no further
advances by the senior lender can eat into the borrower's equity to the
detriment of the junior mortgage.
The drafters of the Mortgages Restatement were attracted to this concept,
and wrote it into the Restatement as if it were a court-made rule." In reality,
when the Restatement was adopted, no courts had adopted its approach
without prior legislation. This remains true today. A few courts have
discussed the Restatement approach with apparent approval, but none have
felt comfortable adopting it in the absence of a supporting statute."
The second model for state legislation on future advances simply
declares that all advances up to some maximum amount stated in the
mortgage will have full priority against intervening liens. At least seventeen
states have such statutes, although some are limited to specific types of
loans." The approach is simpler, of course, but it disregards the borrower's
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 2.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
' See, e.g., Barclays Invs., Inc. v. St Croix Estates, 399 F.3d 570, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding
that the Virgin Islands would adopt the Restatement approach, but that it was inapplicable because the
parties to the mortgage had not agreed that it would secure future advances); Shutze v. Credithrift, Inc.,
607 So. 2d 55, 63 (Miss. 1992) (dictum); Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Benun, 140 A.3d 547, 561 (N.J.
2016) (court could not depart from common law because it had been adopted by statute in New Jersey).
" Some of these statutes are limited to particular types of future advance mortgages, such as open-
end mortgages or construction loans. See ALASKA STAT. § 34-35.060 (2018); CAL. Civ. CODE § 8456
(2018) (advances "used for construction costs"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-3 (2018) (construction
loans only); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 25, § 2118 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.04(2) (2018); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 506-1 (2018); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-1-10 (2018), applied in 'The Money Store Inv. Corp. v.
Summers, 822 N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2336 (2018), construedin Fidelity
Say. Ass'n v. Witt, 665 P.2d 1108 (1983); LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 3298 (2018); MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 7-102 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 565.902 (2018) (apparently applicable to all types of
mortgages), discussed in Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Spot Realty, Inc., 714 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. Ct
App. 2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479:3 (2018) (financial institutions only); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:9-
8.1 to 46:9-8.4 (2018) (inapplicable to construction loans); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-7-9 (2018); N.Y. REAL
PROP. LAW § 281 (2018) ("credit line" mortgage only; inapplicable to construction loans); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 45-70 (2018), applied in Perry v. Carolina Builders Corp., 493 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997);
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ability to obtain junior financing. In this legal environment, the only practical
stance a second mortgage lender can take is to assume that advances up to
the stated maximum might be made by the first lender, and to consider only
the property's value in excess of that maximum as being available to secure
a second mortgage loan. The result is that a very substantial portion of the
borrower's equity in the real estate may go unused for borrowing purposes if
the first lender refuses to make further advances on its security, while
potential second mortgage lenders treat the additional equity as having
already been encumbered by the first lender. These statutes get rid of the
common law's annoying optional/obligatory distinction, but do so at
considerable cost to borrowers who seek additional financing.'
It is difficult to summarize the national picture with respect to the priority
of future advances in a succinct and accurate way simply because many of
the adopted statutory variations apply only to specific types of loans.
Nonetheless, a rough approximation looks something like this. The common
law optional/obligatory rule continues to prevail, unchanged by statute, in
about one-third of the states. In nearly another one-third, future advances are
given priority over intervening liens, but can be "cut off" if the borrower
decides to seek junior financing elsewhere. The Restatement agrees with this
approach. Both of these rules are intended to facilitate the market for
secondary financing although the common law rule, because of its
ambiguities, probably does so ineffectively. In the remaining one-third of the
states, the law gives all future advances priority and provides no method for
the borrower to cut off further advances. This approach disfavors the
borrower's efforts to obtain subordinate financing. Hence, overall legislative
reform efforts have been about equally divided between those that seek to
facilitate second mortgage financing and those that pay no heed to it.
OR. REV. STAT. § 86.155(2) (2018), construed in In re Lane, No. 06-32879-ELP7, 2007 WL 1723502, at
*6 (Bankr. D. Or. June 11, 2007) (statute provides a safe harbor for achieving priority for future advances,
but common law method of obtaining priority remains available); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 44--8-26 (2019)
(applicable only if mortgage refers to statute); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 60.04.226 (2018), overruling
Nat'l Bank v. Equity Inv'rs., 506 P.2d 20 (Wash. 1973), and not requiring a statement of the maximum
amount to be advanced), applied in Pac. Cont'l Bank v. Soundview 90, LLC, 273 P.3d 1009, 1013 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2012); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 706.11(1) (2018) (mortgages to state or national banks), applied in
Marine Bank Appleton v. Hietpas, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 604 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (statute covers, but is not
limited to, construction loans). Texas has no statute, but case law appears to give priority to all advances
if the mortgage contains a future advance and the advances are within the scope of the clause. There seem
to be few modern cases: see F. Groos & Co. v. Chittim, 100 S.W. 1006 (Tex. Ct Civ. App. 1907); Coke
Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 529 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1975).
6 See THOMAS E. BAYNES, JR., FLORIDA MORTGAGES § 5-6 (2016).
2192019]
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW
C. Statutory Redemption and Junior Lien Revival
A third way in which mortgage law favors lending on the security of
junior liens is statutory redemption. Statutory redemption is available only
after foreclosure of a mortgage has been completed, and should not be
confused, although it often is, with equitable redemption.' Every state's
common law recognizes equitable redemption, which is a right held by any
and all parties subordinate to the mortgage being foreclosed, including the
mortgagor and junior lienors.62 If a junior lienor redeems by paying the
balance due on the senior loan, it is subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee
from whom redemption is made. Hence, thejunior lienor exercising equitable
redemption does not obtain title to the real estate, but is entitled to an
assignment by operation of law of the mortgage being redeemed.63 A junior
lienholder who redeems from the senior mortgagee can thereby stop the
foreclosure of the senior lien from taking place, and can regain control of the
situation.
Statutory redemption is completely different. It was not a feature of the
common law, and exists by statute in only about twenty-three states." It is
available only after foreclosure, and only for a statutorily fixed period
(commonly three months to one year). In most states, statutory redemption is
made by paying to the foreclosure sale purchaser the amount that the
purchaser bid at the sale plus interest and, in some states, certain of the
purchaser's out-of-pocket expenses on the property. One who exercises
61 For an in-depth treatment of the distinction between equitable and statutory redemption, see
NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, §§ 7:1-:2.
' Catherine A. Gnatek, Note, The New Mortgage Foreclosure Law: Redemption and Reinstatement,
U. ILL. L. REV. 471,475 (1989).
' See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Bracero & Rivera, Inc., 895 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1990);
Davis v. Cole, 747 N.Y.S.2d 722, 729 (N.Y. Sup. CL 2002); Home & City Say. Bank v. Sperrazza, 612
N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. §
6.4(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
" ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-248,-253 (2018), construed in 600, L.L.C. v. Virani, 88 So. 3d 831 (Ala. 2012)
(foreclosure price, not price obtained by sale purchaser on resale, is the redemption amount); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 09.45.190, .35.250 (2018); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-1282 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-66-502
(2018); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 729.010-.090, 726(e) (2018); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38-38-302 (2018);
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-122 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 628.28, .3 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
2414 (2018); Ky. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 426.220 (2018); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 14, § 6313 (2018); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3140 (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 580.23, .24 (2018); Mo. REV. STAT. §
443.410 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. 1947, § 25-13-802 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-18 (2018);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-18 (2017); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-962 (2018); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §
21-52-1 (2018); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-8-101, -102 (2018); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6--906 (2018);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.23.010, .020 (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-18-103 (2018). See NELSON,
WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, §§ 7:1, 8:4-:7.
6` Depending on the particular statute, these expenses may include property taxes, insurance costs,
and even improvements made to the property prior to the redemption. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-253
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statutory redemption receives the rights of the foreclosure purchaser-in
other words, title to the land itself.' Thus, in effect, the redemptioner is
buying the property back from the foreclosure sale purchaser.67
Who can redeem under these statutes? All of the states that have adopted
them agree that the mortgagor (or a successor owner of the property) can do
so." But in nearly half of the states having statutory redemption, holders of
junior liens can redeem as well.69 The importance of this right of junior
lienors is relatively limited. If the mortgagor (or a successor owner of the real
estate) redeems, the right ofjunior lienors to redeem is generally nullified. In
addition, where there is more than one junior lienor seeking to redeem,
complicated statutory provisions exist to determine which of them will have
priority over the others.7 o Thus, in a practical case the right to redeem may or
(2018) (redemptioner must pay interest, taxes, insurance, and permanent improvements). Minnesota is
among the most thorough of states, requiring the redemptioner to reimburse the purchaser for interest at
6%, property taxes and assessments, hazard insurance premiums, appraisal or valuation fees, attorneys'
fees, payments on superior mortgages, recording fees, and (if the property has been abandoned by the
mortgagor) expenses for installing or changing locks and other costs of protecting the property from
vandalism and the elements. See MINN. STAT. §§ 580.23, 582.03 (2018).
' Illinois is an exception; there, a redeeming junior lienholder is simply entitled to a cancellation of
the foreclosure sale and a revival of the junior lien. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-132 (2018);
Crowder v. Scott State Bank of Bethany, 5 N.E.2d 387, 388 (Ill. 1936); Lamb v. Richards, 43 Ill. 312,
316-17 (1867).
6 See Metcalf v. Phoenix Title & Tr. Co., 261 P. 633, 636 (Ariz. 1927); Annotation, Creditor or
Encumbrancer Redeeming from Mortgage Sale as Acquiring Tide and Rights of Sale Purchaser, 135
A.L.R. 196 (1941).
6 5 TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 1530 (3d ed. 2017).
69 ALA. CODE § 6-5-248 (2018), applied in Ross v. Rogers, 25 So. 3d 1160, 1168-69 (Ala. Ct Civ.
App. 2009); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1281 (2018); COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-38-306 (2018), applied
in WYSE Fin. Serys., Inc. v. Nat'l Real Estate Inv., LLC, 92 P.3d 918,922 (Colo. 2004) (en banC); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 11-402 (2018); IOWA CODE ANN. § 628.8 (2018); KAN. STAT. ANN § 60-2414(c) (2018),
applied in Alliance Mortg. Co. v. Pastine, 104 P.3d 405, 413 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
58014 (2018), applied in TCM Props., LLC v. Gunderson, 720 N.W.2d 344,350-51 (Minn. Ct App.
2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-13-801 (2017), applied in Savoy v. Cascade Cty. Sheriffs Dep't, 887
P.2d 160,165 (Mont 1994); S.D. CODIFED LAws § 21-49-33 (2018), applied in Bank of Am. v. Driggs,
669 N.W.2d 721, 724 (S.D. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 6.23.010 (2018), applied in Capital Inv. Corp. v.
King Cty., 47 P.3d 161, 164-65 (Wash. Ct App. 2002).
1 Two main systems exist The "strict priority" approach allows a fixed time for redemption by the
mortgagor, if that period expires without redemption, each junior lienor, in descending order of priority,
has the right to redeem for a brief period (e.g., five days). If any junior lienor redeems, a lower-priority
lienor (when its turn comes) may redeem by paying the amount bid at the foreclosure sale plus the amount
necessary to buy out the liens of higher-priority lienors who previously redeemed. Under the "scramble"
method, there is no exclusive redemption period for the mortgagor. Rather, redemption may be made by
both the mortgagor and junior lienholders, although if redemption is ever made by the mortgagor, the
redemption period ends. As among the junior lienholders, each may redeem at any time irrespective of
their priority, but any lienor who redeems must pay the amount bid at the sale and in addition must buy
out the amount owed to any other lienor with a higher priority who has already redeemed. For a detailed
explanation with examples, see NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART& FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 8:7.
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may not accrue to a particular lienholder. Nonetheless, in some cases the
privilege of redeeming under the statute may prove to be of considerable
value to a junior lienor-particularly if the successful bid at the foreclosure
sale was substantially below the property's value, so that there is significant
equity in the property that the junior may capture by redeeming.
Holders of junior liens have one additional advantage in the statutory
redemption scheme. There is a considerable body of case law holding that if
the mortgagor or a successor owner of the property exercises the right of
statutory redemption and thereby reacquires the property, thejunior liens will
revive and reattach to the property." The obvious policy behind this rule is
to prevent the mortgagor from unfairly cleansing the property ofjunior liens
by running it through a possibly collusive foreclosure. Whatever one may
think of the merits of the rule,72 it is obviously advantageous to junior
lienholders, giving them a renewed (and probably quite unexpected)
opportunity to collect their debts out of the property.
The right of statutory redemption, unlike the Garn Act and the future
advance rules, is not designed to facilitate the market in origination ofjunior
mortgage loans. Instead, its ostensible purpose is to provide an incentive for
foreclosure purchasers to bid something close to the property's fair value, so
that there will be little or no reason for anyone to redeem the property.
Nonetheless, it can prove highly useful to subordinate lienholders in the right
" See, e.g., Mihoover v. Walker, 164 P. 504, 505 (Colo. 1917); Franklin v. Spencer, 789 P.2d 643,
645 (Or. 1990); Rist v. Andersen, 19 N.W.2d 833, 835 (S.D. 1945); Newman v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 780 P.2d
336,340 (Wyo. 1989); Scott v. Scott, 534 N.E.2d 174, 176 (111. App. Ct 1989); Feldman v. M. J. Assocs.,
324 N.W.2d 496,498 (Mich. Ct App. 1982). At the opposite extreme are states like California, where the
statute expressly provides that the junior liens do not revive. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.080(e) (2018).
Many states also allow revival of junior liens in the analogous situations in which the mortgagor is the
successful bidder at the senior foreclosure sale, or even when the mortgagor buys the property later from
the foreclosure sale purchaser. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 4.9 cmt b (AM. LAW
INST. 1997); NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 8:6 (statutory redemption
by mortgagor). By way of contrast, when a mortgagor engages in equitable redemption of a first mortgage
(i.e., pays it off), the first mortgage is cancelled but any junior liens simply remain attached to the property.
The mortgagor may not, for example, claim to be subrogated to the rights of the first mortgagee and then
re-foreclose the first mortgage to wipe out the juniors, since this would present an obvious case of unjust
enrichment. See id § 6:6.
' See, e.g., Newman, 780 P.2d at 340 ("The potential for a mortgagor to eliminate junior mortgagees
by allowing a foreclosure by the senior mortgagee and then [redeeming from the senior mortgagee] is a
solid basis for such public policy." The Restatement agrees in the analogous situation in which the
mortgagor buys at the foreclosure sale or buys later from the foreclosure purchaser, unless the latter is a
bona fide purchaser. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 4.9 cmt b (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
" The statutes are likely ineffective in achieving this objective. For a thorough analysis and critique
of statutory redemption, see United States v. Stadium Apts., Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 365-73 (9th Cir. 1970)
(particularly the dissent of Judge Ely).
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circumstances, and to some extent makes junior liens more valuable than they
would otherwise be.
III. METHODS OF RESOLVING MORTGAGE DEFAULT
When a residential mortgage servicer is faced with a default that the
borrower is unable or unwilling to cure, there are two general approaches
available to the servicer. The first might be called a "workout" or a "loan
modification," and involves changing the terms of payment in order to
improve the borrower's chances of curing the default and becoming current."4
Several federally sponsored programs have been aimed at encouraging
servicers to pursue this option." The other approach is to terminate the loan
and realize on the security provided by the real estate mortgage, typically (but
not always, as explained below) by mortgage foreclosure." The servicer may
take this approach if the borrower appears to be so financially weak that loan
modification is unlikely to be successful, or is unable to meet the guidelines
of the applicable federal programs. It may also do so if a loan modification
has been tried and failed.
The discussion in Part II focuses on the approaches available to the
servicer with a particular focus on how the presence of one or more junior
liens on the property affects the legal posture of the servicer in pursuing these
approaches. In Part III.A, we deal with various forms and types of loan
modification when the objective is to keep the mortgagor in the home. In Part
' See supra note 2.
* Under the Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), borrowers whose loans are held by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac may be able to refinance at lower interest rates. The program has been
extended through September 2017 at this writing. See Making Homes Affordable: Home Affordable
Modfication Program, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, https/www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/TARP-Programs/housing/mhaPages/hamp.aspx (last updated Jan. 30, 2017, 3:14 PM); see also
About HARP, HOME AFFORDABLE REFINANCE PRoGRAM, https://www.harp.gov/About (last visited Aug.
12,2018). The Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP) provided mortgage modifications, usually
in the form of interest rate reductions or loan term extensions. See MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,
https://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov (last visited Aug. 12,2018). No new applications were accepted
after the end of 2016. The Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program, offered by some
servicers, was designed to facilitate short sales or deeds in lieu of foreclosure by borrowers whose
applications for the HAMP program were rejected. It was likewise terminated at the end of 2016. See
Bank of America Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (HAFA) Matrix, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE, https://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/Documents/HAFA/HAFA-policiesBank-of-
America.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2018), for atypical explanation of eligibility under HAFA. In general,
these programs have been controversial and their results disappointing. See Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank,
673 F.3d 547, 555 (7th Cir. 2012) (there is no private right of action under HAMP); Nelson D. Schwartz,
Some Doubt a Settlement Will End Mortgage Ills, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/business/some-doubt-a-settlement-will-end-mortgage-ills.html.
76 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTO. § 8.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
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III.B, we discuss resolutions of distressed mortgages that result in the
mortgagor's loss of the home, beginning with foreclosure and then discussing
foreclosure alternatives (e.g., deeds in lieu of foreclosure and short sales). In
a later section," we discuss in detail the ways that holders ofjunior liens can
impede the resolution of the mortgage default, but in this section, we simply
address whether and to what extent such liens will acquire priority over the
first mortgage.
A. Resolving Distressed Loans Through Modification
We begin with consensual loan modification," the object of which is to
make it easier for the borrower to comply with the loan's payment terms. The
- See infra Part IV.
78 See generally NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:3. In theory,
federal bankruptcy law could also provide a nonconsensual basis for modification of a home mortgage.
At present, however, the Bankruptcy Code (Code) provides only very limited assistance to the financially
distressed homeowner. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, a borrower whose mortgage is in default can obtain a
discharge of its personal liability on the mortgage debt, thereby obtaining protection against the risk of a
deficiency judgment that the borrower might otherwise face under state law. Id § 8:17, at 804,807. The
mortgage lien itself "rides through" the bankruptcy, however, and remains valid against the property as
an in rem obligation capable of being enforced by the mortgagee through foreclosure once the automatic
stay is no longer in effect. JEFF FERRIELL& EDWARDJ. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY § 13.01,
at 466 (2d ed. 2007) ("[D]ischarge provides debtors with relief from their in personam liability but does
not affect creditors' in rem rights against a debtor's property."). Section 506(d) of the Code invalidates a
lien to the extent it "secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed secured claim." II U.S.C. §
506(d) (2018). Read literally, this would appear to permit a Chapter 7 debtor to obtain principal reduction
if the debt exceeded the value of the mortgaged property-i.e., to "strip-down" the principal amount
secured by the lien to the property's then-current value. A debtor could then redeem the property from the
lien by payment of this reduced principal amount (and thereafter capture the benefit of any post-
bankruptcy appreciation in the value of the home). In Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), however,
the Supreme Court rejected this reading of section 506(d) and held that the mortgagor could not use section
506(d) to strip-down an undersecured mortgage lien. While Dewsnup has been seriously criticized and is
probably wrongly decided, see, e.g., Margaret Howard, Secured Claims in Bankruptcy: An Essay on
Missing the Point, 23 CAP. U.L. REv. 313 (1994), the Court has recently reaffirmed it in Bank ofAm. v.
Caulkett, 135 S. Ct. 1995 (2015), in holding that section 506(d) did not invalidate ajunior mortgage lien
even though the junior lien was entirely unsupported by any equity. Chapters II and 13 of the Code
generally permit a reorganizing debtor to modify secured claims through a plan of reorganization-even
over the objection of the secured creditor-as long as the plan meets the necessary "cram-down" standards
for confirmation of the plan. II U.S.C. §§ l129(bXl), (2XA) (2018) (Chapter I1); id § 1325(aX5)(B)
(Chapter 13). For a mortgage claim, this means that the mortgagor/debtor's plan must pay the mortgagee
an amount which has a present value at least equal to the then-fair market value of the property. Id §§
I 129(bX I), (2XA); id § 1325(a)(5)(B). However, the power to modify a secured claim is not available if
the claim is secured "only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence . . . ." Id § I 123(bX5) (Chapter I1); id § 1322(b)(2) (Chapter 13). This "anti-modification rule"
incentivizes home mortgage lending by protecting home lenders from the risk of principal reduction that
other secured creditors might suffer in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity
Financing, 69 TUL. L. REv. 373, 404-06 (1994). The anti-modification rule prevents the debtor from
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changed terms might include a lower interest rate or a longer loan duration,
either of which will result in lower monthly payments. They might also
include a moratorium on or a reduction of payments for a short period. They
might even involve a reduction of the loan's principal. Principal reductions
may be permanent, or the reduction may be deferred, to be recovered in
subsequent years of the loan. Likewise, accrued but unpaid interest on the
loan, or any deferred interest, may be added to the principal loan balance (or
"capitalized") with the expectation of its recovery by the servicer at the end
of the loan term, or when the loan is paid off."
Of course, if there are existing subordinate mortgages on the property,
the creditor does not want them to achieve priority over the first mortgage as
a consequence of the modification. Fortunately, there are legal doctrines that
provide at least some protection against that risk. We examine them here
under three headings, corresponding to three variations on the loan
modification scenario. The first is a refinancing, in which the same lender
makes a new loan (typically with more lenient payment terms) to pay off the
existing first mortgage.' The second is simply an agreement between
borrower and lender to amend the terms of the promissory note secured by
the existing first mortgage while leaving it in place." The third is a
refinancing by a different lender than the one that made the original loan.'
confirming a plan that would modify the home mortgagee's claim in any respect without the home
mortgagee's consent-unless the mortgagee loses the benefit of the anti-modification rule by taking
additional collateral to secure the-debt See, e.g., NELSON, WHrIMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra
note 25, § 8:18. Under the overwhelming weight of authority, the anti-modification rule also applies to
claims held by junior lienholders such as home equity lenders. See Forrester, supra, at 423-25 (noting
some court decisions critical of this result as inconsistent with the apparent purpose of the rule to facilitate
long-term mortgage financing). However, the rule applies only as long as the junior lien is supported by
any equity. If the home's value is less than the balance due on senior liens, the strong weight of authority
holds that the junior claim is not "secured" and may be "stripped-off" so that it does not survive the
bankruptcy. NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 8:18, at 818, 821
(collecting cases). Thus, bankruptcy may provide a means for the insolvent mortgagor to extinguish fully
underwater junior liens on the mortgagor's home-and thus potentially to benefit from any future market
appreciation that would have redounded to the benefit ofjunior lienholders outside of bankruptcy.
" See Kirk Haverkamp, Loan Modtflcation T)es & Options, Loan Mod 14formation & Plans,
MORTGAGELOAN.COM (Nov. 23, 2009), https://www.mortgageloan.com/mortgage-loan-
modification/types. See also OCC Mortgage Metrics Report, OFFICE OF THE COMPfROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY 9 (Sept. 2016), https://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-
reports/mortgage-metrics/metrics-q2-2016.pdf (Table One). This table, which compiles data on the
volume of mortgage modifications completed on first-lien residential mortgages serviced by seven
national banks (Bank ofAmerica, Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan Chase, PNC, U.S. Bank, and Wells Fargo),
characterize modifications into seven categories: (1) capitalization; (2) rate reduction or freeze; (3) term
extension; (4) principal reductions; (5) principal deferral; (6) combination; or (7) other/not reported.
m See infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
a See infra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
* See infra notes 106-17 and accompanying text
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1. Refinancing and the Replacement Mortgage Doctrine
Refinancing, when done by the same lender who made the original loan,
involves a payoff of the loan and a discharge of the mortgage recorded in the
public records, followed immediately by the execution of a new promissory
note and mortgage and the recording of the new mortgage. The original
balance on the new loan must be sufficient to pay off the old loan in full
(unless the servicer has agreed to a principal reduction).
Suppose there is a junior lien, such as a second mortgage, a HELOC, or
a judgment lien on the property. The ordinary operation of the first-in-time
principle and the recording system would dictate that the junior lien, having
been executed and recorded first,' would take priority over the refinance
mortgage. But that outcome would, of course, be entirely unacceptable to the
first lender, who expects to maintain its first lien status. Furthermore, the first
lender could have chosen to modify the existing mortgage-thereby retaining
its temporal first-in-time position-rather than replacing it with an entirely
new mortgage document and releasing the original mortgage." Thus, it
would make little sense to take a strict temporal approach and promote the
junior lien into a senior position over the refinance mortgage.
Fortunately, a common law rule known as the replacement mortgage
doctrine will come to the lender's aid. As the Restatement of Mortgages
explains:
If a senior mortgage is released of record and, as part of the same
transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage retains the
same priority as its predecessor, except to the extent that any change in the
terms of the mortgage or the obligation it secures is materially prejudicial
to the holder of a junior interest in the real estate.'
" Cf Strong v. Stoneham Coop. Bank, 310 N.E.2d 607, 608 (Mass. Ct App. 1974) (the court rather
bizarrely held that first mortgagee was not held to constructive notice of junior lien, despite fact that it
was recorded at time first mortgage loan was modified).
" As discussed, the modified mortgage would retain its priority over an intervening junior lienholder
except to the extent that the modification resulted in material prejudice to the intervening junior. See infra
notes 102-05 and accompanying text
85 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 73 (AM. LAW INST. 1997). See Houston Lumber Co.
v. Skaggs, 613 P.2d 416, 417 (N.M. 1980); Union Bank v. Thrall, 872 N.E.2d 542, 548 (Ill. App. Ct.
2007); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 813 N.W.2d 332, 335 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011); Sovereign Bank v. Gillis, 74 A.3d 1, 9 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (remanding case to trial
court for consideration of the amount of "material prejudice"); Fleet Bank v. Cty. of Monroe Indus. Dev.
Agency, 637 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996); Sheppard v. Interbay Funding, LLC, 305 S.W.3d
102, 108-09 (rex. App. 2009). See generadly Carol Vento, Annotation, Discharge of Mortgage and
Taking Back of New Mortgage as Affecting Lien Intervening Between Old and New Mortgages, 43
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Thus, the refinanced senior mortgage is protected against loss of priority
to junior liens unless the changes in loan terms would be materially
prejudicial to them. Even a prejudicial change will keep priority, of course,
if the junior lienholder consents to the changes or subordinates its lien to the
new mortgage.8
The replacement mortgage doctrine makes perfect sense. At the time the
junior lienholder obtained its junior position, it knew or should have
known-by virtue of the recording of the original mortgage-that it was in a
junior position and would remain in a junior position until the original
mortgagee was paid in full. While the refinance may involve a new
promissory note and the cancellation of the old note, the debt to the
mortgagee is not really being "paid in full," but merely restructured. As such,
a rule according the refinance mortgage with the priority of the original
mortgage is fully consistent with the expectations of both the refinancing
mortgagee and the intervening junior lienholder.
The difficulty in applying the replacement mortgage doctrine is in
determining what types of changes are materially prejudicial to junior
lienors." The prejudicial effect of some changes is obvious. For example, if
the new mortgage secures a larger principal amount than the balance owing
on the old mortgage at the time of the refinancing, the prejudice to a junior.
lienor is clear, and the senior lender will suffer a loss of priority to the extent
of the increased balance."
A.L.R.5th 519(1996). Louisiana has rejected the doctrine on the basis of strict construction of Louisiana's
"race" recording statute. See Pelican Homestead & Say. Ass'n. v. Sec. First Nat'l Bank, 532 So. 2d 397,
400 (La. Ct. App. 1988). See also Hilco, Inc. v. Lenentine, 698 A.2d 1254, 1256-57 (N.H. 1997). The
release of the old mortgage and recording of the new mortgage must be part of the same transaction. See
United States v. Tolin, 827 F.3d 809, 814 (8th Cir. 2016) (where more than two months elapsed between
release of old mortgage and recording of new mortgage, court refused to protect the new mortgage with
the old mortgage's priority).
' See, e.g., Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223, 229-32 (Mo. CL App. 2001).
7 See id at 231-32.
1 See U.S. Bank v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, 398 P.3d 118, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017) (where
replacement mortgage had larger balance than original mortgage, creditor was entitled to retain priority
only to the extent of the original mortgage's balance); Bowling Green Sports Ctr., Inc. v. G.A.G. LLC, 77
N.E.3d 728, 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (junior lienor gained priority to the extent of $51,000 advanced in
loan modification); Nationstar Mortg., L.L.C. v. Bowman, 889 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016); Wells
Fargo Bank v. SBC IV REO, LLC, 896 N.W.2d 821, 837, 844 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016) (new mortgage lost
priority to intervening lien to the extent its balance was larger than balance on old mortgage); Golden
Delta Enters., L.L.C. v. US Bank, 213 S.W.3d 171, 176 (Mo. CL App. 2007) (case remanded for further
findings as to whether increased balance was materially prejudicial to junior lienor); Sheppard v. Interbay
Funding, LLC, 305 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tex. App. 2009) (new mortgage was entitled to priority of old
mortgage to the extent of balance paid off); Nature's Sunshine Prods., Inc. v. Watson, 174 P.3d 647, 652-
53 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (new mortgage was sixteen times larger than obligation on initial mortgage
sixteen years earlier and was materially prejudicial to intervening lienholder). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §
46:9-82 (2018), which expressly preserves the priority of a modified mortgage except to the extent of
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A little further analysis of the "increased balance" problem may be
helpful here. Consider the following factual variations, which are based on
these assumptions: (1) the senior mortgage debt bears a rate of 5% per annum
simple interest; (2) the senior debt has a principal balance of $200,000 prior
to the given modification; (3) the senior mortgage does not cover future
advances (or the particular future advance involved would not qualify for the
priority of the original loan under the applicable legal rules); (4) the terms of
the senior mortgage are consistent with the provisions of the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac uniform single-family mortgage instrument; (5) there is
only one junior lien at the time of the modification; and (6) the junior
lienholder did not consent to the modification. The conclusions expressed
below represent our understanding of the concept of "material prejudice."
Example 1. Borrower is current at the time of the modification. In the
modification, the senior lender advances $10,000 in cash to the borrower,
increasing the principal balance to $210,000. Result: In this case, the increase
in the principal balance of the loan is materially prejudicial to the junior
lienholder. Thus, the senior lender's lien now has a "split" priority; while it
retains first priority to the extent of the $200,000 principal balance prior to
modification, it is subordinated to the extent of the additional $10,000 loan.
Example 2. Borrower is current at the time of the modification. In the
modification, the senior lender advances $10,000 in cash to the borrower,
increasing the principal balance to $210,000. However, the borrower makes
no payments on the loan over the next year, by which time the senior
mortgage now has a total balance of $220,500 ($210,000 principal plus
accrued but unpaid interest of $10,500). Result: As in Example 1, the junior
suffers material prejudice to the extent of the additional $10,000 advance. In
addition, the junior suffers material prejudice to the extent of the additional
interest that accrued on that $10,000 during the past year but was not paid
($10,000 x 5% = $500). Thus, the senior lender's lien now has a split priority.
"any balance due in excess of the maximum specified principal amount which is secured by the mortgage,
plus accrued interest, payments for taxes and insurance, and other payments made by the mortgagee
pursuant to the terms of the mortgage." See Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. Benun, 140 A.3d 547, 557
(NJ. 2016) (statute does not protect optional future advances from loss of priority). Occasionally a court
will hold that a modification that is prejudicial to ajunior lienor results in a complete reversal ofpriorities,
giving the junior lien a first position for its full balance. See generally Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. Smith,
284 S.E.2d 770, 772 (S.C. 1981) (priorities completely reversed on account of senior mortgagee granting
a one-year time extension); Gluskin v. Ad. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 108 Cal. Rptr. 318, 323 (Cal. Ct. App.
1973). But the better and much more common view is that the reversal of priorities is only pro tanto, to
the extent of the prejudice suffered. See Shane v. Winter Hill Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 492 N.E.2d 92,
96-97 (Mass. 1986) (junior lienor not subordinate to increased interest rate on senior loan, but still
subordinate to original interest rate). Further, the holding in Gluskin is severely undercut by Friery v.
Sutter Buttes Say. Bank, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,38-39 (Cal. CL App. 1998) (finding no prejudice to the junior
lienor from the shortening of the senior loan's term).
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It retains first priority to the extent of $210,000 (the $200,000 principal
balance prior to modification and the $10,000 of interest that accrued on that
amount but was unpaid); however, it is subordinated to the extent of the
additional $10,000 loan and to the $500 of interest that accrued but was
unpaid on that portion.
Example 3. At the time of the modification, borrower is in default, with
$10,000 in interest having accrued but being unpaid. In the modification, the
senior lender agrees to capitalize the accrued but unpaid interest, thus
increasing the principal balance to $210,000. Result: At this point, the junior
lienholder has not suffered material prejudice due to the modification. Prior
to the modification, the junior was in a subordinate position to the senior with
respect to both the $200,000 unpaid principal balance and any accrued but
unpaid interest on that amount. The modification (capitalization of the
accrued but unpaid interest) increases the principal, but it has not increased
the total amount of the debt and thus the junior has as yet suffered no
prejudice. The senior lender retains its priority to the full extent of the
$210,000 modified balance.
Example 4. At the time of the modification, borrower is in default, with
$10,000 in interest having accrued but being unpaid. In the modification, the
senior lender agrees to capitalize the accrued but unpaid interest," thus
increasing the principal balance to $210,000. However, the borrower makes
no payments on the loan over the next year, by which time the senior debt
now has a total balance of $220,500. Result: As in Example 3, the mere
capitalization of accrued but unpaid interest did not by itself materially
prejudice the junior. However, over the ensuing year, the modified balance
of $210,000 accrued more interest ($210,000 x 5% = $10,500) than would
have accrued on the loan if it had not been modified ($200,000 x 5% =
$10,000). The junior thus does suffer material prejudice to the extent of the
extra $500 of interest accrued. The senior lender thus retains its priority to
the extent of $220,000 (the $210,000 principal balance plus the $10,000 in
accrued but unpaid interest that would have accrued on the unmodified loan),
but is subordinated to the junior with respect to the additional $500 in interest
accrued.
Example 5. At the time of the modification, borrower is in default, and
the senior lender has expended $10,000 for weatherproofing the property,
providing security to prevent vandalism, payment of delinquent insurance
" Most residential mortgage loan documents, such as the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Note, do
not provide that accrued but unpaid interest is capitalized automatically. Likewise, they do not provide
that amounts of unpaid interest will accrue additional interest (i.e., there is no "interest on interest"). Thus,
in a modification, if the lender is not willing to forgive unpaid interest or further delay its collection, the
lender may insist that accrued but unpaid interest be capitalized (added to the unpaid principal balance).
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premiums, and attorney's fees in efforts to collect the loan. In the
modification, this $10,000 is added to the loan balance, increasing the
principal balance to $210,000. Result: The junior lienholder suffers no
material prejudice by virtue of the modification. All of the senior's
expenditures are within the scope of the original mortgage, which permits the
senior to add those expenses to the debt, and thus the junior knew (or should
have known) it was at risk of being subordinate to the extent of such
expenses. The senior lienholder retains priority to the full extent of the debt
as modified.
Other changes may be obviously nonprejudicial. If the senior lowers the
interest rate or reduces the balance on the refinanced loan, any junior lienors
are better off, not worse. 0 By contrast, an increased interest rate is very likely
to be held prejudicial.9' An extension of the loan term is more debatable. On
the one hand, if the term extension lowers the monthly payments (as it would
on an amortizing loan), this would make the loan easier for the borrower to
repay and reduce the risk of default, which is beneficial to the junior. On the
other hand, if the loan is held to maturity (perhaps not likely, but certainly
possible), the result is that the junior lienor will be subordinate for a longer
period of time (assuming that the junior is not already paid off), which is a
detrimental result. Further, the property's security value might diminish
during the extension period. The opposite arguments can be made, of course,
if the modification shortens the loan term and monthly payments rise as a
result, increasing the risk of the mortgagor's default.' As a practical matter,
courts have usually viewed term extensions as benign and refused to treat
" See generally Big Land Inv. Corp. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 657 P.2d 837, 84041 (Alaska
1983) (interest rate reduction was not prejudicial to junior lien holder); Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC v. Quinn,
No. A-2668-14T3, 2016 WL 6156209, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 24, 2016) (change of interest
rate from potential 9.700% adjustable to 6.625% fixed was beneficial to junior interest holders).
"' See, e.g., Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Assocs., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890,893 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 73 cmt a (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (increased interest rate
prejudicial by placing additional strain on mortgagor's financial capacity, leading to greater probability of
default).
' In the analogous situation of financing by a different lender, see Am. Sterling Bank v. Johnny
Mgmt. LV, Inc., 245 P.3d 535, 541 (Nev. 2010) (where original loan matured in fifteen years and refinance
loan matured in six months, with large increase in monthly payments, court found material prejudice to
junior lienor). But see Friery v. Sutter Buttes Say. Bank, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 38 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(refusing to find prejudice to the junior lienor from a shortening of the senior loan's term).
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them as causing a loss of the senior's priority.93 There is little specific
authority dealing with term reductions.9
Of course, there are also other less common modifications. What about a
change from fixed rate to adjustable rate or vice versa? A change in the index
for rate adjustments? A change in the caps for future rate changes? Or
suppose the modification includes a cross-collateralization clause, so that the
new mortgage also secures obligations that the original mortgage did not?95
Suppose the modification releases one of the co-borrowers from liability or
adds a new guarantor? There is little or no judicial authority on these points,
and for the most part, it is anyone's guess whether a court will hold a junior
lien to be promoted in priority on account of them.
A further confounding factor is the possible presence of a clause in the
senior mortgage reserving the right to modify the loan against junior lienors.
The standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac residential mortgage, perhaps
surprisingly, does not contain such a clause.' The Restatement approves the
use of such clauses and provides that if a modification falls within the scope
of such a clause, the senior mortgage will retain its priority even if the change
is prejudicial to ajunior lienor." That is a plausible position and is probably
correct, but there is no significant case authority addressing it." Moreover,
I Cases holding that loan term extensions were not materially prejudicial and caused no loss of
priority include: Resolution Tr. Corp. v. BVS Dev., Inc., 42 F.3d 1206, 1215 (9th Cir. 1994) (five-month
extension, based on California law); St Agatha Fed. Credit Union v. Ouellette, 722 A.2d 858, 861-62
(Me. 1998) (three-year extension, accompanied by decreased interest rate and monthly payment);
Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397, 402-03 (Mass. 1966) (two-year extension); Ocwen Loan Servs.,
LLC v. Quinn, No. A-2668-14T3, 2016 WL 6156209 (N.J. Super. CL. App. Div. Oct. 24, 2016) (two-
year extension); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223, 234 (Mo. Ct App. 2001) (note extended from
six months to six years). 'Te Restatement agrees. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 73
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1997) ("Extensions of maturity generally reduce the likelihood of foreclosure of
the senior mortgage, and thus are beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to the interest ofjunior lienors.").
" See Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223,230 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
" In Burney, 63 S.W.3d at 233-34, the court was willing to disregard such changes and uphold the
original mortgagee's priority, but it is unclear whether other courts would do so.
' In Clause 12, the Uniform Instrument does provide that a forbearance, time extension, or alteration
of the amortization schedule will not operate to release the borrower or the borrower's successors, but it
says nothing about the effect of these actions on junior liens. See Security Instruments, FREDDIE MAC,
httpJ/www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.3(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1997). The Restatement also
recognizes the right of the mortgagor to "cut oft" the effect of such a clause by notice to the mortgagee,
for the purposes of freeing up the property for future junior financing. Id § 7.4.
" In a recent case, Wells Fargo Bankv. SBCIVREO, LLC, 896 N.W.2d 821,838-44 (Mich. Ct App.
2016), Wells Fargo claimed that it retained senior priority to the full extent of a cash-out modification,
arguing that Michigan had adopted Restatement § 7.3(c) and that the original mortgage provided that
"[t]his Security Instrument may be modified or amended . . . by an agreement in writing signed by
Borrower and Lender." The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this argument and, based on material
prejudice, denied Wells Fargo the priority of the original loan to the extent of the cash-out portion of the
refmancing loan. The court reasoned that while a prior Michigan decision had adopted other portions of
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such clauses can be complex and tricky, and debates can arise about whether
a particular modification falls within the clause or not.9
In sum, although the replacement mortgage doctrine is designed to
protect senior lenders from loss of priority when they refinance their own
loans, reliance upon the doctrine alone involves some risk. Except in the case
of the most benign and innocuous changes of terms, such as a lowered interest
rate or a reduction of principal balance, the consequences of any change are
to some extent debatable, and there is some risk that they will result in at least
a partial loss of priority vis-i-vis intervening liens. Even the presence in the
original mortgage of a clause reserving the right to modify, while certainly
helpful, is no guarantee of protection.'" The only way for the refinance
lender to eliminate this sort of risk entirely is to obtain a written consent or a
subordination agreement from each junior lienholder. It is this fact that gives
such lienors the leverage to "blow up" the proposed modification or make it
much more costly, as explained below,'o" and this leverage exists even if the
junior lien has little or no actual value.
Restatement § 7.3, it was "not clear" that the court had adopted § 7.3(c). The court also reasoned that in
any event, § 7.3(c) did not apply, as the refinancing loan "did not entail a mere modification ofthe original
mortgage; rather, it was a true replacement mortgage, resulting in the satisfaction, discharge, and
cancelation of the original mortgage in its entirety." Id at 839. This latter argument is breathtakingly
formalistic, if not stupid. In terms of priority, the end result should be the same whether the parties proceed
by replacement of the original mortgage or modification of it The court's distinction would essentially
force the refinancing lender that wants the advantage of § 73(c) into a modification of the original loan
documents rather than a replacement--even if the execution of new loan documents may well be easier
for the parties and involve lower transaction costs for the borrower. The court's reasoning, however, may
mask a general reluctance by courts to embrace the more senior-friendly approach reflected in § 7.3(c).
Cf Robert Kratovil & Raymond J. Werner, Mortgage Extensions and Modifications, 8 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 595, 610 (1975) (expressing doubt about the enforceability of a modification clause in the original
mortgage). An enforceable future advance clause in the original mortgage may have a similar effect,
provided that the modification is in the nature of an additional advance and is within the scope of the
clause. On the enforceability of future advance clauses, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. §
2.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1997); NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 12:7.
Under such a clause, the mortgage may be immunized from loss of priority even if the advance is deemed
prejudicial to junior liens. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Fin. Ky., Inc. v. Thomer, 315 S.W.3d 335,341 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2010).
" See, e.g, First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Arena, 406 N.E.2d 1279, 1284-85 (Ind. CL App. 1980)
(clause held ineffective where original mortgage reserved the right to forbear, to sue, or extend the time
for payment, but did not mention increasing the interest rate as modification actually did).
"n See Robert P. Giesen, "Routine" Mortgage Modifications: Lenders Beware, 17 REAL EST. L.J. 22
(1989).
.o. See infra Part IV.
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2. Amendment of the Original First Mortgage Loan Documents
Instead of paying off the first mortgage with the proceeds of a new loan,
the servicer may make a simpler type of modification-an amendment to the
existing promissory note restating the terms of payment"i A careful servicer
will probably have the borrower execute (and will record) an amendment to
the mortgage as well, which indicates that the mortgage now secures the
amended note.O3 In this situation, the law is essentially identical to the
process of a replacement mortgage, which was previously discussed above.
As the Restatement of Mortgages explains:
If a senior mortgage or the obligation it secures is modified by the parties,
the mortgage as modified retains priority as against junior interests in the
real estate, except to the extent that the modification is materially prejudicial
to the holders of such interests."'
Thus the "materially prejudicial" standard discussed above applies here as
well, and the foregoing discussion is equally applicable when the mortgage
and note are amended rather than refinanced by a replacement mortgage. 0 5
3. Refinancing by a Different Lender; Assignment or Subrogation
A third way in which a defaulting borrower may be able to retain title to
the property is by refinancing with a different lender. Such transactions do
not occur often, because a borrower who is already in default is obviously a
credit risk and will likely have an impaired credit score." Nonetheless, the
borrower may find a willing lender. If one or more junior liens have attached
to the property since the original loan was made, the refinancing lender would
like to be able to "inherit" the priority of the original mortgage.107
"n See generally In re Payne, 523 B.R. 560, 574-75 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2014).
" But see id at 574 (holding amendment of mortgage unnecessary if it contained a dragnet clause
and modification consisted of an additional advance).
'" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 73(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
"' See, e.g., In re White, 514 B.R. 365,369 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2014) (modification that reduced interest
rate and monthly payments and deferred a portion of principal until maturity, did not materially prejudice
junior lienor); Acorn 420 Broadway LLC v. New England Phoenix Co., No. 13 MISC 478331, 2015 WL
2345641, at *8 (Mass. Land Ct. May 18, 2015) (material prejudice standard applies on a pro tanto basis,
resulting in loss of priority to the extent of the prejudice).
"o More commonly, the new lender is refinancing an original mortgage loan that is current at the time
of the refinancing.
" See generally Philip Bond et al., Does Junior Inherit? Refinancing and the Blocking Power of
Second Mortgages, 30 REv. FIN. STUD. 211,213 (2017).
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One way in which the refinancing lender could inherit the priority of the
original mortgage is by taking a direct assignment of the original mortgagee's
position through an assignment of the original mortgage documents (rather
than a release of that mortgage).'os Even without direct assignment of the
original mortgage, however, the new lender could inherit the priority of the
original mortgage through the principle of equitable subrogation. As the
Restatement explains:
(a) One who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage,
becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the mortgage to the
extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. Even though the
performance would otherwise discharge the obligation and the mortgage,
they are preserved and the mortgage retains its priority in the hands of the
subrogee.
(b) By way of illustration, subrogation is appropriate to prevent unjust
enrichment if the person seeking subrogation performs the obligation: ...
(4) upon a request from the obligor or the obligor's successor to do so, if
the person performing was promised repayment and reasonably expected to
receive a security interest in the real estate with the priority of the mortgage
being discharged, and if subrogation will not materially prejudice the
holders of intervening interests in the real estate. 109
Thus under the Restatement's view, the refinancing lender will receive
the priority of the mortgage that was paid off if it reasonably expected to do
so, and if granting that priority will not "materially prejudice" the position of
intervening lienors."o Courts that follow the Restatement generally have no
difficulty in finding the necessary "reasonable expectation" of priority in a
refinance by a new lender; hence, the remaining issue is whether changes in
the terms of the new loan, as compared to the old one, are materially
prejudicial to juniors"'-precisely the same test discussed above in
connection with refinances and loan amendments by the original mortgagee.
"0s In New York, for example, when a refinancing occurs, the refinancing lender has traditionally taken
an assignment of the original mortgage, so as to permit the borrower to avoid having to pay the New York
mortgage tax associated with the amount being refinanced. See, e.g., Lisa Prevost, Reducing Refinancing
Expenses, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26realestate/reducing-
refinancing-expenses.htmi).
209 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.6(bX4) (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
2n0 See id
". Am. Sterling Bank v. Johnny Mgmt LV, Inc., 245 P.3d 535, 541 (Nev. 2010) (where original loan
matured in fifteen years and refinance loan matured in six months, with large increase in monthly
payments, court found material prejudice to junior lienor); Bel Air & Briney v. City of Kent, 358 P.3d
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Under the Restatement, the refinancing lender's knowledge or notice of
intervening liens is irrelevant to the availability of subrogation, but not all
decisions follow the Restatement. One line of cases takes the view that
subrogation should be denied if the refinancing lender has actual knowledge
of the intervening liens.i"2 Another, more rigid doctrine holds that even
constructive notice, deriving from the fact that the junior liens are recorded
in the public records, is sufficient to warrant denying subrogation.1 ' While
both of these views are waning'1 4 and the Restatement has gained
considerable ascendance "s and seems obviously preferable,"' it has not yet
won the day in all jurisdictions.
This means that in addition to worrying about the vagaries of application
of the "material prejudice" standard discussed above, a lender who refinances
another lender's loan without taking a direct assignment of the original
mortgage must, in a number of jurisdictions, worry about exactly what
version of the doctrine of equitable subrogation the court will apply. The only
way for the refinance lender to eliminate this uncertainty entirely is to obtain
written consent from any junior lienor acknowledging its subordinate
1249, 1253 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015), review denied, 366 P.3d 1243 (Wash. 2016) (material prejudice
standard applied).
112 See, e.g., Vogel v. Veneman, 276 F.3d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 2002) (Texas law); Fishman v. Murphy
ex rel. Estate of Urban, 72 A.3d 185, 198 (Md. 2013); Highmark Fed. Credit Union v. Wells Fargo Fin.
S.D., Inc., 814 N.W.2d 814, 817 (S.D. 2012); Indep. Nat'l Bank v. Buncombe Pmfl Park, LLC, 741
S.E.2d 572, 576 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013). See NELSON, WHrrMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note
25, § 10:1 n.29 (collecting cases).
" See, e.g., In re Beltramo, 367 B.R. 825, 831 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2007) (New Mexico law); Ex parte
Lawson, 6 So. 3d 7, 13 (Ala. 2008) (constructive notice of mechanics' liens from visible construction on
the property); Mill Creek Lumber & Supply Co. v. First United Bank & Tr. Co., 278 P.3d 12, 17 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2012); Falk v. Fannie Mae, 738 S.E.2d 404, 411 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013); NELSoN, WHITMAN,
BURKHART & FREYERMuT, supra note 25, § 10:1 n.30 (collecting cases).
"' See Wells Fargo Bank v. Simpson, 36 N.E.3d 266, 284, appeal denied, 39 N.E.3d 1012 (Ill. 2015)
(seeming to take the application of subrogation for granted); NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART &
FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 10:1, at 942-43. Virginia adopted the Restatement view by statute, but
with limitations. If the property is a single dwelling unit, the new mortgage does not exceed the old
mortgage's balance by more than $5,000 and does not have a higher interest rate than the old mortgage,
and the intervening lien is a mortgage with an original balance not exceeding $150,000, the old mortgage's
priority is preserved. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-58.3 (2017).
"' Bank of Am. v. Citizens Bank, No. 14-cv-455-PB, 2015 WL 9305653 (D.N.H. Dec. 21, 2015)
(same); Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Citibank, 214 Cal. Rptr. 3d 504, 517 (Cal. CL App. 2017) (citing
Restatement and holding refinancing lender's constructive notice of intervening lien does not disqualify
it for subrogation); AJJ Enters., LLP v. Jean-Charles, 125 A.3d 618, 636-37 (Conn. Ct. App. 2015)
(constructive notice of the intervening lien could be disqualifying in some circumstances, but was not
here). See also NELSON, WHYTMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 10:1 n.28 (collecting
cases).
"1 See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage Principles: Saving
Billions ofDollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REv. 305, 355-65 (2006).
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position.' 17 In sum, no matter what form a loan modification takes-whether
an amendment to the original loan documents or a refinancing by the same
or a different lender-there is often plenty of uncertainty as to whether the
resulting mortgage will maintain priority over junior liens.
B. Resolution Resulting in Mortgagor's Loss of the Mortgaged Property
1. Foreclosure
The prototypical action by mortgage servicers in the face of an uncured
default is, of course, foreclosure of the mortgage. Foreclosure is an invention
of the English courts of equity and has ancient roots." 8 The term stems from
the concept of the equity of redemption-the right of a borrower to pay off
the mortgage debt and thereby to redeem title to the land from the mortgage,
despite the fact that payment is delinquent."' Once the equity courts had
established this right, it was necessary to put some time limit on it, so that a
mortgagee would not have to wait indefinitely to see if the mortgagor would
redeem. To accomplish this, the equity courts began to fix an outside date on
which the redemption would have to be carried out, and failing which, that
right of redemption would terminate (or literally be "foreclosed").
Originally, foreclosure was "strict," which meant that if redemption was
not carried out by the foreclosure date, the mortgagee simply retained title to
the property free and clear of the mortgage. 20 However, when English
mortgage law was transplanted to the United States, strict foreclosure was
widely regarded as unduly harsh.' 2 ' Most American jurisdictions adopted and
continue to require foreclosure by auction sale instead.'22 In this form of
foreclosure, the property is auctioned to the highest bidder rather than having
its title simply vested in the mortgagee. The proceeds of the sale are then paid
to the mortgagee insofar as necessary to discharge the secured debt.
Foreclosure by sale has the advantage, from the borrower's viewpoint, that it
is possible for the highest bid at the sale to exceed the balance owing on the
mortgage debt. If there are nojunior liens on the property, this surplus is paid
"I Obviously, the refinancing lender is not going to obtain a subordination agreement from the
intervening junior ifthe refinancing lender does not know the intervening junior lien exists.
" See NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 1:3, at 7.
"' See id §§ 1:2, 1:3.
"2 See id § 1:3, at 7.
1 Connecticut and Vermont continue to use strict foreclosure. See id § 7:12, at 602.
"2 Id § 1:4.
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to the borrower and represents a return of the borrower's "equity" in the
property."
Traditionally, American foreclosure was a judicially-supervised
process. 24 The mortgagee filed a bill in equity to foreclose the mortgage and
the borrower was entitled to file an answer, just as in any other civil lawsuit.
If the factual allegations in the complaint were contested, the court would
conduct a hearing and resolve the dispute. If the court found a proper legal
basis for foreclosure-i.e., that the debt was valid and delinquent, was held
by the mortgagee, and that the mortgage properly secured the debt and
encumbered the real estate-the court would order a judicial sale, typically
conducted by the sheriff as an officer of the court. The sheriff would
distribute the proceeds, disbursing them to the foreclosing mortgagee up to
the amount of the delinquent debt, and allocating any surplus first to junior
lienors (if any) in descending order of their priority, and finally to the
borrower.125
This process is obviously complex, costly, and time-consuming.1 2 6 It
continues to be available in all American states, and is the usual mode of
foreclosure in about half of them. In the other half of states, a statutory
process known as nonjudicial foreclosure has supplanted judicial foreclosure
as a practical matter. The details of nonjudicial foreclosure vary among the
states recognizing it, but it typically involves giving a notice of default and
election to foreclose to the borrower (or current owner of the property) and,
in some states, to the holders of junior interests in the property.127 If the
default continues uncured after some grace period-commonly in the range
of thirty days to six months-a notice of sale is issued to the borrower, and
again, perhaps to junior interest holders. Assuming no cure or redemption
'" See generally id § 7:32 (discussing distribution of surplus).
124 See id § 1:4, at 8.
25 Id §§ 7:12, 7:17.
' See generally An Overview of the Home Foreclosure Process, FED. HOuSING FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.ihfaoig.gov/Content/Files/SAR%2Home%20Foreclosure%/20Process.pdf (last visited Aug.
5, 2018).
" About half of the states recognizing nonjudicial fbreclosure do not require notice of foreclosure to
subordinate interest-holders. They include Alabama, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota (unless the junior interest-holder is in possession; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.03 (2003)),
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah (although notice posted on the
property may come to the attention ofjunior interest-holders in possession; UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-
25(1)(b) (2003)), West Virginia (unless the junior interest-holder has notified the foreclosing creditor of
the interest; W. VA. CODE § 38-1-4 (2003)), and Wyoming. In some of the jurisdictions mentioned, the
absence of required notice is mitigated by the statutory right of any person, including the holder of a
subordinate interest, to record a request for notice of the foreclosure of a particular security interest and
thereby become entitled to receive one.
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occurs,12 s the auction sale is conducted, either by the mortgagee or a trustee
designated by the mortgagee, and the proceeds distributed in the same
manner as in judicial foreclosure.
Whichever mode of foreclosure the mortgagee uses, the process is not
cheap or quick.'29 As noted above, the process is usually handled by a
servicer acting as the agent of the debtholder. There are a variety of expenses
initially paid by the servicer but ultimately borne by the creditor (although
the mortgagor is often obligated for these costs under the loan documents). If
judicial foreclosure is used, the servicer will nearly always need to retain
legal counsel; if the foreclosure is nonjudicial, the servicer will need to pay
the fee of the trustee, lawyer, or other individual who conducts the auction.'`
A title examination will be necessary to determine the identity of the holders
of any junior liens or other subordinate interests and to establish whether the
original mortgagor is still the owner of the property. Notices must be mailed,
as indicated above, and in most states the notice of sale must also be
published in a newspaper-usually at a nontrivial cost.
Whether judicial or nonjudicial, the process is likely to take several
months at a minimum. 3 ' If judicial process must be used and the courts are
crowded with other foreclosures, as they were in many states at the height of
mortgage crisis in 2007-2010, it may take a great deal longer. If the borrower
raises defenses, further time may be occupied with hearings and discovery,
even if the defenses are ultimately shown to have no merit and the mortgagee
completes the foreclosure. Even worse, in some states, statutes also grant the
mortgagor a right of statutory redemption that permits the mortgagor (and
perhaps junior lienors) to redeem the property for some period even after the
foreclosure sale. 13 2 Where such a redemption right exists, and where the
borrower has not validly waived that right, it further extends the time before
the mortgagee can obtain a marketable title for and liquidate the property. A
study by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) in 2013 showed that
the average total time to obtain marketable title to a vacant home through
foreclosure ranged from a low of 240 days (in Alabama and Missouri, two of
"s In some nonjudicial foreclosure states, the borrower need not redeem in order to stop the foreclosure
process, but need only cure the existing default, even though the loan has been accelerated. See NELSON,
WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:7, at 585. Section 22 of the standard Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Instrument provides a thirty-day cure period. See Security Instruments,
FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/unifsecurity.htmi (last visited Aug. 5, 2018).
" There is also a broad consensus that foreclosure auctions consistently produce sub-market prices.
See Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure
Act, 53 DuKE L. J. 1399, 1417-25 & nn.91-107 (2004).
13 See generally id
n31 Id at 1404.
132 See supra notes 61-73 and accompanying text.
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the states with the most rapid nonjudicial foreclosure timetables) to a high of
850 days (in New York, ajudicial foreclosure state), with a national weighted
average of 438 days.133
In this context, time is money to the creditor. The property will often be
vacant, abandoned by the borrower, and the mortgagee will need to secure it
against vandalism and the elements. The mortgagee must maintain casualty
insurance, the cost of which is unlikely to be paid by the borrower. Interest
will continue to accrue on the unpaid debt. Property taxes must be paid to
protect the priority of the mortgagee's lien. The creditor will also incur legal
expenses and costs of sale. In a 2013 report, the FHIFA estimated these
collective costs to range from 1.12 basis points per day (in Puerto Rico) to
2.37 basis points per day (in Texas)." In theory, the mortgagee can add these
expenses (up to the foreclosure sale date) to the secured obligation and collect
them out of the foreclosure sale proceeds,"' or from the borrower directly
where the mortgagee has recourse against the borrower. However, if the
property's value is "underwater" as compared with the loan balance and the
borrower is judgment-proof, the mortgagee will have little hope of recovering
these added costs.
Moreover, the foreclosure period described above is only the middle
portion of a much longer time sequence. Most likely, the servicer will already
have spent several months in collection efforts with the delinquent borrower
before instituting foreclosure. And at the other end of the process, the likely
result of the foreclosure is the vesting of title to the property in the creditor,
since in most cases the servicer, acting on the creditor's behalf, is the
successful bidder at the sale. But now it is the servicer's task to liquidate the
property, which typically involves listing it with a real estate agent (thus
generating another fee to be paid) and hoping for a successful and quick
marketing period. Sadly, if foreclosure rates are high, the market is likely to
'3 State-Level Guarantee Fee Analysis, FED. HOusING FIN. AGENCY 20 (Dec. 9, 2013),
httpsY//www.thfiLgov/AboutUs/Reports/ReportDocuments/20131209_StateLevelGfeeAnalysis_508.pdf
(Table 2); see also Lisa Prevost, Paying for Foreclosure Delays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 2, 2014),
https//www.nytimes.com/2014/01/05/realestate/paying-for-foreclosure-delays.html.
134 FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, supra note 133, at 20. See also Larry Cordell, Liang Geng, Laurie
Goodman & Lidan Yang, The CostofDelay I (Fed. Res. Bank ofPhila., Working Paper No. 13-15,2013),
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/4media/bank-resources/publications/presentations/Ihe-cost-of-
delay.pdf. These authors summarize their findings as follows: "The cost of delay, estimated by comparing
today's time-related costs to those before the start of the financial crisis, is eight percentage points, with
enormous variation among states. While costs are estimated to be four percentage points higher in statutory
foreclosure states, they are estimated to be 13 percentage points higher in judicial foreclosure states and
19 percentage points higher in the highest-cost state, New York." Id
'13 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG, § 2.2 (AM. LAW INST. 1997) (permitting the
mortgagee to recover from the proceeds of foreclosure any expenditures that were reasonably necessary
to protect the security).
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be crowded with other similar properties, and it may take a long time indeed
to find a buyer.
This grim story shows why mortgage investors usually consider
foreclosure a costly, cumbersome, and inefficient process. However, there is
a silver lining. The existence ofjunior liens on the property presents little or
no problem to the foreclosing creditor. It is true that they add some minor
expenses. A title examination is necessary to identify them, but it would be
required in any event to verify the current ownership of the property.'
Notices must be sent to them, along with the notices sent to the property's
owner.'3 ' But the beauty of foreclosure is that, if the notices are properly
served, the interests of any junior lienholders will be wiped out by the
foreclosure proceeding, and title will vest in the foreclosure sale purchaser
free and clear of them.138
Thus, with all of its warts, foreclosure represents a sort of "gold standard"
from the mortgage creditor's viewpoint in its treatment of junior liens. The
holders of those liens have little power to interfere with the foreclosure
process. Indeed, the senior creditor may view their presence in foreclosure as
beneficial, because any junior lienholder can redeem its lien from the holder
of the first mortgage-paying it off in full and thereby having the first
mortgage rights assigned to itself by operation of law.' Of course, if the
property's value is underwater with respect to the first mortgage, redemption
by a junior lienor would be foolish. But if a junior does in fact redeem, the
first mortgage holder will ordinarily be delighted, for it will recover its debt
in full without the need to take title to the property and market it-the best of
all possible worlds.
This protection against disruption by junior lienholders is surely one of
the reasons that conventional foreclosure is so widely used. As we will show
below, there are several alternatives to foreclosure that hold the promise of
greatly reduced time and expense, but they do not offer the same sort of
protection for the first mortgage creditor against interference by junior
lienors.
" See generally An Overview of the Horne Foreclosure Process, FED. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY,
https://www.fhfaoig.gov/Content/Files/SAR%2OHome%2OForeclosure/o2OProcess.pdf (last visited Aug.
5,2018).
'37 Id at 10.
'3 See NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:13.
3 See id § 7:2.
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2. Deed in Lieu of Foreclosure
Arguably, if loss of the mortgaged property is inevitable for the
defaulting borrower, there is little point in forcing the creditor to go through
the cumbersome process of foreclosure. Because the ultimate outcome of a
foreclosure is a virtual certainty, the only purpose it serves for the borrower
is delay. In effect, foreclosure provides a residential borrower with a
minimum of several months-and in extreme cases, a year or more-of rent-
free housing. If the borrower can raise some sort of colorable defense to
foreclosure, this period can be extended even further. This may be
advantageous to the borrower in many cases," but it is not necessarily so. If
the borrower has already moved from the premises or abandoned the
property, or expects to do so soon, the delay is useless. Moreover, a
foreclosure is likely to have a disastrous impact on the borrower's credit score
and may delay very significantly the time when the borrower can obtain
another home loan in the future.14 1
Thus, in a substantial proportion of cases, it makes sense for the borrower
to offer to deed the property to the creditor voluntarily in lieu of going
through the foreclosure process. The deed's effect on the borrower's credit
score is likely to be less detrimental than an actual foreclosure.1 42 If the
borrower insists, she or he can usually negotiate an agreement that the
transaction will fully discharge the mortgage debt, thus avoiding the risk of
a deficiency judgment against the borrower that accompanies a foreclosure
in most states. 43 Sometimes the process of negotiating a deed in lieu will
" There is little doubt that in places where foreclosure delay is longer, strategic default is a more
attractive option to borrowers. See Shuang Zhu & R. Kelley Pace, The Ifluence ofForeclosure Delays
on Borrowers' Default Behavior, 47 J. MONEY, CREDrr & BANKING 1205 (2015).
141 See Real Estate Short Sale: What Is It and How Does It Effect My Credit, PRACfICAL LIST,
httpJ/practicallistcom/real-estate-short-sale (last visited Aug. 5,2018).
142 See id (indicating that the impact on credit score is lessened if the borrower has been able to obtain
a waiver of liability for the deficiency). The data in this source, provided by Fair Isaac Corp., suggest that
the negative impact of a foreclosure on one's FICO score is typically about thirty-five points more severe
than a short sale or deed in lieu. However, there are numerous credit scores in use in addition to FICO,
and they may vary with respect to the impact of a foreclosure as compared to a deed in lieu or short sale.
"' The cases are divided as to whether a deed in lieu will automatically bar the mortgage creditor from
pursuing a deficiency judgment. Compare In re Johnson, 371 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) ("the
acceptance of the deed in lieu of foreclosure does not extinguish the mortgage debt, but does bar the
mortgagee from obtaining or enforcing a deficiency judgment"), and Olney Tr. Bank v. Pitts, 558 N.E.2d
398, 403-04 (111. App. Ct. 1990) (holding lender prohibited from pursuing an action for a deficiency
judgment), with Nash Finch Co. v. Corey Dev., Ltd., 669 N.W.2d 546 (Iowa 2003) (lender could obtain
deficiency judgment after accepting deed in lieu), and Morrison v. Christie, 266 S.W.3d 89 (Tex. CL App.
2008) (same). A well-advised borrower will eliminate this issue by obtaining a cancellation of the
promissory note or a covenant not to sue from the creditor.
2019] 241
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW
even result in a modest payment from the lender to the borrower to help
defray the borrower's costs of vacating the property.
From the creditor's viewpoint, the deed in lieu of foreclosure has
advantages as well. It provides a much quicker way of obtaining title to the
real estate than foreclosure with less uncertainty and lower legal expenses.
Because the parties are dealing face-to-face in a collaborative mode and the
time is shortened, the deed in lieu reduces the risk of the borrower neglecting
the property, or of the borrower or third parties vandalizing it.'"
Thus, the deed in lieu of foreclosure seems to make good sense to both
parties,1 45 and it is perhaps surprising that it does not occur more frequently.
During the mortgage crisis this was partly due to structural reasons; servicers
often were not sufficiently knowledgeable and well-staffed to work out deeds
in lieu with their borrowers. But there is also a legal reason that deeds in lieu
are problematic: the presence of junior liens. If the property is subject to a
lien subordinate to the mortgage that is in default, as a practical matter a deed
in lieu will be accepted only if the junior lienholder consents."
Stated simply, a deed in lieu of foreclosure is not the equivalent of a
foreclosure. As we have seen, a proper foreclosure sale has the effect of
delivering to the foreclosure sale purchaser title of the same quality as existed
on the date that the mortgagor granted the mortgage being foreclosed. 147
Thus, the proper foreclosure of a first priority lien will eliminate all junior
liens and permit the foreclosure purchaser to take clear title to the property.
By contrast, a deed in lieu of foreclosure has no such inherent title-clearing
effect. A voluntary deed in lieu transfers to the mortgagee the mortgagor's
title as it exists on the date the mortgagor delivers the deed in lieu.44 Thus,
the grantee of the deed in lieu takes title subject to the mortgagee's own lien
as well as any junior liens then in existence, which continue to encumber the
property.1 4 9
'" The lender may require the borrower to attempt to market the property by listing it with a real estate
agent for several months before the lender will consider a deed in lieu; see Deed in Lieu, BANK OF AM.,
https://homeloanhelp.bankofamerica.com/en/deed-in-lieu.htmi (last visited Aug. 5, 2018), for Bank of
America's requirements in this regard. The deed in lieu may be especially helpful if the mortgage cannot
be foreclosed immediately-for example, because of the limitations of the Servicemembers' Civil Relief
Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C § 501 et seq. (2018), or because the mortgagor has died and his estate is not yet in
administration.
' The deed must be a voluntary act of both parties; the borrower cannot force the creditor to accept a
deed in lieu. See, e.g., In re Phillips, 368 BR. 733 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2007); Martin v. Uvalde Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 773 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
'" NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART& FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:13.
'4 Id at 607-08.
14 Id § 6:19, at 553 n.358.
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Obviously most potential purchasers of the property from the lender have
no desire to take it subject to such liens. Of course, the servicer or a later
grantee can foreclose against the junior lienor in order to clear the title of the
lien.'o But the necessity of doing so defeats the whole purpose of using a
deed in lieu in the first place in terms of speed and cost.
Overall, then, the existence of junior liens acts as a substantial
impediment to the otherwise attractive practice of using deeds in lieu of
foreclosure. American real property law provides no solution to this problem,
although as discussed in Part V, a solution may become available by virtue
of a new model act recently approved by the Uniform Law Commission.
3. Short Sale
A second technique for terminating a mortgage in default without the
necessity of foreclosure is the short sale.15 1 In such a transaction, the
mortgage creditor agrees to permit the borrower to sell the property and remit
the proceeds to the creditor in full satisfaction of the debt, despite the fact
that the sum remitted is less than a full payoff of the outstanding balance. The
amount paid is "short" of the full balance, but is accepted as full payment.
150 Unfortunately, a few cases have held that the delivery of the deed in lieu to the creditor causes a
merger of the mortgage and the fee title, thus eliminating the mortgage as a separate entity and making
foreclosure against the junior lien impossible. See, e.g., Janus Props., Inc. v. First Fla. Bank, 546 So. 2d
785 (Fla. Ct App. 1989) (where mortgagee recorded a satisfaction of the mortgage after accepting a deed
in lieu, the mortgage could not thereafter be foreclosed); NELSON, WHiTMAN, BURKHART &
FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 6:19. But the great majority of modern cases reject the merger doctrine in
this context, or accept it only if there is affirmative evidence that the mortgagee intended a merger. See
F.D.I.C., as Liquidating Agent of New England Allbank for Say. v. Holden, No. CIV. 92-455-JD, 1994
WL 263691, at *5 (D.N.H. Jan. 26, 1994) (merger will not be found where it would inequitably promote
the priority of ajunior lien); In re Estate of Ozier, 587 N.E.2d 77, 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (in absence of
contrary evidence, an intent not to merge is presumed); Gruenzner v. Hickok, No. A12-0169, 2012 WL
3641354, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2012) (evidence both for and against an intent to merge; trial
court's finding of no merger upheld); Congregation Beth Medrosh of Monsey, Inc. v. Rolling Acres
Chestnut Ridge, LLC, 956 N.Y.S.2d 95, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (merger is disfavored and will not be
found where it would unjustly enrich ajunior lienor); Miller v. Martineau & Co., C.P.A, 983 P.2d 1107,
1113 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (if intervening liens exist, no merger will be found absent contrary evidence);
Ennis v. Finanz Und Kommerz-Union Etabl., 565 So. 2d 374, 375 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) ("absent
manifestations of an intention by [the mortgagee] that there be a merger, none occurs"). To avoid the
merger problem, wise mortgagees always include anti-merger language in their deeds in lieu. For cases
finding no merger in deference to such clauses, see PNC Bank v. Philben, Inc., No. CIV. A. 96L-02-005,
1997 WL 717786, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct Oct. 1, 1997); Clark v. Fed. Land Bank, 423 N.W.2d 220, 222
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); GBJ, Inc., II v. First Ave. Inv. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
In a few states, statutes expressly authorize the holder of a mortgage to foreclose against ajunior lien after
accepting a deed in lieu of foreclosure; see 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/15-1401 (2018); TEx. PROP. CODE
ANN. § 51.006 (2017). But if the common law is properly understood, such statutes are unnecessary.
"' See supra note 4.
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From the viewpoint of both borrowers and creditors, the advantages of a
short sale are similar to those of a deed in lieu of foreclosure. The borrower
can continue to occupy the property until the sale is completed. The process
avoids the embarrassment of a foreclosure and carries less credit stigma. 5 2
The lender benefits from a potentially speedier process as compared to
foreclosure, has greater confidence that the borrower will maintain and care
for the property in order to maximize the chances of the sale being
consummated, and likely can expect a higher sale price through a short sale
as contrasted with a foreclosure sale. 53
Short sales are finicky and can be challenging to arrange, as they require
the concurrence of the seller, the buyer, the creditor, and any mortgage
insurer."' The creditor may demand a Broker's Price Opinion (BPO) or an
appraisal; the creditor is naturally concerned that the agreed price
approximate the best possible price and does not wish to leave money "on
the table."'"s The creditor is also concerned that the broker's commission and
other closing costs be reasonable. As with the deed in lieu, a well-advised
borrower will attempt to negotiate a release from liability for any
deficiency.5 6 It may require considerable effort on the part of all of the
parties to reach agreement on these matters.
In one respect, the short sale is even better for the creditor than a deed in
lieu or a foreclosure. Because the short sale provides liquid funds to the
creditor, the creditor has no need to undertake any marketing effort, nor to
pay the carrying costs of the property while waiting for it to sell. For this
reason short sales, despite their challenges, can be very attractive to a creditor
that wishes to avoid foreclosure.
However, like the deed in lieu of foreclosure, a short sale is not a
foreclosure and does not eliminate subordinate liens."' A title examination
is necessary to discover whether such liens exist. If they do, it is necessary to
obtain their holders' consent or buy them out, even if they are valueless.iss
152 See Elizabeth Weintraub, How a Foreclosure or Short Sale Affects Credit, BALANCE (Sept 10,
2017), https*//www.thebalance.com/how-a-short-sale-or-a-foreclosure-affects-credit-1798177.
" See, e.g., Zhang, supra note 4 (finding that homes selling by short sale transact at 9.2-10.5% higher
prices on average than those selling through foreclosure).
" See Vacco, supra note 4, at 40.
1ss Id
" California, by statute, prohibits a deficiency judgment after a short sale. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
580e (2011). An Arizona court assumed that the state's anti-deficiency statute would apply to short sales.
See Tanque Verde Anesthesiologists L.T.D. Profit Sharing Plan v. ProiTer Grp., Inc., 836 P.2d 1021 (Ariz.
Ct App. 1992).
'5 see NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, §§ 6:20, :21.
" For example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will approve up to $6,000 in payments to buy out junior
liens. See Servicing Guide Announcement: Standard Short Sale/HAFA II and Deed-in-Lieu ofForeclosure
Requirements, FANNIE MAE II (Aug. 22, 2012),
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Hence, junior liens can act as a serious hindrance to the implementation of a
successful short sale.
IV. THE "JUNIOR LIEN PROBLEM": JUNIOR LIEN AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO
RESOLVING MORTGAGE DEFAULT OTHER THAN BY FORECLOSURE
As Part 111 noted, the presence of one or more junior liens complicates
the ability of a senior lienholder to resolve mortgage default through a
process other than foreclosure. The methods aimed at loan modification-an
amendment to the promissory note, or the refinancing of the debt by the
current loan's holder or by a new lender-may not clearly preserve the senior
mortgagee's expected priority vis-ii-vis junior liens. Given judicial
uncertainty over the meaning of "material prejudice" and the circumstances
under which material prejudice exists, the result is simply uncertain. To be
certain of obtaining its expected security, the senior mortgagee must
negotiate for and obtain the junior's consent to the modification and an
acknowledgment by the junior of the expected parameters of the senior's
priority. If the junior lienor is cooperative, the senior mortgagee may be able.
to obtain this agreement, but only after incurring transaction costs that the
senior either has to absorb itself or pass through to the borrower. If the junior
lienor is uncooperative, the senior mortgagee must decide whether to modify
the loan anyway-and risk a potential loss of priority-or refuse, at which
point the borrower loses the benefits of an otherwise desirable loan
modification.
In the loan modification context, these disruption and transaction costs
may be relatively modest (though they are not trivial).s' In the context where
the borrower gives up the home, however, the calculus changes dramatically.
As Part III also noted, the presence ofjunior liens is the most common legal
barrier to deeds in lieu and short sales, as such transactions do not have title-
clearing effect without junior lienholder consent." If the junior's lien is
supported by equity (i.e., if the unencumbered fair market value of the
https://www.fanniemae.com/content/announcement/svcl2l9.pdf Likewise, under the HAFA program,
the loan's holder could allow up to $12,000 from the home's sale price to pay junior liens. See Bank of
America Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternative (HAFA) Matriz MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE,
https://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/Documents/HAFA/HAFA-policiesBank-of-America.pdf (last
visited Aug. 12,2018).
1` To be completely safe, a prudent refinancing or modifying lender would require an inter-creditor
agreement with any intervening lienholders. At a minimum, the agreement would include the intervening
lienholders' agreement to subordinate their liens to the extent expected by the refinancing/modifying
lender. Even in a residential transaction, the negotiation, preparation, and execution of such an agreement
would involve transaction costs that ultimately will be borne by the borrower.
16 See supra notes 140-58 and accompanying text.
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mortgaged property exceeds the senior debt), it is entirely appropriate that
the junior should have an effective veto power over a transaction that would
extinguish its lien-other than a foreclosure by the senior, which the junior
could easily avoid by paying off the senior debt.
During housing market declines like those experienced during the period
between 2007 and 2010, however, it becomes more likely that the balance
owed on a defaulted first mortgage will exceed the property's unencumbered
fair market value. In this situation, ajunior lien has no economic value. If the
first mortgagee conducted a foreclosure sale, the sale proceeds would not be
sufficient to pay off the first mortgage in full, much less to pay anything on
account of the debt nominally secured by the junior lien. 16 1 The economic
worthlessness of the underwater junior lien demonstrates why the
Bankruptcy Code permits a reorganizing debtor in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13
to invalidate any junior lien that is not supported by any value in excess of
the balance due on prior encumbrances.' 62 This reflects that the benefits to be
gained by the debtor's rehabilitation outweigh any benefit that might
ordinarily attach to allowing ajunior to assert the leverage offered by its lien.
But in our modem system of mortgage foreclosure, as noted earlier,
extinguishing an underwater junior lien takes significant time163 and results
in significant transaction costs.'" A timely deed in lieu or short sale would
permit the lender to mitigate many of these delay and transaction costs, either
in full or in significant part. In this context, a junior lien that ought to be
valueless instead acquires nontrivial nuisance or leverage value. 165
Consider an example typical of many distressed loans in the post-2007
era. Borrower owns a home subject to a first mortgage held by First Bank
(securing a debt of $300,000) and a second mortgage held by Second Bank
(securing a debt of $50,000). The home's value is only $240,000, as reflected
by a short sale proposal from Purchaser. Expenses of the proposed short sale
(including Borrower's brokerage commission) will be $15,000. First Bank
1" NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:32 (discussing distribution of
sale proceeds).
In See supra note 78.
16 See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
'" See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
1" See, e.g., Christopher J. Mayer, Edward R. Morrison & Tomasz Piskorski, A New Proposal for
Loan Modifications, 26 YALE J. REG. 417, 419 (2009) ("[B]y delaying, the second-lien lender might
convince the first-mortgage servicer to 'buy out' the second lien at a price above its true value. This is
often called a 'hold-up' problem."); Leventis, supra note 13, at 4 (notingjunior lienors act as "roadblocks"
to the handling of distressed loans); Donghoon Lee, Christopher J. Mayer & Joseph Tracy, A New Look
at Second Liens 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18269, 2012),
http//www.nber.org/papers/wl8269 (noting second liens represent a serious public policy challenge to
the extent that second lienholders block refinancing programs such as HARP by refusing to agree to re-
subordinate to refinanced first lien).
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agrees that it will release its lien and waive any deficiency claim against
Borrower in exchange for payment of the $225,000 of net sale proceeds. The
home is in Florida, however, where the expected time to foreclosure is nearly
two years-and during which time First Bank might incur $20,000 or more
in delay-associated costs (which it is unlikely to recover from either the home
or Borrower)." As a result, when Borrower seeks a release from Second
Bank to facilitate the short sale, Second Bank responds that it will release its
lien only if Borrower agrees to pay Second Bank $10,000 from the net sale
proceeds. Borrower does not have an additional $10,000 in cash to pay
Second Bank's demanded ransom; Purchaser will not agree to pay an
additional $10,000 not justified by the home's market valuation; Broker will
likely have no interest in reducing its commission by $10,000; and First
Bank-having already agreed to forgo a $75,000 deficiency judgment to
facilitate the sale at the current terms-will not agree to diminish its share of
the sale proceeds further.1 7  As a result, the short sale agreement fails,
increasing the ultimate likelihood that Borrower will end up facing a
foreclosure sale by First Bank (and, in many states, potential liability for a
deficiency judgment).
Liens are property interests, so leverage is an intrinsic aspect of holding
any lien. As others have noted, the junior lienholder in effect holds a type of
option on the mortgaged property." Even if ajunior lien is underwater, as
long as the lien remains effective, the value of the mortgaged property could
increase in value to the point that the junior lien may once again meaningfully
secure repayment of some or all of the unpaid debt. For this reason, Second
Bank might argue that its-conduct-demanding a $10,000 ransom as a price
for releasing its option, even though its lien presently has no market value-
is both rational and normatively justified. In other words, Second Bank might
say that there is no "junior lien problem." There are several problems with
this position, however.
First, as Part H explained, our existing residential mortgage market
prevents a senior mortgage lender from contracting for protection against this
risk. In a perfectly free market, the senior mortgagee could gain protection
from this risk by including in the senior mortgage a due-on-encumbrance
clause and enforcing that clause in the event that a junior lien arises without
'" This estimate of delay and transaction costs derives from the FHFA's data. See supra notes 133-
34 and accompanying text
.67 Of course, in some individual cases one or more of the parties might make additional financial
concessions, but it would be understandable and typical if all refused to do so.
'" See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 43, at 1272-86; Vickie Been, Howell Jackson & Mark Willis,
Sticky Seconds-The Problems Second Liens Pose to the Resolution of Distressed Mortgages, 9 N.Y.U.
J.L. & Bus. 71, 98 (2012).
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the senior's consent. It is true that an enforceable due-on-encumbrance clause
in the senior mortgage would not avoid the risk of undesired junior liens
completely; a junior lien could arise without the senior's consent
involuntarily (e.g., another creditor obtains a judgment lien) or even
voluntarily (e.g., the mortgagor and the junior mortgagee decide to take the
risk that the nonconsenting senior will choose not to accelerate the debt and
proceed to foreclosure).i' Nevertheless, to the extent that a senior could
bargain for and enforce a due-on-encumbrance clause, it would surely
discourage lenders from voluntarily taking junior lien positions without the
senior's consent. It would also increase the senior's leverage to obtain an
inter-creditor agreement that could limit the junior's ability to exercise the
leverage effect to the senior's detriment.170 However, as Part II explained, the
Garn Act prohibits the senior residential mortgagee from exercising a due-
on-encumbrance clause."' The Garn Act thus effectively pernits the
mortgagor to create ajunior lien (and its associated leverage risk) without the
consent of the senior mortgagee and without permitting the senior to protect
itself against this risk contractually (other than by pricing that risk into the
senior interest rate in the first instance).17 2
Second, in a market where the junior lien is underwater, the junior's
exercise of the leverage effect is extortionate because the costs of the
foreclosure process in that instance are entirely external to thejunior."'7 If the
'" A senior mortgagee might attempt to prevent this through the use of a disabling restriction (under
which any attempt by the mortgagor to create ajunior lien is void) or a forfeiture restriction (under which
any attempt by the mortgagor to create a junior lien would result in the forfeiture of the mortgagor's
interest). However, while the Gam Act establishes the reasonableness and validity of a due-on-
encumbrance clause, it does not validate either disabling or forfeiture restrictions, and courts might be
more willing to characterize a disabling or forfeiture restraint as an unreasonable restraint on alienation
and thus invalid. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 405 (AM. LAw INST. 1944) ("Disabling
restraints, other than those imposed on equitable interests under a trust, are invalid."); Id § 406 (forfeiture
restraint valid only if it is "qualified so as to permit alienation to some though not all possible aliences"
and "is reasonable under the circumstances").
'" To preserve its position, the junior either would have to enter into an inter-creditor agreement with
the senior (and likely bear the cost of negotiating it) or redeem its position by paying off the balance of
the senior debt See Patrick Cleary, Intercreditor Agreements, ALEXANDER HOLBURN: Bus. L. BLOG (May
3, 2012), http/businesslawblog.ahb.ca/2012/05/03/intercreditor-agreements/.
"' See supra notes 17-43 and accompanying text.
"n See 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 et seq. (2018). To the extent that the senior adjusts by pricing this into
first mortgage interest rates, of course, it creates a potentially undesirable cross-subsidy in which
homeowners without second mortgages are effectively subsidizing the debt service costs of homeowners
with second mortgages.
'" See, e.g., Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 168, at 97 ("The second lien holder may be more
likely to underinvest in or block cooperative approaches to a modification or other efficient resolution of
a distressed mortgage. Some of the costs of doing so-such as the consequences of foreclosure-are born
by the first lien holder or by others who are not involved in the transaction, such as the neighbors ofthe
property. On the other hand, the benefits of modifying a delinquent mortgage accrue to the borrower,
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junior demands an excessive ransom that "craters" an otherwise beneficial
deed in lieu or short sale and a foreclosure of the senior mortgage results, the
additional costs associated with that foreclosure fall on the mortgagor (i.e.,
loss of the home and potentially continued deficiency risk),174 the senior
mortgagee (i.e., additional transaction and delay costs, unlikely to be
recovered, and a likely foreclosure sale discount relative to a frustrated short
sale), 7 s neighboring landowners (i.e., property values that are diminished by
proximity to the foreclosed property),"' and the local community as a whole
(i.e., diminished property tax collections resulting from reduced property
values and other social costs associated with vacant housing)."' The desire
to avoid these costs explains why the federal government's foreclosure
neighbors, and the economy as a whole, not necessarily the holder of a second lien.").
" Julie Forrester has also argued that because bankruptcy law gives substantial protection to junior
mortgage lenders, such as the potential benefit of the anti-modification rule discussed supra note 78, the
presence of junior liens on home mortgages may inappropriately discourage deserving borrowers from
seeking bankruptcy protection. Forrester, supra note 78, at 427-32 (discussing tendency of many
homeowners to encumber their homes with junior liens to pay or consolidate unsecured debts rather than
filing for bankruptcy).
'" See Zhang, supra note 4, at 17 (noting a 92% transaction discount between homes selling in
foreclosure sales and homes selling via short sales).
'" As others have explained, housing prices are both spatially and serially correlated; a decline in the
value of an inadequately maintained house will tend to reduce the value of neighboring houses. Because
borrowers often cease maintaining mortgaged properties in foreclosure, foreclosures tend to have spillover .
effects on neighboring parcels, and these effects increase in neighborhoods with multiple foreclosed
properties. See, e.g., Vicki Been, Jenny Schuetz & Ingrid Gould Ellen, Neighborhood Effects of
Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures, 17 J. HouSING ECON. 306, 317 (2008); John Y. Campbell et al.,
Forced Sales and House Prices, 101 AM. ECON. REv. 2108, 2130 (2011); John P. Harding et al., The
Contagion Efect of Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. URBAN ECON. 164, 177 (2009); Dan Immergluck &
Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact ofSingle-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on
Property Values, 17 HousING POL'Y DEBATE 57, 69 (2006); Zhengou Lin et al., Spillover Effects of
Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 387, 388-89 (2009). See
also Levitin & Wachter, supra note 43, at 1251-52 ("Several studies have found that home sale prices
decline an average of 1% for each nearby foreclosure (usually within 0.1 miles)."); Zhang, supra note 4,
at 19 ("Each foreclosure sale decreases nearby home prices by up to 0.6% after the foreclosure sale itself
and this negative foreclosure externality does not disappear even one and a half years after the foreclosure
sale itself. On the other hand, the short sale externality is almost nonexistent").
'" To the extent that foreclosures in an underwater market diminish the property values of other
homeowners, then it likewise (as revaluation occurs) diminishes the local tax base and thus property tax
collections. See, e.g., James Alm, Robert D. Buschman & David L. Sjoquist, Foreclosures and Local
Government Revenues fram the Property Tax: The Case of Georgia School Districts, 46 REGIONAL SC.
& URB. ECON. 1 (2014) (increase in home foreclosures from 2006-2011 caused 3% decrease in property
tax base); Ann M. Burkhart, Fixing Foreclosure, 36 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 315 (2018); Keith Ihlanfeldt
& Tom Mayok, Foreclosures and Local Government Budgets, 53 REGIONAL SC. & URB. ECON. 135, 145
(2015) (empirical study of foreclosures in fifty-five Florida counties; finding that foreclosures reduced tax
base by 1.65% and diminished tax revenue by over $5,000 for each foreclosure).
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mitigation efforts include significant payment incentives tojunior lienholders
to facilitate short sales or deed in lieu transactions."'
Finally, agency problems in the residential mortgage servicing market
further compromise the efficient resolution of distressed mortgage loans
other than by foreclosure. These agency problems take predominantly two
forms. First, compensation schemes for the servicer of the first mortgage
have tended to favor foreclosure of a defaulted mortgage rather than
modification:
Servicers have no stake in the performance of mortgage loans, so they do
not share investors' interest in maximizing the net present value of the loan.
Instead, a servicer's decision whether to foreclose or modify a loan is based
on its own cost and income structure, which is skewed toward
foreclosure.1'"
Thus, as Professor Been has noted, because second liens add to the
transaction costs a servicer must bear to modify a first mortgage loan,
"second liens exacerbate the gap between a servicer's own interests and the
interests of the principal."" Second, and more significantly, the entity
servicing the first mortgage is also frequently the same entity (or an affiliate
of the same lender) holding the junior lien position.8 i In this situation, the
" See supra note 121 (discussing governmental short sale and deed in lieu of foreclosure
requirements). See also Levitin & Wachter, supra note 43, at 1265 n.49 (discussing 2MP Second Lien
Modification Program); Second Lien Modgication Program (2MP): Overview, HOME AFFORDABLE
MODIFICATION PROGRAM, httpsJ/www.hmpadmin.com/portal/programs/second-lien.jsp (last visited
Aug. 5, 2018). Some have posited that junior lienholders and junior lien servicers may have strategically
refused to cooperate with deed in lieu and short sale proposals to increase the likelihood that government
actors would introduce these subsidies for junior lienholder cooperation. See, e.g., Been, Jackson &
Willis, supra note 168, at 98-99 ("[S]econd lien holders may hope the government will introduce
programs that will require other parties (such as taxpayers) to bear some of the costs of any workout That
expectation may lead to moral hazard: a second lien holder will be more likely to take the risk that its
delay in working with the first lien holder to reduce the borrower's distress will render the second lien
worthless if it believes that delay may allow it to take advantage of subsidies that might become
available."); James Kwak, Underwater Second Liens, BASELINE SCENARIO (Mar. 13, 2010),
https://baselinescenario.com/2010/03/13/underwater-second-lins/ ("In practice, the second liens do have
some small value, based on three things: (1) the hope that some borrowers will continue to make payments
on second liens, even though would do better (financially) to walk away; (2) option value, since housing
prices could rise enough to make the second liens worth something; and (3) the possibility that the
government will start paying off second lienholders to stop blocking short sales.").
'" Levitin & Twomey, supra note 1, at 1; see also Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 168, at 100
("foreclosure allows the servicer to minimize its out of pocket costs and to recover quickly any advances
it has to make to cover the shortfall to investors when a borrower is delinquent"); Diane E. Thompson,
Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 WASH. L. REV.
755(2011).
' Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 168, at 100.
a The phenomenon clearly exists, but its precise frequency is unclear. While some have asserted that
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servicer's incentives are also skewed; for example, the servicer may urge
modification of the senior debt so as to preserve its junior lien position when
a deed in lieu or short sale might provide a more appropriate resolution."
Alternatively, the servicer may refuse an otherwise appropriate modification
of the senior debt so as to avoid any appearance of self-dealing. 83
As long as mortgage law continues to allow the creation of junior
mortgages and disempowers the senior home mortgagee to protect itself
contractually from a junior's inefficient exercise of its leverage, we will
continue to have what we are calling "the junior lien problem," i.e., junior
liens will continue to complicate resolution of distressed senior mortgages
other than by foreclosure. What is needed-but what standard mortgage law
has not previously provided-is a way for a borrower to deliver a deed in lieu
or short sale deed that will wipe out the liens of underwater and uncooperative
junior lienholders. We now turn to a new model law that would accomplish
that result.
V. THE MODEL NEGOTIATED ALTERNATIVE TO FORECLOSURE ACT
The concept of a deed in lieu of foreclosure with title-clearing effect is
not revolutionary. In fact, the concept has featured prominently in UCC
Article 9's default remedies structure-where it is known as "strict
foreclosure"-for more than five decades already."'
A. The Precursor: Article 9 Strict Foreclosure
A strict foreclosure is a trade under which the secured party acquires the
debtor's rights in the collateral without the normal foreclosure process" in
over half of all second liens are held by the servicer of the first lien, see Been, Jackson & Willis, supra
note 168, at 100, this number seems quite high. In congressional testimony in 2010, then JPMorgan Chase
Home Lending CEO David Lowman stated that "[albout 10 percent of Chase's total serviced portfolio of
first lien mortgage loans has a Chase-owned second lien." Second Liens and Other Barriers to Principal
Reduction as an Effective Foreclosure Mitigation Program: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fi. Servs.,
I I 1Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of David Lowman, ChiefExecutive Officer for Home Lending, JPMorgan
Chase).
"n Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala Chomsisengphet & Yan Zhang,
Holdup by Junior Claimholders: Evidence from the Mortgage Market (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 20015, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20015 ("We show that servicers are less
likely to act on the first lien mortgage owned by investors when they themselves own the second lien
claim secured by the same property. When they do act, such servicers' choices are skewed towards actions
that maximize the value of their junior claims, favoring modification over liquidation and short sales and
deeds-in-lieu over foreclosures.").
183 Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 168, at 96-97; Levitin & Wachter, supra note 43, at 1265.
184 U.C.C. § 9-620(a), cmt 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2010).
'8 WILLIAM H. LAwRENcE, WILLIAM H. HENNING & R. WilsoN FREYERMUTH, UNDERSTANDING
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exchange for (where the debtor is a consumer) satisfaction of the underlying
debt.'" The secured party is then free to use or dispose of the collateral as it
wishes, without regard to the provisions that would govern an Article 9
foreclosure sale.
A secured party initiates a strict foreclosure by making a "proposal" that
sets forth the terms on which the secured party will accept the collateral
satisfaction of the debt,1 7 and by providing notice of the proposal to all
persons who would have been entitled to notification prior to an Article 9
foreclosure sale."' If the secured party receives a timely objection from
anyone receiving the proposal or from a person holding a subordinate interest
in the collateral, the secured party cannot use strict foreclosure.'i If the
secured party does not receive a timely objection, the debtor's rights in the
collateral become vested in the secured party, and the secured party's
interest-and any subordinate liens-are extinguished.'" The strict
foreclosure process thus permits the debtor and the secured party to
accomplish the equivalent of a deed in lieu of foreclosure, but with all of the
title-clearing benefits associated with foreclosure.
If the collateral's value exceeds the debt owed to the secured party (plus
expected costs of foreclosure), the debtor will object to the proposal and
effectively force the secured party to conduct a foreclose sale. The resulting
sale should, if the debtor's valuation is correct, generate surplus proceeds for
the debtor. 9' Likewise, because strict foreclosure will extinguish junior liens,
SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 18.04 (5th ed. 2012).
"' Under the original Article 9, strict foreclosure always resulted in the complete satisfaction of the
debtor's obligation, as the Code did not authorize strict foreclosure in partial satisfaction of the debt. See
U.C.C. § 9-505(2) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1972) (secured party may retain collateral "in
satisfaction of the obligation"); id § 9-505 cmt. I (strict foreclosure involves "abandoning any claim for
a deficiency"). Critics argued that the parties should be free to stipulate to a "fair price" for the secured
party to take title to the collateral in lieu of foreclosure (and thus to stipulate to a deficiency amount).
Revised Article 9 now permits partial strict foreclosure, but only in non-consumer transactions. U.C.C.
§§ 9-620(a), (g) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
'" Id. § 9-102(aX66). The decision to seek strict foreclosure rests with the secured party; the debtor
cannot force the secured party to use the procedure. LAWRENCE, HENNING & FREYERMUTH, supra note
185, at 450.
' U.C.C. § 9-621(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
* Id § 9-620(aX2). A person entitled to notification of the proposal must notify the secured party of
an objection within twenty days after notification of the proposal was sent. Id § 9-620(dX). Any other
person holding an interest in the collateral (such as a judgment lien) but not entitled to notification ofthe
proposal must object within twenty days of the last notification given by the secured party or, if no
notifications are given, before the debtor consents to the proposal.
2" Id § 9-622(a). Strict foreclosure extinguishes subordinate interests even if the secured party fails
to comply with its notification requirements. Id § 9-622(b). Any person that was entitled to notification,
but did not receive it, may recover any damages caused by the secured party's noncompliance. Id § 9-
625(b).
'9 Id § 9-61 5(d)(1) (debtor entitled to surplus following payment of expenses of sale and liens
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juniors will also object if a normal disposition would be expected to produce
a surplus that would be paid to the objecting junior.
B. The Model Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure Act
In 2015, the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the Uniform Home
Foreclosure Procedures Act (UHFPA).im UHFPA is a substantial. and
complex act dealing with many aspects of mortgage foreclosure. It addresses
who has standing to commence a foreclosure, notice of default and
mortgagor's right to cure, sending and publication of notice of sale, sale
procedures, remedies and defenses, and alternative dispute resolution
processes which include a title-clearing deed in lieu of foreclosure called a
"negotiated transfer.""' The intent ofthe drafters was to provide an "overlay"
to existing state law foreclosure processes." In other words, while each state
could continue to follow its traditional foreclosure practices (e.g., requiring
judicial foreclosure rather than permitting nonjudicial foreclosure), UHFPA
would establish certain basic threshold procedures and protections.
No jurisdiction has enacted UHFPA, and nojurisdiction is likely to enact
it anytime soon. Though UHFPA does reflect a thoughtful overall balance
between the interests of borrowers and mortgage lenders, borrower and
lender advocates each perceive that the present m6lange of state foreclosure
laws provides them with respective advantages in resolution of defaulted
mortgage loans-advantages they are reluctant to compromise through
comprehensive reform. 9 s Further, major consumer advocacy groups refused
to participate in the drafting process, and thus feel no stake in UHFPA's
enactment."
Nevertheless, some of the concepts reflected in individual segments of
the UHFPA are beginning to be reflected in piecemeal state-by-state
foreclosure reform legislation. Even prior to UHFPA, alternative dispute
resolution procedures similar to those reflected in UHFPA Article 3 had
extinguished by fbreclosure).
1 UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES AcT (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2015) [hereinafter UHFPA].
* See generally id
* See id § 805 cmt. 2.
19 Legislative Fact Sheet-Home Foreclosure Procedures Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheetaspx?titleHome/*2Foreclosur/2Procedures/20
Act (last visited Aug. 3, 2018).
'" This is unfortunate, because some of UHFPA's provisions, such as its limitations upon an
assignee's ability to assert holder-in-due-course status as a defense to a borrower's claims of fraud or
material misrepresentation in the origination of the loan, see UHFPA, supra note 192, § 705, are quite
borrower-favorable.
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already been adopted in a number of states.'9 Further, several states have
recently adopted "fast-track" foreclosure procedures for abandoned
mortgaged property; some of which are comparable in substance to the
provisions of UHFPA Article 6.198
In our view, the most valuable innovation of UHFPA is the "negotiated
transfer" authorized in UHFPA Article 5,99 which would permit a title-
clearing deed in lieu of foreclosure akin in important respects to Article 9
strict foreclosure. At its 2017 Annual Meeting, the ULC carved out the
negotiated transfer provisions from UHFPA Article 5, placed them in a free-
standing act labeled the Model Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure Act
(MNAFA), and approved MNAFA for enactment in the states. 200 MNAFA is
a targeted response to the problem ofjunior liens as a barrier to deeds in lieu
and short sales. It authorizes the mortgagor and the mortgagee to negotiate a
transfer of the mortgaged property to the mortgagee, and provides that
"all ... interests subordinate to the interest of the creditor that is a party to
the proposed negotiated transfer are extinguished.""' Of course, wiping out
junior liens in this fashion is justified only where those liens have no
economic value. MNAFA accomplishes this ingeniously, effectively forcing
the junior lienholder to decide for itself whether its lien is worth preserving.
The remainder of Part V outlines MNAFA's negotiated transfer procedures.
'" See id §§ 301-06, which provide what is essentially a court-supervised or agency-supervised
mediation process (though UHFPA eschews the term "mediation" in favor of "foreclosure resolution").
The National Consumer Law Center maintains a page on its website identifying twenty-six states with
foreclosure mediation programs. See Foreclosure Mediation Programs by State, NAT'L CONSUMER L.
CTR., https://www.nclc.org/issues/foreclosure-mediation-programs-by-state.html (last visited Aug. 5,
2018).
'" See UHFPA, supra note 192, § 601 (determination of abandonment in judicial foreclosure
proceedings); id § 602 (determination of abandonment in nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings); id § 603
(when presumption of abandonment arises); id § 604 (procedure for withdrawal of abandonment); id §
605 (foreclosure procedures for abandoned property); id § 606 (maintenance obligations with respect to
abandoned property). As of2014, states with specific procedures for foreclosure with respect to abandoned
property existed in Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, and Oklahoma. Geoffry
Walsh, Fast Track Foreclosure Laws: Are They Headed in the Right Direction?, NAT'L CONSUMER L.
CTR. (Jan. 2014), https://www.ncic.org/images/pdt7pr-reports/report-fast-track-foreclosure-laws.pdf.
Maryland enacted a fast-track foreclosure statute for vacant properties in 2017. See MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. §§ 7-105.1, .14 (2018).
'" UHFPA, supra note 192, §§ 501-04.
2m See generally MODEL NEGOTIATED ALT. To FORECLOSURE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017)
[hereinafter MNAFA].
2' Id § 5(a).
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C. The Mechanics and Scope of the MNAFA
1. Notification to Junior Lienholders
Because the consummation of a negotiated transfer will extinguish junior
liens, MNAFA requires notification of the proposed transfer to junior
lienholders. If there is a judicial foreclosure pending at the time of the
negotiated transfer agreement, the homeowner and the mortgagee must
request the court to send notice of the proposed transfer to all other parties to
the action;202 this would include any junior lienholders, who are necessary
parties to a judicial foreclosure.203 If there is no judicial foreclosure pending
at the time of the agreement,2 04 the mortgagee must send notification of the
proposed transfer to junior lienholders of record and any other persons from
whom the creditor has received notice of a claimed interest in the home.205
2. Objection and Redemption by Junior Lienholder
A junior lienor has twenty days from the date notice was sent to object
to the proposed negotiated transfer.20 If the junior lienholder does not timely
object, the parties can complete the transfer and the junior lien is.
extinguished. 2 07 However, if ajunior lienholder objects and wishes to prevent
the negotiated transfer, the junior must redeem the property from the senior
2 Id § 4(a).
2o3 NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supm note 25, § 7:13.
' MNAFA, supra note 200, § 4(b). Section 4(b) would apply in a judicial-foreclosure-only state if
the mortgagee has not yet filed a foreclosure action. This might occur either because mortgagor has
defaulted but mortgagee has not yet determined to foreclose, or because the mortgagee has determined to
foreclose but has not yet prepared and filed a complaint. Section 4(b) will always apply in a nonjudicial
foreclosure state (except in the rare case in which the mortgagee has nevertheless filed a judicial
foreclosure action), without regard to whether the mortgagee has taken the steps necessary to commence
a nonjudicial foreclosure.
20 Id ("If a homeowner and creditor propose a negotiated transfer when a judicial foreclosure is not
pending, the creditor shall send notice of the proposed transfer to: (1) a person from which the creditor
received, before the homeowner and creditor agreed to the proposed transfer, notice of a claimed interest
in the mortgaged property; and (2) a person that, [10] days before the homeowner and creditor agreed to
the proposed transfer, held a recorded interest in the property subordinate to the mortgage that is the
subject of the proposed transfer.").
2 Id § 3(a)(4). The objection must be in a "record," i.e., "inscribed on a tangible medium or [] stored
in an electronic or other medium and [] retrievable in perceivable form." Id § 2(11).
207 Id §§ 5(a), 6(a) (negotiated transfer "(1) discharges the obligation in full; (2) transfers to the
creditor all of the homeowner's rights in the property, except for a right of the homeowner to continue to
occupy the property pursuant to an agreement between the homeowner and creditor which is incorporated
in the negotiated-transfer agreement; (3) discharges the mortgage held by the creditor and any mortgage
or other lien subordinate in priority to the mortgage held by the creditor; and (4) terminates any other
subordinate interest except an interest protected from termination by law other than this [act].").
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mortgage lien by tendering the amount of the senior mortgage obligation.20
If the junior does redeem, the junior becomes "entitled to the benefit of the
proposed transfer," i.e., it obtains title to the property free of the redeemed
lien and all subordinate interests.2" Obviously, ajunior lienor will do so only
if it believes the home's expected value justifies the redemption price.
Due to the need for title clarity, MNAFA requires a judicial process to
establish a redemption date if a junior lienholder objects.21 o If a judicial
foreclosure is already pending, the court simply sets a date, not more than
thirty days after the objection, by which the objecting junior lienor must pay
off the senior lien.2" If the junior objects when no judicial proceeding is
pending-as would typically be the case in ajurisdiction that uses nonjudicial
foreclosure-the mortgagee must file a judicial proceeding and have the
court set a redemption date for the objecting lienholder.21 2 In either case, if
the junior lienor fails to tender the redemption amount by the date established
by the court, its lien is extinguished.2 13
Because a home could be subject to multiple junior liens, and all junior
lienholders must receive notice of a proposed negotiated transfer, it is
possible (though not likely) that two or more junior lienholders could file
objections. In such a situation, MNAFA requires the court to establish a
process for sequentially recognizing the juniors' respective rights of
redemption. To accomplish this, the court must establish the relative
Id § 5(a) (objecting junior lienholder may "tender to the creditor that is a party to the transfer an
amount equal to the obligation to be satisfied"). Ifa junior lienor makes such a tender, the mortgagee's
claim is paid in full and the redeeming junior lienholder steps into the position of the paid-off creditor.
Id (ifjunior timely redeems, junior "is entitled to the benefit of the proposed transfer, and all interests
subordinate in priority to the interest ofthe creditor that is a party to the proposed transfer are extinguished
effective on the date of tender").
2M id
210 id
211 Id The MNAFA's process is functionally the same as ajunior lienholder would face under the law
in Connecticut, which uses strict foreclosure. When a senior lienholder in Connecticut files a petition for
strict foreclosure and the property is affected by a junior lien, the court would establish a date by which
the junior lienholder would have to redeem its junior lien from the foreclosing senior or have that lien
extinguished. See also 3 JOEL M. KAYE & WAYNE D. EFFRON, CONN. CIVIL PRACTICE FORMS, Form
707.1 (4th ed. 2018).
212 MNAFA, supra note 200, § 5(c) ("If a judicial proceeding is not pending and a creditor that sends
a notice under Section 4(b) receives an objection from a person holding an interest in the mortgaged
property which would be affected by the negotiated transfer, the negotiated transfer may not proceed
unless the creditor initiates a judicial proceeding to allow the objecting person to tender the amount due
to the creditor.").
..3 Id § 5(a) ("If the person does not tender the amount to the creditor on or before the date set by the
court, the interest of the person objecting and all other interests subordinate to the interest of the creditor
that is a party to the proposed negotiated transfer are extinguished, effective on the date set by the court
by which the tender could have been made.").
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priorities of the objecting juniors 214 and then fix a series of redemption
dates-assigning a redemption date to each objecting junior lienholder in the
reverse order of their priority, with the most junior lienholder getting the
earliest redemption date.215 The most junior objecting lienholder must tender
an amount equal to the total of the balances due on all debts secured by liens
superior to its own.2 1 6 If it does so in a timely manner, the tendering junior
becomes the owner of the property free and clear of the redeemed liens and
any subordinate interests.217 If that junior fails to make a timely tender, its
lien is extinguished and the next (i.e., the next more senior) lienholder is
entitled to its turn. 218 This process continues until any objecting junior
exercises timely redemption or until all objecting juniors have failed to do
SO.219
This process is conceptually similar to the rights ofjunior lienholders in
an ordinary foreclosure; all juniors are subject to being terminated by the
foreclosure of a senior lien, but each has a common law right to redeem its
lien from senior liens prior to the foreclosure sale. However, in an ordinary
foreclosure, a junior who redeems from the senior lien acquires only the
senior's lien position, not the mortgagor's equity of redemption. 220 By
contrast, under MNAFA-because the mortgagor has already agreed to
2M Id § 5(b) (if there are multiple objecting juniors, "the court promptly shall determine the relative
priorities ofthe interests held by each person that filed an objection").
21- Id ("The court shall set separate days by which each objecting person holding an interest in the
mortgaged property may tender the amounts described in [Section 5(a)] to the creditor proposing the
negotiated transfer and the amounts due to other persons holding junior interests]. The court shall assign
the days to the objecting parties in the reverse order of their priorities, with the objecting party holding
the most junior interests receiving the first tender date.").
216 id
217 Id § 5(d) ("If an objecting person holding the most junior interest in the mortgaged property tenders
the amounts described in subsection (b) on or before the date set by the court, the person is entitled to the
benefit of the proposed negotiated transfer, and all interests junior in priority to the interest of the creditor
that first proposed the negotiated transfer are extinguished effective on the date of tender.").
218 Id § 5(e) ("If an objecting person holding the most junior interest in the mortgaged property does
not tender the amounts described in subsection (b) on or before the date set by the court, the interests of
the person that failed to tender are extinguished, and the objecting party with the next tender date is entitled
to tender to all creditors that are senior in priority to the objecting party in the same manner described in
subsection (b). This process continues until each objecting person has been paid in full or has its interest
extinguished.").
219 Id.
m NELSON, WHrrMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:2, at 570 ("A junior
lienholder's equitable right to redeem is different than the redemption right of the mortgagor .... [Tihe
mortgagor's equitable redemption right is to pay off the mortgage in default and redeem the land. The
mortgagor's payment extinguishes the mortgage. In contrast, the junior lienor purchases the senior
mortgage to prevent the senior mortgagee from foreclosing and thereby eliminating the junior lien.")
(emphasis in original).
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transfer its equitable ownership-the junior is redeeming the mortgaged
property itself
3. MNAFA's Scope and General Provisions
As a threshold matter, a negotiated transfer under MNAFA is possible
only for a mortgage on one-to-four-family residential property.22 ' A
negotiated transfer also requires express agreement between the mortgagor
and the mortgagee entered into after default.2 2 This agreement must state that
it is made pursuant to Section 3 of MNAFA, 2 3 and must "specify the date
and time when the homeowner must surrender possession" to the
mortgagee. 2 24
Under this agreement, the mortgagee must accept the property in full
satisfaction of the debt;2 5 in a negotiated transfer governed by MNAFA, the
22 MNAFA, sqpra note 200, § 2(6) ("'Mortgaged property' means real property improved with not
more than four dwelling units which is subject to a mortgage."). The term includes an attached single-
family unit such as a condominium or townhouse unit, a manufactured housing unit or time-share unit if
that unit constitutes real estate under applicable state law, property on which four or fewer dwelling units
are under construction, and a single-family unit in a common interest community. Id. The term does not
include a home that "was used or intended to be used primarily for nonresidential purposes" at the time
the mortgage was granted. Id Under the UHFPA, from which MNAFA was excerpted, the drafters
limited the act's scope to residential property for two reasons: (1) it was residential foreclosures that
clogged the courts and bogged down servicers during the mortgage crisis; (2) the drafters perhaps felt that
enactment prospects for UHFPA would be improved if the support of commercial mortgage lenders was
not required. Conceptually, of course, the principles of MNAFA could be applied equally well to
nonresidential mortgage loans, and a state that enacted MNAFA could, if it wished, remove this scope
restriction.
m Id § 3(a)(1). In an Article 9 strict foreclosure, it is possible that strict foreclosure can occur based
upon implied consent, i.e., where the secured party proposes strict foreclosure and the debtor fails to
respond (which might occur because the debtor receives the proposal and does not object, or because the
debtor never reads the proposal, or even because the debtor never received a proposal that was properly
sent). By contrast, under MNAFA, implied consent from the mortgagor is not permissible; the
homeowners and the mortgagee must agree to the transfer in a "record," id, which means a writing
("inscribed on a tangible medium") or storage of the agreement "in an electronic or other medium ...
retrievable in perceivable form." Id § 2(11).
m Id § 3(aX2). MNAFA does not preclude the mortgagor and mortgagee from entering into a deed
in lieu agreement the terms of which would be governed by the applicable state's prior common law. See
id § 6(f) ("This [act] does not prevent a homeowner and creditor from entering into an agreement other
than a negotiated transfer, but the consequences of a negotiated transfer described in this section do not
apply to an agreement that does not state it is made pursuant to Section 3."). 'Tis requirement thus enables
an interested person to distinguish between a negotiated transfer (which would have title-clearing effect
under MNAFA) and a traditional deed in lieu (which would not).
m Id § 3(b). Where there are junior lienholders entitled to notice of the proposed agreement, the
homeowner "is not obligated to surrender possession before the 20-day period" for junior lienholders to
object to the agreement, even if the agreement provides to the contrary. Id
m Id § 3(a) ("A homeowner and creditor may negotiate a transfer of mortgaged property to the
creditor infull satisfaction of the obligation to the creditor secured by the mortgage . . . .") (emphasis
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mortgagee cannot preserve the right to a deficiency judgment to any extent.2 26
This protects unsophisticated consumers from bad negotiated transfer deals,
corresponds with the result most borrowers would expect," and is consistent
with Article 9's analogous prohibition on partial strict foreclosure in
consumer transactions.22 8 However, nothing in MNAFA prevents the
mortgagee from agreeing to pay the mortgagor additional sums (e.g., "cash
for keys") to help defray moving expenses and encourage the mortgagor's
agreement.229 If there are multiple owners of the home, the choice to proceed
under the Act is available only if all of the owners agree.23 0 However,
obligors who are liable on the debt but have no interest in the real estate (e.g.,
guarantors) need not be parties to the negotiated transfer agreement, because
a negotiated transfer extinguishes the obligation and thus such obligors have
no down-side risk."
As noted above, MNAFA's procedures govern only if the parties choose
to have MNAFA govern and state this intent in their agreement. 32 Thus, if a
first mortgagee conducts a title examination and discovers no junior liens, the
mortgagee and the homeowner may prefer to use a traditional deed in lieu of
foreclosure, in which case the provisions of MNAFA do not apply.233
Finally, while MNAFA will be of greatest use to first mortgage lenders;
it is equally available to junior mortgagees. However, MNAFA has no effect
on mortgages or liens senior to the mortgage that is the subject of the
negotiated transfer.2 3 Thus, for example, assume that Freyermuth's home is
added); Id § 3(c) ("This section does not authorize a transfer of mortgaged property to a creditor in partial
satisfaction of the obligation it secures.").
' Id § 6(d) ("Transfer of mortgaged property under Section 3 terminates any right of the creditor to
obtain a personal judgment against the homeowner and any other person liable for the obligation secured
by the property, including attorney's fees, costs, and other expenses.").
m Cf CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580e (2018) (prohibiting deficiency judgment against mortgagor
fIlowing short sale).
22 U.C.C. § 9-620(g) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAw COMM'N 2010) ("In a consumer transaction, a
secured party may not accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures.").
229 See generally MNAFA, supra note 200.
Id § 3(a)(1). See also id § 3, cmt 4 ("When there are multiple owners of the mortgaged property,
all the owners need to consent to a negotiated transfer. The act does not authorize a forced transfer outside
of foreclosure for a non-consenting co-owner.").
" Id § 3, cmt 5 ("Because the effect of a negotiated transfer under section 6(aX1) is to completely
discharge the obligation, this section does not require any consent from an obligor who is not also a
homeowner.").
232 Id § 3(aX2).
13 Id § 6(f) ("This [act] does not prevent a homeowner and creditor from entering into an agreement
other than a negotiated transfer, but the consequences of a negotiated transfer described in this section do
not apply to an agreement that does not state it is made pursuant to Section 3.").
2 Id § 3(d) ("A negotiated transfer does not affect the rights of a person holding an interest in
mortgaged property, if the interest has priority over the interest of a creditor to whom title to the property
is transferred under this section."); see also id § 5 cmt. 3 ("persons that hold interests that have priority
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subject to an unpaid property tax lien, which is superior in priority to Bank's
otherwise first mortgage. If Freyermuth and Bank engaged in a negotiated
transfer under MNAFA without paying the unpaid taxes, Bank would take
title to the home subject to the tax lien (the same result as would occur in a
conventional foreclosure).2"
D. MNAFA and Short Sales
By its terms, MNAFA applies only to transfers by a homeowner to a
mortgagee, i.e., the typical deed in lieu of foreclosure." It does not explicitly
address a short sale transaction in which the homeowner proposes to transfer
to a third person. MNAFA's provisions, nevertheless, can facilitate short sale
agreements and short sale deeds. For example, the homeowner and
mortgagee could structure the transaction so that the chain of title for the
short sale passes through the mortgagee. For instance, suppose that
Mortgagor owns a home subject to a $300,000 mortgage held by First Bank
and a $50,000 mortgage held by Second Bank. Mortgagor proposes to sell
the home to Purchaser for $240,000 (slightly below its appraised fair market
value of $250,000), so long as Mortgagor can deliver marketable title free of
the liens of First Bank and Second Bank. In this situation, the negotiated
transfer agreement could be a three-party agreement between Mortgagor,
Purchaser, and First Bank, in which First Bank agrees to take title pursuant
to the agreement under MNAFA and in turn to deliver title to Purchaser once
the negotiated transfer is complete. This would involve two deeds: one from
Mortgagor to First Bank-which under MNAFA would extinguish the
underwater Second Bank mortgage if, as is likely, Second Bank chooses not
to satisfy the First Bank mortgage debt-and a second from First Bank to
Purchaser conveying clear title. Presumably, First Bank would insist that the
deed it delivers to Purchaser would be without general title warranties, but
nothing in MNAFA requires such a warranty.
E. Negotiated Transfer, Article 9 Strict Foreclosure, and the Policy of
MNAFA
To an extent, MNAFA provides the mortgagee with a remedy that is
analogous to an Article 9 strict foreclosure as described above in Part V.A.
over the interest of the creditor who enters into the negotiated transfer with the horneowner-so-called
'senior interests'-would not be affected by the negotiated transfer, and the creditor taking title by
negotiated transfer would take only what the transferee had").
135 See NELSON, WHITMAN, BuRKHART& FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:13.
m MNAFA, supm note 200, § 3(a).
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However, the remedies are not precisely the same. Under Article 9 strict
foreclosure, if ajunior lienholder objects to the secured party's proposal, the
junior lienholder need not pay off the senior debt. Instead, the senior
receiving such an objection effectively must proceed with a foreclosure
sale." By contrast, under MNAFA, once the mortgagor and the mortgagee
send notice of the proposed negotiated transfer, the junior cannot simply
object and insist on a foreclosure sale; ajunior that wishes to protect itsjunior
lien must redeem the property or see its lien extinguished by the negotiated
transfer.238 Thus, while the Article 9 junior that believes there is equity in its
position can insist upon having that equity tested at a foreclosure sale,
MNAFA deprives the junior mortgagee of this option.
This policy distinction between MNAFA's procedure and Article 9 strict
foreclosure is entirely appropriate. For personal property collateral, if the
junior insists upon foreclosure, that foreclosure can occur in an arms-length
private sale239 that can happen in as little as two or three weeks.24 Even a
short reinvestment delay of a few weeks' time imposes some delay costs, and
Article 9 sales do involve transaction costs. For this reason, Article 9 permits
strict foreclosure to allow the secured party and the debtor to avoid these
costs by mutual consent. But while these delay and transaction costs are
external to the junior lienholder, they are relatively small enough that on
balance, Article 9 justifiably permits a junior lienholder to decide to protect
its potential equity in the collateral by insisting upon a foreclosure sale.
" This statement is not strictly correct, because Article 9 actually does not require the secured party
to conduct a disposition of the collateral (except in limited circumstances not pertinent here). Article 9
says that a secured party "may" dispose of collateral after default U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (AM. LAw INST. &
UNw. LAw COMM'N 2010). It does not say "shall dispose." See id Thus, a secured party that received
an objection to a strict foreclosure proposal could choose, consistent with the statute, not to conduct a
disposition and instead just use the collateral in whatever way the secured party chose to. A secured party
that did so, however, would still hold the collateral subject to the debtor's right of redemption, which can
only be extinguished by disposition. Id § 9-617(aX). Further, it would have the duties of a secured
party in possession of collateral, which might well be breached by the secured party's use of the collateral
without the debtor's consent See id § 9-207. Thus, as a practical matter, the secured party receiving an
objection to a strict foreclosure proposal must dispose of the collateral (usually by sale).
2 NMNAFA, supra note 200, § 6(a).
9 U.C.C. § 9-610(b) (AM. LAW INST. & UNEF. LAw COMM'N 2010) ("If commercially reasonable, a
secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a
unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.").
4 U.C.C. § 9-610(b) provides that except in the limited circumstances in which notice is excused, a
secured party disposing of collateral must send a "reasonable" notice of disposition to the persons
identified in § 9-610(c) (which include the debtor and junior lienholders). Id What amount of notice is
"reasonable" is a question of fact, but in non-consumer transactions, ten days prior notice is deemed to be
"within a reasonable time." Id §§ 9-612(a), (b).
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By contrast, in the real estate context, the external cost calculus is more
extreme. The real estate foreclosure must occur in a public auction,241 which
is likely to produce a lower recovery than what the mortgagee would receive
through a deed in lieu or short sale.242 Further, the real estate foreclosure
would in most states take six months to two years or more to complete 243
increasing the senior's likely reinvestment loss due to delay (including
opportunity costs and possible vandalism or deterioration of the property)
and additional transaction costs (particularly those associated with judicial
foreclosure).2 " Finally, the real estate foreclosure sale has spillover effects
not present in the Article 9 context. If Whitman defaults on his home loan
and the bank forecloses on Whitman's home, that foreclosure sale is more
likely to reduce the value of Freyermuth's nearby home; by contrast, if
Whitman defaults on his car loan and the bank repossesses and sells his car,
that repossession and sale has no impact on the value of Freyermuth's car.2 4 5
The MNAFA justifiably requires the objecting junior that wants to retain its
interest to internalize these costs-to "put its money where its mouth is." This
provides a fair, quick, and relatively inexpensive alternative form of
resolution of the distressed mortgage loan.
One might argue requiring an objecting junior to redeem the senior debt
is unfair to junior lienholders that have'little or no access to capital. This
argument holds no force for institutional lenders, who carry the majority of
junior liens. The argument may carry somewhat more force as applied to an
individual junior mortgagee (e.g., a home seller who takes a purchase money
mortgage to secure a portion of the purchase price but subordinates to an
institutional lender that provided financing to cover the balance of the price),
certain junior statutory lienholders (e.g., a subcontractor or material supplier
asserting a mechanic's lien), or judgment lienholders.24 On balance,
241 NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTrH, supra note 25, §§ 7:17 (judicial foreclosure),
7:20 (nonjudicial foreclosure).
242 See supra notes 129, 140-58 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. Judicial-foreclosure-only requirements magnify
the foreclosing creditor's transaction costs, as do inefficient nonjudicial foreclosure requirements (such as
the statutory requirement for repetitive newspaper publication of sale notice that typically provide little or
no useful information about the property).
243 Levitin & Wachtel, supra note 43, at 1251 ('[M]ost asset classes have serially uncorrelated asset
prices .... For example, ifyour car is damaged and declines in value, it does not affect the value of my
car, even if we park them next to each other.") (emphasis original).
24 One could simply exempt these more "sympathetic"junior lienors from the title-clearing effects of
a statute like the MNAFA. The drafters of MNAFA chose not to do so, perhaps because the percentage of
transactions in which one or more of such interests arises is likely nontrivial; exempting them altogether
would create a significant gap in MNAFA's scope and utility. Alternatively, because MNAFA does
contemplate some judicial process, one might allow these more sympathetic junior lienors to obtain a
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however, we believe that the MNAFA approach creates the necessary
mechanism to facilitate more efficient resolutions of distressed mortgage
loans during the next real estate crisis.
VI. RETHINKING JUNIOR LIENS: IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER REFORM OF
MORTGAGE LAW
As we explained in Part V, we believe that the enactment of MNAFA
would provide a necessary and useful mechanism to facilitate certain
resolutions of distressed mortgage loans, particularly in periods of declining
real estate values. In Part VI, we take a step back and think more broadly
about subordinate financing of residential real estate. How else might Article
9 inform potential reforms of American mortgage law so as to address the
junior lien problem? We begin by describing the way the Article 9 system
addresses junior liens, and then consider some ways in which state mortgage
law might adopt Article 9-inspired reform approaches.2 47
A. Article 9 vs. Mortgage Law-The Junior Lender's Calculus
As a threshold matter, UCC Article 9 and mortgage law provide parallel
secured finance systems and share a common overall conceptual approach.
Each system provides a set of rules governing the creation of a valid security
interest ("attachment" in Article 9 parlance) and certain aspects of the pre-
foreclosure relationship between the borrower and the creditor. Each system
provides a set of rules governing the process by which a creditor can give
notice of its security interest so as to make that interest enforceable against
certain third parties-"perfection" under Article 9, and "recording" under
real estate law. Each system provides a set of priority rules that rank-order
liens where more than one creditor holds a lien against the same collateral.
foreclosure sale if they can "prove the value" of the mortgage property through a competent appraisal.
This approach would, in some regards, be quite comparable to the existing strict foreclosure procedure
used in Connecticut, in which the court has discretion to order a foreclosure sale if the mortgagor or a
subordinate lienholder proves that the value of the mortgaged real estate exceeds the balance of the
foreclosing party's debt. See Fidelity Tr. Co. v. Irick, 538 A.2d 1027 (Conn. 1988); NELSON, WHITMAN,
BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 7:11, at 602.
247 One might also attempt to facilitate the modification of distressed mortgages through reform of
federal bankruptcy law so as to permit the mortgagor/debtor to obtain principal reduction. Professor Adam
Levitin has made this argument elsewhere. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosre Crisis:
Modification ofMortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 565 (2009) (arguing that mortgage lending
markets are in fact indifferent to bankruptcy strip-down of underwater liens). Such a change may well be
advisable. We have chosen here to focus more overtly on potential solutions based in state mortgage law.
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And each provides a set of remedies to the creditor when faced with default
by the borrower.
Junior liens can arise under both systems. However, because each system
has different priority and enforcement rules, the systems diverge dramatically
as to the prevalence and impact of junior liens. With respect to residential
real property, junior liens are widely found; previous commentators have
suggested that 20% of all homes are covered by junior mortgages.2 48
Voluntary junior liens against a home typically arise because a lender has
made a conscious decision to advance credit to the borrower against the
borrower's equity (the excess value of the home above the balance of the
senior mortgage debt) in exchange for the junior lien. Further, as noted in
Parts HI and IV, the priority and foreclosure rules associated with mortgage
law facilitate the ability of junior lienholders to exploit their leverage in a
fashion that can impose unwarranted costs upon senior lienholders,
borrowers, and even neighboring landowners.249
By contrast, under Article 9, there is no comparable "junior lien
problem." As noted earlier, Article 9's more streamlined foreclosure
procedures strongly temper the junior's leverage vis-A-vis the debtor and
senior lienholders. 2so But there is a more significant divergence. When a
voluntary junior lien arises under Article 9, it is not because a lender has
chosen to make a loan against the equity in machinery or other goods
belonging to the debtor. When voluntary junior liens arise under Article 9,
they arise in a very different way,251 for two important reasons.
24 See, e.g., Been, Jackson & Willis, supra note 168, at 77-78 ("Robert Avery and his colleagues
recently estimated that 13.2 million mortgages originated between 2004 and 2009 had a second mortgage.
Given that there are almost 66 million home purchase and refinance loans originated over the same period,
that estimate would suggest that some 20 percent of them had second liens.... Other estimates suggest
a similar or slightly higher percentage. Industry sources have reported, for example, that second liens
encumbered less than 18 percent of the loans held or guaranteed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
("agency" mortgages). Laurie Goodman and her colleagues estimated that more than 50 percent of the
mortgages in non-agency securities were accompanied by a second lien. Because the dollar volume of
non-agency mortgage-backed securities outstanding in 2011 amounted to less than a fifth ofthat of agency
mortgages, the weighted average of the 18 percent estimate for agency loans and the 50 percent estimate
for non-agency mortgage backed securities yields an average in the low 20's."); Second Liens and Other
Barriers to Principal Reduction as an Effective Foreclosure Mitigation Program: Hearing Before the H.
Comn. on Fin. Servs., 11Ith Cong. 5 (2010) (statement of David Lowman, Chief Executive Officer for
Home Lending, JPMorgan Chase) (noting that 30% of Chase-held first mortgages were subject to junior
liens, whether held by Chase or another lender). Junior liens could also arise involuntarily (e.g., judgment
liens, mechanics liens, and tax liens), but reliable data on the prevalence of involuntary liens is not readily
available.
249 See supra notes 74-183 and accompanying text.
'o See supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text.
' When voluntary junior liens arise under Article 9, they generally do not involve an extension of
new credit by the junior. Instead, the typical scenario in which a voluntary junior lien arises under Article
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First, there is a significant practical distinction between real property
collateral and most forms of personal property collateral. Lenders generally
expect that the value of real property will not decline (assuming proper
maintenance of the realty). This expectation has facilitated the popular
perception that one's home is a veritable ATM from which one can readily
tap equity as needed.252 By contrast, most forms of personal property
collateral-even if properly maintained-have a shorter useful life and lose
their value more rapidly, making junior lending against such property much
less desirable.
Second, and more significantly, Article 9's priority rules structurally
discourage voluntary junior lending. There certainly are forms of personal
property that do not readily depreciate over time (e.g., artwork) or do so very
slowly (e.g., a copyright or trademark). Yet there is no active market for
second lien financing of these assets. This is because Article 9's perfection
and priority rules are based upon the "first-to-file-or-perfect" rule,253 which
precludes a creditor from presuming that the debtor's equity in personal
property collateral is a reliable source of collateral.
To demonstrate, suppose Debtor wishes to borrow $2 million from Bank,
to be secured by a Picasso painting worth $5 million that Debtor owns free
of encumbrances. Bank searches the UCC records and finds no financing
statement on file covering the Picasso. On February 1, Bank then files a
financing statement covering the Picasso, Debtor signs a security agreement
covering the Picasso, and Bank advances $2 million to Debtor. Bank now has
a perfected security interest in the Picasso to secure repayment of the $2
million loan. Now assume that Debtor needs another $1 million in credit and
9 is this: (1) Bank already holds an otherwise first-priority blanket lien on all of Debtor's machinery,
presently-owned and after-acquired; and (2) Debtor acquires a new machine using credit obtained from
Finance Company to which Debtor grants a purchase-money security interest Bank obtains a perfected
security interest in the new machine by virtue of the after-acquired property clause in its security
agreement with Debtor, and if the first-to-file or perfect rule applied in this scenario, Bank's security
interest in the new machine (acquired when Debtor acquired rights in the machine) would take priority
over Finance Company's by virtue of Bank's prior-filed financing statement. However, in this scenario,
Article 9 subordinates Bank's security interest in the new machine to Finance Company's purchase-money
security interest in that machine, assuming that Finance Company takes sufficient action to perfect its
security interest within twenty days after Debtor takes possession ofthe machine. See U.C.C. § 9-324(a)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNiF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
2 See, e.g., Gabriel Rico, Think Twice Before Using Your House as an ATM, Experts in Tucson
Advise, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (July 9, 2016), https://tucson.com/business/tucson/think-twice-before-using-
your-house-as-atm-experts-in/article_6dl38236-lcb7-5255-9f3b-392cb9988c6.html; Diana Olick,
Homes as ATMs: It's Starting Again, CNBC (Oct. 5, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/05/homes-
as-atms-its-starting-again.html; Nin-Hai Tseng, The House That Was Your ATMIs Back, FORTUNE (Nov.
27, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/11/27/the-house-that-was-your-atm-is-back/.
25 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010) ("Conflicting perfected
security interests ... rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection.").
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approaches Finance Company, which on March 1 files a financing statement
covering the Picasso, loans Debtor $1 million, and takes a second-priority
security interest in the Picasso. Finally, on April 1, Debtor returns to Bank
and borrows an additional $3 million-increasing its total debt to Bank to $5
million-and signs another security agreement granting Bank another
security interest in the Picasso to secure repayment of the additional credit.
Debtor later defaults to Bank, which repossesses and sells the Picasso for $5
million.
In this situation, Finance Company (which is still owed $1 million) might
have expected that after Bank received payment of the original $2 million
loan, Finance Company's security interest would hold first priority (and thus
that Finance Company would have the best claim against the next $1 million
in sale proceeds). But this conclusion by Finance Company would be wrong.
Even though Finance Company's March I security interest in the painting
may have attached prior to Bank's April 1 security interest (granted to secure
the second loan) of $3 million, Bank's security interest has priority because
Bank was the first to file a financing statement covering the Picasso on
February 1, and that financing statement remains in effect. Thus, Bank will
recover the full amount of its $5 million loan from the Picasso's sale
proceeds, and Finance Company will be left with only an unsecured claim
for repayment of its $1 million loan.
Thus, even though Debtor may have had $3 million in equity in the
Picasso, Finance Company could not safely take ajunior position because the
first-to-file-or-perfect rule permits Debtor and Bank to enter into subsequent
loan agreements that "soak up" or "consume" that equity. As a result, a
creditor in the position of Finance Company that expected to have its desired
priority has only three ways to achieve that priority:
* It could enter into an inter-creditor agreement with Bank, in
which Bank agrees that while Bank will retain its priority as to
the then-$2 million outstanding principal balance and interest
accrued thereon, Bank subordinates its priority position as to any
future loans Bank might make to Debtor that are secured by the
Picasso.25 4
* It could loan Debtor $3 million, but direct $2 million of the loan
proceeds to pay off the existing debt to Bank and then require
Bank to terminate its financing statement255-thereby preventing
* Id § 9-339 ("This article does not preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to
priority.").
2s Id § 9-513(c) (secured party must take steps to terminate financing statement within twenty days
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a future Bank-Debtor secured loan transaction from qualifying for
priority under first-to-file-or-perfect.
* It could "take out" the Bank's position, paying Bank $2 million
and taking an assignment of Bank's security interest and
financing statement. 5 6
If it makes the loan without taking one of these steps, however, Finance
Company subjects itself to the risk that a future loan transaction between
Debtor and Bank will consume the Debtor's equity in the collateral. In effect,
under Article 9 all subsequent loans by Bank that are secured by the same
collateral take the priority of its original financing statement. This effectively
prevents a debtor from using its equity in personal property collateral as a
source of collateral without the consent or repayment of the first-priority
secured party.
B. Possible Mortgage Law Reforms Informed by Article 9 (Beyond
MNAFA)
Beyond the enactment of MNAFA as we recommended in Part V, what
other useful mortgage law reforms might Article 9 inspire?
1. Comprehensive Codification of Mortgage Law
Without question, the most aggressive reform would be to codify all of
mortgage law in a manner comparable to the way Article 9 codified the law
governing personal property security interests. This approach would include
a foreclosure process that allowed the mortgagee to complete a foreclosure
and obtain marketable title (i.e., free and clear ofjunior liens and any rights
of redemption) as quickly as that is possible for personal property collateral
under Article 9. Such a system would protect the current expectations of
borrowers that they can borrow against home equity and the current
expectations of lenders that such lending is secure (at least absent declining
following authenticated demand by debtor, if "there is no obligation secured by the collateral ... and no
commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value. . . ").
I In this situation, Article 9 would permit Finance Company to file an amendment of the Bank's
financing statement to indicate the assignment of the Bank's security interest to Finance Company. Id §
9-514(b). Such an amendment is not required, however; if Bank's security interest was properly
perfected, the security interest would remain perfected following its assignment to Finance Company as
long as Bank's financing statement remained effective, even if no amendment was made to reflect the
assignment. Id § 9-310(c) ("If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest or agricultural lien, a
filing under this article is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against
creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.").
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market values or circumstances involving waste). It would also permit a
foreclosing senior to avoid the severe enforcement delay and unwarranted
transaction costs that permit underwaterjunior lienholders to block otherwise
efficient modifications, deeds in lieu, or short sales. This might be done by
including provisions similar to MNAFA.
Of course, this approach has been tried and failed, would have no
likelihood of being enacted if tried again, and thus is probably not worth
trying again. Nearly half of the states require judicial foreclosure for land,257
and the fates of the 1985 Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA) and
the 2002 Uniform Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act (UNFA)-both of which tried
to encourage broader enactment of nonjudicial foreclosure-provide a
cautionary tale about further efforts.25 8 The likelihood that Congress might
federalize the foreclosure process seems even more remote.259
There is an intermediate solution that would ostensibly protect state
prerogatives while protecting national interests. The FHFA could use its
supervisory authority to direct Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase
mortgage loans only in states which have laws permitting nonjudicial
foreclosure processes that meet certain fairness and efficiency criteria. Such
a move would undoubtedly encourage recalcitrant state legislatures to adopt
nonjudicial foreclosure statutes like UNFA. However, the FHFA seems
unlikely to take such a bold step in an area which customarily falls under the
prerogative of state law.
25 See supra note 126 and accompanying text
258 In 1985, the ULC promulgated the Uniform Land Security Interest Act (ULSIA), which attempted
to codify a very substantial portion of mortgage law in a manner akin to UCC Article 9. See, e.g., Norman
Geis, Escape from the 15th Century: The Uniform Land Security Interest Act, 30 REAL PROP., PROB. &
TR. J. 289, 292 (1995) (ULSIA "holds the promise of accomplishing for the law of real estate mortgage
security what the Uniform Commercial Code has already accomplished so well for commercial law.").
ULSIA received zero enactments. 'he ULC adopted UNFA in 2002. UNFA's procedures were both fair
relative to existing state nonjudicial foreclosure processes (some of which permitted foreclosure on
unreasonable time frames and without required notice to certain creditors) and efficient relative to judicial
foreclosure. UNFA even included provisions permitting the possibility of foreclosure by negotiated sale
(e.g., one conducted by customary commercial methods used in the sale of real estate in arms-length
settings, including the use of brokers and pictorial advertising). See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 48.
But while UNFA provides the "state of the art" with respect to nonjudicial foreclosure, not a single state
has enacted UNFA to date.
I Our colleagues Grant Nelson and Bob Pushaw have previously argued that Congress could and
should federalize real estate law given that the secondary market has transformed the historically-local
mortgage market into a national one. See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Rethinking the Commerce
Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control
Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1999); see also Grant S. Nelson, A Commerce Clause Standard
for the New Millennium: "Yes" to Broad Congressional Control Over Commercial Transactions; "No"
to Federal Legislation on Social and Cultural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REv. 1213 (2003).
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2. Equating a Recorded Real Estate Mortgage with an Article 9
Financing Statement
A more modest, yet relatively aggressive reform would be for mortgage
law to allow a recorded mortgage to have the same effect as an Article 9
financing statement. Under this approach, the recording of a senior mortgage
would stake out the mortgagee's priority for any debts owed by the mortgagor
to the mortgagee and secured by the land-even debts incurred later--for as
long as the mortgage remained of record. Under this approach, as under
Article 9, a creditor taking a junior lien against the mortgagor's equity in the
property would be at risk that this equity would be "consumed" by future
advances or other subsequent loans from the mortgagee to the mortgagor that
are secured by the property.26
This approach holds significant potential advantages relative to mortgage
law's status quo. First, it would provide the most comprehensive fix to the
junior lien problem by creating the most optimal incentives. In the current
market, it is common for one lender to hold a senior mortgage, a separate
lender to hold a junior mortgage, and for there to be no inter-creditor
agreement between them.2 6 1 From a systems design perspective, this is
particularly undesirable-perhaps the worst possible result. An inter-creditor
agreement would be more likely to establish the respective priorities of the
parties explicitly; it would more likely constrain the junior's ability to
obstruct an efficient refinancing; and it would more likely prevent the junior
from blocking the senior's ability to obtain an otherwise efficient
modification or settlement of the senior mortgage. Mortgage law should
encourage the existence of such agreements. But under the status quo, such
" In fact, something similar to this approach is already available in some states, but remains unused
in residential lending. As noted, statutes in about one-third of the states empower mortgage lenders to
make future advances with the assurance that those advances will receive the priority of the original loan,
subject only to two conditions: the mortgage must contain a clause authorizing future advances, and it
must state a maximum amount for those advances. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
ITheoretically, the lender could insert a number into the mortgage that would stake out the lender's priority
beyond any amount likely to be loaned against the home. In other words, even if the home has a value of
only $200,000, the lender might state that the mortgage could secure up to $5 million. However, the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage form contains no future advance clause (and of course,
no statement of the maximum amount to be advanced), and thus fails to take advantage of these statutes.
Individual state adaptations of the uniform instrument (such as Missouri's) do have the necessary recitals
of the future advance priority statute, but lenders do not routinely use them to "stake out" priority in an
unlimited amount as described here. See THOMAS E. BAYNES, JR., FLORIDA MORTGAGEs § 5-6 (Dec.
2016).
" See Rohit Kapuria et al., What is an Inter-Creditor Agreement?, EB5 DILIGENCE (June 5, 2015),
https-//www.eb5diligence.com/articles/what-is-an-inter-creditor-agreement (highlighting inter-creditor
agreements as "not very favorable to a subordinate lender").
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an inter-creditor agreement typically does not exist; the Garn Act prevents
the senior home mortgagee from using the mortgage's due-on-encumbrance
clause as leverage to compel such an agreement.262
By contrast, under this Article 9-informed approach, a creditor taking a
voluntary junior lien could not be assured of having any priority against the
equity in the mortgaged property unless the junior obtained an inter-creditor
agreement establishing the agreed parameters of that priority. This approach
would place the burden of obtaining such an agreement on the junior-where
that burden rightly belongs under a system ostensibly based on the prior-in-
time concept. Further, because the Garn Act does not affect state law
perfection and priority rules, this approach accomplishes this result without
any need for Congress to modify the Garn Act.263
Second, this approach would eliminate the need for a mortgage to contain
provisions securing future advances,2" as well as all of the legal confusion
associated with the existing future advance priority rules. Courts would no
longer have to struggle with trying to articulate a meaningful and coherent
distinction between optional and obligatory advances, decide whether or
when the borrower had issued a stop notice, or if the borrower's issuance of
a stop notice is enforceable (i.e., whether it would unreasonably jeopardize
the senior's security for advances already made).26 5 This doctrine would
become irrelevant and unnecessary.
Third, this approach would also eliminate any need for courts to
determine whether a loan modification, replacement mortgage, or refinancing
mortgage resulted in a "material prejudice" to the intervening junior,266 or
a See Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (2018) (preemption
of due-on-sale provisions).
" Based in state law, this approach thus differs from the previous proposal by Professors Adam
Levitin and Susan Wachter that Congress should modify the Gam Act to permit a senior to accelerate the
senior debt if the borrower obtained a junior lien. See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 43, at 1287 ("We
suggest that the Garn-St Germain Act's prohibition on [due-on-sale] clause enforcement be modified, at
least as applied to voluntary junior liens. A lender should be able to call its loan ifthe homeowner willingly
encumbers the property with ajunior lien.").
' A mortgage could still have a future advances clause, and for efficiency purposes likely would. The
presence of such a clause would obviate the need for the mortgagee to have the borrower execute yet
another mortgage agreement at the time of later loans. But under this approach, a future advance clause
would be significant only as between the borrower and the lender with regard to whether a lien exists to
secure the later loan (i.e., for "attachment" purposes, in Article 9 terminology). The clause would, as under
Article 9, have no significance for purposes of establishing priority vis-A-vis other creditors.
265 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 2.3(cXl) (AM. LAW INST. 1997)
(mortgagor's issuance of stop notice is ineffective if "a termination or subordination of future advances
would unreasonably jeopardize the mortgagee's security for advances already made").
" It is conceivable that a senior/junior inter-creditor agreement could incorporate a "material
prejudice" standard in attempting to establish contractually how a subsequent modification of the senior
debt would affect the parties' relative priorities. If so, we suppose, present case law regarding the
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whether allowing equitable subrogation to a refinancing mortgagee would
prevent "unjust enrichment." If the existing senior mortgage remains of
record and is sufficient to stake out the senior's priority for future secured
loans, a lender that makes a junior mortgage loan without obtaining an inter-
creditor agreement establishing its expected priority would have no credible
material prejudice argument. Likewise, under this approach, it would be
irrelevant whether a refinance lender knew of an intervening junior lien or
had constructive notice by virtue of the recording of the junior lien. Over the
past three decades, an exceptionally large sum of attorneys' fees has been
spent litigating over the parameters of equitable subrogation in the
refinancing context,267 which we believe was largely wasted. Implementing
this approach would obviate the need for such litigation.
On the surface, this approach has one substantial apparent drawback: it
disrupts the expectation of borrowers-encouraged by thirty-five years of
experience under the Gan Act-that they can obtain junior financing against
home equity in an unfettered market competition. By contrast, under this
Article 9-informed approach, a mortgagor seeking to tap its home equity is
to some extent "locked-in" to dealing with the existing senior mortgagee,
which would have an implicit first refusal right to make further secured loans
against the home while the senior mortgage remains of record. One might
object that this approach could prevent the borrower from obtaining a home-
equity loan altogether (if the senior mortgagee unreasonably refuses an
additional loan) or could force the borrower to accept such financing at a
higher rate. It could also subject them to other more onerous terms than the
borrower could receive from competing lenders. In fact, this very concern-
protecting the mortgagor's access to credit--explains much of the present
substance of mortgage law regarding future advance priority.2 6
At first blush, this concern would appear overstated. As Professors
Levitin and Wachter have previously argued, the senior lender "does not in
fact have an absolute bilateral monopoly" over the borrower's access to
credit.26 Consider the example of Borrower, who owns a home worth
$500,000 and subject to a first-priority mortgage held by First Bank securing
an outstanding balance of $250,000. Borrower wants to obtain an additional
existence of "material prejudice" could remain relevant
2 See generally, John C. Murray, Equitable Subrogation: Can a Refinancing Mortgagee Establish
Priority overIntervening Liens?, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. U. 249 (2010) (discussion of unpredictability
of equitable subrogation).
2" See, e.g., NELsoN, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 12:7, at 1096
(common law's optional vs. obligatory standard meant to protect "marketability of the mortgagor's title,
so that she can borrow from other lenders"); see supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
2 Levitin & Wachter, supra note 43, at 1289.
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$50,000 loan to pay college tuition bills for Borrower's child. Second Bank
would be willing to extend this credit at a competitive rate, but First Bank
simply refuses to consent or to agree to subordinate to Second Bank with
respect to any future advances to Borrower. This refusal does not mean that
Borrower will be denied access to its home equity. If prudent underwriting
justifies Second Bank's willingness to make Borrower a $50,000 home
equity loan, it would also justify Second Bank in making a $300,000 loan
that would be a first priority mortgage once Second Bank takes out First
Bank's senior position and either compels the cancellation of First Bank's
mortgage or an assignment of that mortgage to Second Bank.27 0 And knowing
that Second Bank would happily make that loan, First Bank is less likely to
act in a way that will exploit Borrower. Thus, the ready availability of
refinancing ameliorates any risk that a creditworthy borrower could not
obtain financing otherwise justified by the value of the borrower's home.
Concededly, this scenario does not work as well if market interest rates
have risen significantly since the original mortgage loan. A refinancing of the
balance due on the original (plus the additional "cash out" needed by the
borrower) would likely be at the higher current rate, and the borrower might
be quite unwilling to give up the benefit of the lower rate on the original loan.
In turn, this might give the original lender considerable additional bargaining
power in setting the terms of an additional advance,2 7' and could result in
higher aggregate interest rates to consumers in refinancing transactions. 272
Further, the availability of refinancing as a complete answer to the
bilateral monopoly problem assumes that the borrower can prepay the senior
mortgage debt at any time. Under existing mortgage law, however, the
default rule is "perfect tender in time"-unless the loan documents permit
prepayment, the mortgagee can refuse prepayment and insist upon payment
in strict accordance with the terms of the documents. 273 As a result, if the
' While such a take-out loan would involve transaction costs, so would any junior mortgage loan.
See id at 1290 ("To be sure, there are transaction costs for refinancing, but they are unlikely to exceed
those for exercising the leverage option, which means borrowing for a separate second mortgage.").
Moreover, the biggest transaction costs are loan origination fees, which would be entirely within the
control of the second lender, and therefore could be minimized to a level comparable to those normally
expected in the making of a free-standing junior mortgage loan.
" For example, suppose that First Bank's existing mortgage bears a rate of 5% and current mortgage
interest rates are at 10%. Borrower clearly would like to maintain the benefit of the 5% rate, but First
Bank-realizing that Borrower cannot "take out" First Bank without refinancing the full balance at 10/-
may refuse to extend additional credit to Borrower unless Borrower agrees to modify the original loan to
increase the interest rate above the now-suboptimal 5% rate.
m If legislators consider this risk to be unacceptable, one solution would be to require the original
lender either to extend second mortgage credit on the same terms offered by a competing lender or to
consent to the borrower obtaining the loan from the competing lender.
2m3 NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 6:1, at 481 ("Contrary to what
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senior loan documents are silent, the senior could refuse to permit its loan to
be taken out, which would complicate the borrower's ability to obtain
refinancing.274
In practice, the perfect tender in time rule has not prevented access to
refinancing because it is a default rule that the parties typically opt out of in
the mortgage contract. In the home mortgage context, the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac uniform notes have provided since 1975 that the borrower
can prepay in whole or in part, at any time, without any prepayment fee.275
The "fee prepayment" clause has contributed to the enormous volume of
refinancing transactions the market has experienced during more than three
decades of generally declining interest rates, and has shaped the expectation
of most homeowners that the law readily permits them to refinance.2 76 As
long as this clause remains in the archetypal home mortgage loan document,
this would sufficiently protect the typical homeowner from being deprived
of access to credit against the value of the home.27 7
In the modem political climate, however, the future of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac are unclear-and in turn, perhaps also the future of the uniform
instrument and its free-prepayment-at-any-time clause.278 To that extent, a
legitimate concern remains and implementing this approach effectively
would not only require state legislation to reject perfect tender in time as.a
default rule,279 but also to establish either a bar on prepayment fees on
residential first mortgages or a statutory limit on the permissible amount of
such a fee.
is probably the pervasive popular belief, in the absence of a specific provision in the note or mortgage so
permitting, there is by the majority view no right to pay off a mortgage debt prior to its maturity.").
m Even if the perfect tender in time rule applies and the senior can thus refuse prepayment, this would
not necessarily preclude a refinancing. The refinancing transaction, however, would have to leave the
existing senior mortgage in place, and thus would have to take the form of a wraparound mortgage. Use
ofa wraparound mortgage for refinancing purposes would certainly complicate the refinancing relative to
conventional refinancing transactions. For a more thorough discussion of wraparound mortgages, see id
§ 9:8.
2' See Forrester, supra note 24, at 1084-85.
27 Id at 1089-90.
m Of course, not all borrowers can satisfy the Fannie or Freddie underwriting requirements, and thus
some end up with nonuniform loan documents that do not allow free prepayment. These loan documents
do, however, customarily allow prepayment for a stated fee.
m See genenally Jeanine Skowronski, Future ofFannie, Freddie Still Unclear, STREET (Aug. 8,2010),
https-/www.thestreetcom/story/2807023/1/future-fannie-freddie-still-unclear.html.
I The Restatement of Mortgages already takes this approach, making the mortgage presumptively
pre-payable without fee unless the mortgage provides otherwise. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
MORTG. § 6.1 (AM. LAw INST. 1997) ("In the absence of an agreement restricting or prohibiting payment
of the mortgage obligation prior to maturity, the mortgagor has a right to make such payment in whole or
in part.").
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The other drawback to this approach is that its comprehensiveness would
make its implementation too ambitious and disruptive. By contrast to Article
9, mortgage law does not exist as a uniform, codified whole, but as a body of
common law rules with a level of statutory overlay that varies by state in its
breadth and depth. For example, the perfect tender in time rule is, in most
states, a common law principle rather than a statutory directive. The future
advance priority rules vary by state as to their source: some states still follow
the judicially-established optional/obligatory distinction, while others have
codified their future advance priority rules but in a non-uniform manner. As
noted above, this approach would require mortgage law to displace both the
perfect tender in time rule and the existing rules on future advance priority.
For lenders in an increasingly national mortgage market to adapt
meaningfully, these changes could not occur via the case-by-case reform
process of the common law; they would have to occur in a largely uniform
statutory codification.
Is this approach practicable? There is room for substantial doubt.
Congress seems unlikely to federalize mortgage law, and as noted earlier,
prior efforts (such as ULSIA) to achieve comprehensive uniform codification
of state mortgage law failed spectacularly. However, ULSIA's failure could
have been a function of its over-comprehensiveness. In particular, ULSIA's
adoption of nonjudicial foreclosure as the standard method of mortgage
enforcement" proved an insuperable political barrier-a lesson reinforced
again when UNFA later achieved no enactments.281 ULSIA tried to do too
much, and could not overcome the resistance of accumulated years of
doctrine and practice-and the expectations those years of doctrine and
practice shaped in borrowers and lenders.2
By contrast, the approach described here would not codify mortgage law
in a comprehensive fashion, a la Article 9. It is actually substantially more
modest. Fixing the junior lien problem does not require that states adopt the
same foreclosure method; judicial-foreclosure-only states could remain
judicial-foreclosure-only states. States could continue to adopt different
approaches with respect to the availability of a deficiency judgment, or
whether the foreclosed borrower should be entitled to "fair value" protection,
280 See UNIF. LAND SEC. INTEREST ACT § 509 (UNIP. LAw COMM'N 1985). See Roger Bernhardt,
ULSIA's Remedies on Default-Worth the Effort?, 24 CONN. L. REv. 1001, 102941 (1992).
281 See supra note 258 and accompanying text.
m One might offer the same critique of ULSIA's predecessors, the Uniform Land Transactions Act
(ULTA) and the Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers Act (USLTA). ULTA and USLTA were
perceived to be too disruptive of existing state conveyancing practices and ultimately not necessary to
facilitate the development of a national mortgage market See, e.g., Marion W. Benfield, Jr., Wasted Days
and Wasted Nights: Why the Land Acts Failed, 20 NOVA L. REv. 1037 (1996).
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or whether an installment contract constitutes a mortgage or is instead
governed by contract law. States could continue to differ in the standards by
which courts should evaluate whether or not to appoint a receiver for
mortgaged property. States could even innovate and attempt to implement
foreclosure sale processes that attempted to shift the foreclosure system from
a public auction-based model to one incorporating characteristics of market
sales.' In fact, this approach would entirely preserve state autonomy with
regard to mortgage enforcement. Instead, it would more narrowly target the
priority rules of mortgage law that contribute to or exacerbate the junior lien
problem. Where the ULC's efforts to achieve statutory reform in real estate
law at the state level have been more narrowly targeted, they have been more
successful.'
Finally, there is substantial reason to believe that lenders can readily
adapt to the changes this approach contemplates. The lending community has
nearly sixty years of accumulated experience with Article 9's first-to-file-or-
perfect rule and its implications for loan underwriting. While this approach
would involve the need for some changes in standard mortgage
documentation, these changes would likely be minor,285 and would not pose
an insurmountable burden if a reform statute provided a suitably delayed
effective date. Likewise, this approach would require no significant changes
to the underwriting or servicing procedures of first mortgage home lenders
or servicers. It would be disruptive of the expectations of second mortgage
lenders, but that is the whole point. The approach does not forbid second
mortgage lending, but places the burden on the second mortgage lender to
obtain contractual protection for its expected priority-again, exactly where
a See, e.g., Burkhart, supra note 177.
m Several ULC real property-related acts narrowly tailored to address particular market failures have
been much more successful. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTITION OF HEIRS' PROP. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010)
(11 enactments); UNIF. REAL PROP. ELEc. RECORDING AcT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2004) (34 enactments);
UNIF. ENVTL. COVENANTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2003) (26 enactments).
m For example, it is common in some states for a mortgage containing a future advance clause to
specify the maximum principal amount that can be secured under the mortgage; in Missouri, for example,
this recital is required by statute. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.055(2) (2018). Under this approach, there
would be no inherent limit on the amount that a mortgage could secure, and thus there would be no need
for such a limit unless the parties themselves agreed to such a limit. But this is a minor tweak, and readily
accomplished. As noted, under this approach, a mortgage would not even have to have a future advance
clause; the recording of the mortgage would establish the lender's priority for both the amount of that
mortgage loan and any future loans by the same lender that are secured by the same land. See supra note
260 and accompanying text However, if the mortgage did have a future advance clause in it, the lender
would not have to have the borrower execute a new mortgage agreement at the time of the subsequent
loan; by contrast, if the original mortgage had no future advance clause, the borrower would have to
execute a new mortgage agreement at the time of the subsequent loan.
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that burden belongs in a priority system ostensibly based on the first-in-time
concept.
The preceding discussion has not addressed the effects of this strong
Article 9-like approach on nonconsensual junior lienholders such as
judgment lien creditors, mechanics' lienors, and some types of tax lien
holders (such as the United States in asserting a federal tax lien). Because
these creditors would not have an opportunity to negotiate inter-creditor
agreements with first mortgagees, one might argue that a system that permits
additional loans by the first mortgagee to "soak up" the borrower's equity
would operate unfairly by diminishing or eliminating the value of their liens.
It is worth noting here that whether these nonconsensual junior liens have
any value at all is largely a matter of luck. For example, consider judgment
liens. At the time a judgment creditor obtains and perfects a lien, the debtor
may or may not have fully encumbered his or her property with mortgages or
other voluntary liens. If the real estate is already fully encumbered or over-
encumbered, the judgment lien is worthless.' Barring an unexpected and
usually improbable increase in the property's value, the judgment is simply
not worth enforcing; an execution sale would have no bidders. The same is
true of mechanics' liens. In most states, mechanics' liens are subordinate to
properly perfected construction loan mortgages.' Hence, if the construction
loan on a project already exceeds its value (a common occurrence with
troubled projects), there is no practical value in an unpaid contractor or
supplier enforcing its lien.
Assume, however, that the property is not fully encumbered. Any
creditor that acquires an involuntary subordinate lien could choose to enforce
that lien by foreclosure immediately; if it chooses not to do so, there is no
inherent unfairness if a later loan to the borrower (which would typically
extend new value to the borrower) increases the balance of the senior debt.288
As a result, we have no particular sympathy for the traditional judgment lien
creditor who chooses to wait rather than enforce its lien immediately. On the
other hand, there may be more sympathetic grounds for an exception that
carves out an intervening priority for a mechanics' lien creditor, whose labor
or materials will have contributed to or preserved the value of the mortgaged
property. And state law, of course, has nothing to say about the priority of an
intervening federal tax lien. Even under this suggested approach, the ability
286 NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART& FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, § 4:2.
7 Id. § 12:4.
Indeed, in the approximately one-third of the states that allow future advances to retain priority up
to the amount stated in the senior mortgage, a judgment lien creditor that acquires a judgment lien but
does not enforce it immediately already runs a comparable risk. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text.
276 [Vol. 57:207
2019] Residential Mortgage Default and the Constraints ofJunior Liens.
of the senior mortgagee to obtain the priority of its original mortgage for
future non-construction-related secured loans vis-A-vis an intervening federal
tax lien would remain limited to advances made without actual knowledge of
the tax lien and within the first forty-five days after the tax lien arises. 28 9
3. Enhancing the Durability of a Mortgage in the Context of Modification
or Refinancing
A more modest reform approach would not treat the mortgage as the
equivalent of an Article 9 financing statement, but would instead enhance its
durability in the event of a modification or refinancing. This approach would
make explicit that a mortgage can remain of record until the mortgage debt
is actually satisfied-i.e., repaid in full by the borrower, rather than through
a refinance.
This approach is best demonstrated by considering the classic refinancing
transaction. Suppose that Debtor owns a home that secures repayment of a
mortgage loan from First Bank with a current balance of $200,000. Debtor
then decides to refinance with Second Bank (which is offering slightly better
terms than First Bank). At the time of the Debtor's application for the
refinancing loan, there is a $100,000 outstanding judgment against Debtor in
favor of Smith. Second Bank nevertheless makes the loan, expecting that it
will have first priority. Second Bank then records its mortgage, and shortly
thereafter the First Bank mortgage is cancelled.
As explained in Part III, the proper result in this circumstance is that
Second Bank's mortgage should receive priority over Smith by virtue of
equitable subrogation to the priority position previously held by First Bank.
On the given facts, there is no credible argument that this result is prejudicial
to Smith or in any way contravenes Smith's reasonable expectations. At the
time Smith obtained the intervening lien, it was in a junior position to First
Bank. Second Bank could have paid First Bank $200,000, taken an
assignment of the First Bank mortgage, and modified the note to conform to
the terms of Second Bank's loan. If that had happened, Smith could not have
prevented the assignment and unquestionably would have remained in the
same junior position?. This demonstrates that by allowing Second Bank to
- 26 U.S.C. § 6323(d) (2018); NELSON, WHITMAN, BURKHART & FREYERMUTH, supra note 25, §
9:9.
2 This assumes, as is usually the case, that Second Bank's loan terms are in fact better for the
borrower than the terms of the old First Bank loan, so that the new loan will be as easy or easier for the
borrower to pay. This fact eliminates any argument an intervening junior lienor might make of material
prejudice from the change of loan terms. Obviously, if Second Bank extends Debtor an additional $50,000
of new credit in this transaction, thereby increasing the principal balance of the debt, Smith would be
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take the existing priority position of First Bank, it does not unduly prejudice
Smith. On the contrary, by promoting Smith in priority, it would enrich Smith
by giving him first dibs at proceeds of sale of the home under circumstances
where Smith had no reasonable assurance of that result when Smith obtained
the judgment. Application of the equitable subrogation doctrine in this
circumstance is efficient and appropriate because it accomplishes this result
without requiring Second Bank to incur the additional transaction costs
associated with an assignment of the mortgage from First Bank and a
subordination agreement from Smith.
Likewise, it should be irrelevant whether Smith's junior lien was of
record or whether Second Bank had actual knowledge of Smith's lien. By
virtue of the refinancing, Second Bank expects to step into First Bank's
position regardless, as it could have done through a direct assignment of the
First Bank mortgage. Some courts have refused to apply equitable
subrogation in this circumstance on the theory that this result is necessary to
preserve the integrity of the state's recording statute, most notably
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. First Nat '1 Bank of Steamboat Springs
(based on Wyoming's race-notice statute)"' and Eastern Savings Bank; FSB
v. CACH LLC (based on Delaware's pure race statute).' But these cases
were wrongly decided, because they fundamentally misunderstood the
purpose of recording statutes as a dispute resolution mechanism. The
recording statute exists to protect the expectations of persons who acquire
their interest in reasonable reliance upon the fact that the information in the
recording system was misleading.2 93 Someone who takes a junior position
(whether voluntarily or involuntarily) behind a recorded mortgage knows or
should know that they have no guarantee or legitimate expectation of first
priority until the senior debt has been satisfied, i.e., paid infidl by the debtor.
Because the later refinancing transaction does not trigger that result, the
junior (in our hypothetical, the judgment creditor Smith) has no compelling
reliance-based story to tell vis-iA-vis the refinancing lender. Further, this is
true regardless of whether the original refinanced mortgage document was
cancelled or not.
The policies that underlie the recording act do become relevant to the
priority of the junior's lien when the junior assigns that position, whether
through sale or foreclosure of the junior lien. Returning to our previous
example, suppose that after the refinancing transaction, Smith obtains an
materially prejudiced if Second Bank was to have its original priority for the newly-extended credit as
well as the original refinanced principal balance. See supra Part Ill.A.I.
a 144 P.3d 1224, 1231 (Wyo. 2006).
m 124 A.3d 585, 592 (Del. 2015).
m 25 DEL. CODE ANN. § 2106 (2018).
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order for an execution sale of the home in satisfaction of Smith's judgment.
At that sale, Henning buys the home, after doing a title search and concluding
that: (1) the First Bank mortgage, having been cancelled, must have been
satisfied; and (2) based on first-in-time, Smith's judgment lien has priority
over Second Bank's mortgage, such that the sale will in fact deliver clear title
to the home. Is Henning a bona fide purchaser (BFP) that takes free of Second
Bank's lien? Or does Henning take subject to that lien on the basis that
Second Bank was subrogated to the priority of the refinanced First Bank
mortgage that was cancelled of record?
Second Bank will argue that equitable subrogation should still apply, and
that a reasonable person in Henning's position was on constructive notice of
this possibility even though the First Bank mortgage had been cancelled of
record. This argument receives strong support from a recent Michigan
decision, Wells Fargo Bank; NA v. SBC IVREO, LLC,2 9 which involved a
dispute between a refinancing mortgagee (Wells Fargo) and the
assignee/purchaser (SBC) of a mortgage loan that had been ajunior mortgage
when originally taken by that lender (Capitol). SBC argued that it was a bona
fide purchaser-based on the recorded cancellation of the original refinanced
mortgage-and thus had priority over Wells Fargo's later-recorded
refinancing mortgage. The court rejected this view:
The bona-fide purchaser argument posed by SBC does not rely on a
previously unrecorded conveyance that allegedly constituted a defect of
which it had no notice.... Instead, SBC appears to be maintaining that it had
no notice of the possibility of an equitable-subrogation claim. Essentially,
SBC is equating an equitable-subrogation interest (a prospective claim of
equitable subrogation) to a "previously unrecorded conveyance," which
equitable-subrogation interest can be defeated if a subsequent mortgagee
acquires a mortgage for a valuable consideration and records it absent notice
of a viable claim for equitable subrogation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the premise of SBC's theory is
sound ... SBC cannot show that it was indeed a bona fide purchaser for
value ... .2
Noting that Michigan courts had embraced the Restatement's view of
equitable subrogation two years prior to SBC's purchase of the Capitol
mortgage, the court held that because the record showed the original
(although cancelled) mortgage and the refinancing mortgage, SBC "should
294 896 N.W.2d 821, 824-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016).
2" Id at 842-43.
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have been aware of an available claim of equitable subrogation" by Wells
Fargo as the refinancing lender. 29 Further, the court suggested that the very
premise of SBC's theory was unsound "considering that the whole purpose
of the doctrine of equitable subrogation is to allow a mortgagee whose
mortgage is the junior lien in the public record to attain senior lien status."2 9
The court's reasoning in Wells Fargo v. SBCIVREO makes perfect sense
in its factual context. As a sophisticated commercial actor engaged in the
purchasing of mortgage loans, SBC can be expected to appreciate the
existence and operation of the equitable subrogation doctrine. Prior to its
purchase, SBC could have (and should have) inquired of Wells Fargo, and
inquiry would have revealed that the later-recorded refinancing mortgage
would have the priority of the prior cancelled mortgage under equitable
subrogation.
The decision may be a bit more unsettling in our hypothetical, where the
person claiming BFP status is not a sophisticated investor but a consumer
homebuyer. On the one hand, it seems less likely that a consumer homebuyer
like Henning would know of the equitable subrogation doctrine or appreciate
its application. Thus, one might expect some judges to be sympathetic to
Henning in a dispute with a lender that could have structured its transaction
differently. On the other hand, as the Michigan court noted, an equitable
subrogation claim does not arise from an unrecorded document, and there are
many circumstances in which purchasers who believe they are BFPs
nonetheless take subject to unknown claims. 298
A modest reform approach would address these issues in two ways. First,
it would explicitly embrace the Restatement's position on the replacement
mortgage doctrine and equitable subrogation for refinancings. Fortunately, in
an increasing number of states, this has happened through judicial adoption
without legislative intervention. In states where it has not, legislation could
codify the Restatement result by providing that when a refinancing occurs
(i.e., where a third-party refinancing lender pays the outstanding balance to
the original mortgagee), an assignment of the original mortgage to the
refinancing mortgagee occurs by operation of law. In the replacement
9 Id at 843.
297 Id at 843 n.24.
2 The recording system does not communicate perfect information and does victimize some
purchasers who might reasonably have thought themselves to be BFPs based on a record search. For
example, Freyermuth might purchase a home because a title search reveals that the only mortgage
appearing in the record chain of title has been satisfied of record; unbeknownst to Freyermuth, however,
the recorded satisfaction piece was a masterful forgery and the mortgage loan remains unsatisfied. The
forgery is void, and Freyermuth takes title to the home subject to the lien of the unpaid mortgage. There
is a reason for prudent buyers to buy title insurancel
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mortgage context (where the lender is taking out its own position), legislation
could codify the Restatement result by making explicit that the mortgagee
has the same priority for the replacement mortgage as it did for the original
mortgage, to the extent of the amount refinanced. 299
Second, the refinancing or replacement mortgagee should be able to
leave the original mortgage of record (i.e., without having to record a
cancellation or satisfaction). This would provide a more effective signal to
potential assignees of an intervening junior that they are stepping into ajunior
position. Ideally, perhaps, either through statutory codification or a change in
documentary practice, the refinancing lender could likewise signal its
intention to invoke the replacement mortgage doctrine or equitable
subrogation (as appropriate) by labeling the new mortgage document as a
"replacement mortgage" or "refinancing mortgage." 30 In some states, this
approach may require a modification of mortgage satisfaction statues, which
in their present form may require the recording of a mortgage satisfaction
even in cases in which the loan is simply being refinanced rather than truly
paid off by the borrower.
4. Summary
We believe that mortgage law can and should address the junior lien
problem through a lens informed by UCC Article 9. This should not take the
form of a comprehensive codification of mortgage law in the style of Article
9, given the failure of similar previous efforts and the political commitment
of more than twenty states to judicial foreclosure as the exclusive foreclosure
method."oi Instead, mortgage law might take one of two less comprehensive
approaches. Under the first approach, a recorded mortgage would be given
the same effect as a filed financing statement under Article 9, such that it
would stake out the mortgagee's priority not only for the contemporaneous
loan, but for any subsequent loans made by the mortgagee that are secured
by the mortgaged property. This approach would still permit junior mortgage
lending, but the junior mortgagee could not enjoy an assured position in the
lien priority stack without obtaining an agreement with the senior mortgagee
' The Commonwealth of Virginia has such a statute, although it is subject to some limits. First, it is
effective only against intervening mortgages not exceeding $50,000 in amount Second, the refinancing
mortgage must contain a clause identifying the recording information for the original mortgage. Third, the
balance on the refinancing mortgage must not exceed the balance paid on the original mortgage by more
than $5,000 and its interest rate must not be higher than that of the original mortgage. See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-58.3 (2018).
M VA. CODE ANN. § 55-58.3 does this, and also requires the inclusion of the recording information
for the mortgage being refinanced.
3" See spra notes 257-59 and accompanying text.
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sufficient to provide that assurance? This approach would also obviate the
need for courts to apply complex existing doctrines (such as future advances
priority and equitable subrogation rules) to resolve senior versus junior
priority disputes. Under the second, more modest approach, mortgage law
could enhance the durability of a mortgage in the context of refinancing or
modification transactions by making it explicit that a mortgage retains its
priority and may remain of record until the mortgage debt is fully satisfied
by the borrower (rather than through a modification or refinancing).303 Even
this more modest approach, in combination with enactment of the MNAFA
as discussed in Part V, would provide a largely complete solution to the
efficiency problems posed by junior mortgage liens.
VII. CONCLUSION
Beginning in 2007, the United States real estate market endured a crisis
more severe than any since the Great Depression ofthe 1930s.3* Today, signs
of recovery are strong; land values in most areas now exceed pre-2007 levels,
and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are returning substantial profits to the
Treasury.0 Yet the crisis has reminded us that land values are not
predestined to move in only one direction; land values remain subject to
economic gravitational forces in the same way that the parcels to which those
values relate are subject to physical gravitational forces. As Isaac Newton is
alleged to have said-and as the band Blood Sweat & Tears definitively
said--"What goes up, must come down."' We may not know when the next
real estate crisis will occur, but it will occur.
During a November 2008 Wall Street Journal forum, former Chicago
Mayor Rahm Emanuel noted, "You never want a serious crisis to go to
waste." 0 The post-2007 real estate crisis exposed how present law permits
junior lienholders to impose unwarranted barriers and costs that obstruct the
efficient resolution of distressed mortgage loans. Now is the time for
mortgage law to fix the junior lien problem prior to the next crisis. In the
' See supra notes 260-64 and accompanying text.
3 See supra notes 282-94 and accompanying text.
1 See Steve Hanke, What Do The Great Depression And The Great Recession Have In Common?,
FORBES (Aug. 16, 2017), https//www.forbes.com/sites/stevehanke/2017/08/16/what-do-the-great-
depression-and-the-great-recession-have-in-common/#3fe2d094375d.
"s See Cicley Wedgeworth, 10 Years After the Crash, the Boom Times Are Back in Real Estate-But
Way Different, REALTOR.COM (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.realtor.com/news/trends/1 0-years-recession-
boom-times-back-real-estate.
30 See BLOOD, SWEAT & TEARS, Spinning Whee4 on BLOOD, SWEAT & TEARS (Columbia 1968).
- A video of Emanuel's comments is available at Wall Street Journal, Rahm Emanuel on the
Opportunities ofCrisis, YouTUBE (Nov. 19, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_mzcbXil'Ik.
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process, mortgage law can and should look to UCC Article 9 where
appropriate for inspiration for the needed fixes. At a minimum, we encourage
the adoption of the Model Negotiated Alternative to Foreclosure Act so as to
permit a deed in lieu of foreclosure to have title-clearing effect and extinguish
valueless junior liens. Further, if federal law is going to continue to prevent
senior mortgagees from exercising due-on-acceleration clauses to discourage
the creation of junior liens, then states should also consider modifying
mortgage law to allow a recorded mortgage to stake out that mortgagee's
priority for subsequent secured loans. This would effectively place on junior
mortgage lenders the burden to obtain an inter-creditor agreement to assure
the junior's expected place in the lien priority stack-exactly where that
burden belongs in a system based upon the first-in-time principle.
Alternatively, states might more modestly enhance the durability of a
mortgage in the context of refinancing or modification by making it explicit
that a refinancing mortgage retains the priority of the original mortgage
(which may thus remain of record) until the refinanced debt is fully satisfied
by payment by the borrower.

